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XIV ABSTRACT 
This  study  seeks  to  make  a  contribution  to  the  field 
of  population  studies  by  throwing  some  light  on  the 
explanation  of  fertility  change  in  developing  countries. 
It  hopes  to  do  this  by  investigating  the  role  of  the  family 
and  its  structure  in  explaining  fertility  attitudes  and 
behaviour  in  Jordan. 
Some  of  the  causes  -  at  the  level  of  intermediate 
variables  -  of  regional  variations  in  fertility  levels  and 
fertility  preferences  in  Jordan  are  examined.  The  study 
tries  to  analyse  several  aspects  of  change  in-the  family 
system  in  Jordan:  social,  economic  kin-relationships  and 
wealth  flow  directions  within  the  family.  Also,  fertility 
attitudes  are  examined  in  relation  to  contrasting  social 
contexts. 
It  is  assumed  that  fertility  decline  will  be  the 
result  of  certain  changes  in  the  family's  internal  and 
external  social  and  economic  structure.  In  order  to  test 
this  assumption  it  is  necessary  to  examine  the  nature  of 
internal  and  external  family  relationships  in  terms  of  the 
following  five  dimensions: 
a)  the  scale  and  character  of  mutual  economic  obligations 
(or  feelings  of  financial  responsibility)  which  exist 
within  the  families  under  study 
b)  the  nature  of  the  family  budget  (to  what  extent  it  is  a 
common  budget  or  one  divided  into  separate  units 
related  to  individual  wage  earners) 
c)  relations  between  the  father  and  his  children  in  terms 
xv of  obedience  and  societal  and  family  norms  (even  when 
the  family  is  geographically  separated  as  a  result  of 
migration 
d)  the  coherence  and  structure  of  the  family  system  (is  it 
a  closed  or  open  nuclear  family  or  does  it  still  have 
elements  of  the  extended  family?  ),  and  women's  roles 
and  status  within  the  family 
e)  wealth  flow  direction  and  its  relation  to  power 
structure  within  the  family. 
Results  suggest-that  changes  in  the  family's  internal 
and  external  social  and  economic  structure  have  a 
significant  influence  on  fertility  attitudes  which,  in 
turn,  tell  that  fertility  decline  is  an  outcome  of  family 
change. 
xv' CHAPTER  1 
The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  discuss  some  of  the 
major  conceptual  and  theoretical  demographic  issues  raised 
in  the  thesis:  demographic  transition  theory,  Caldwell's 
theory  of  fertility  decline,  the  concept  of  the  rationality 
of  fertility  behaviour,  the  concept  of  the  family,  women 
within  the  Islamic  family,  and  fertility  studies  in 
geography. 
All  these  topics  are  inter-related,  and  in  particular 
are  linked  to  the  central  interest  of  this  thesis:  namely 
Caldwell's  propositions  on  fertility  change  (Caldwell, 
1982).  Caldwell's  theory  itself  can,  in  many  respects,  be 
considered  as  an  extension  of  demographic  transition 
theory,  since  he  tried  to  restate  the  conditions  under 
which  a  fertility  transition  would  occur  by  suggesting  some 
new  ideas  about  the  context  and  mechanisms  associated  with 
fertility  decline.  Given  this  relationship,  it  is 
important  to  discuss  demographic  transition  theory  prior  to 
considering  Caldwell's  theory.  These  two  theories  make 
different  suggestions  with  regard  to  the  rationality  of 
fertility  behaviour. 
In  reviewing  the  literature  three  other  key  topics 
are  considered  as  of  relevance  to  this  thesis.  Firstly,  it 
is  necessary  to  set  the  analysis  of  the  changing  structure 
of  the  family  in  Jordan,  in  a  broader  context.  Secondly, 
in  order  to  understand  fertility  attitudes,  it  is  also  very 
important  to  discuss  the  changing  role  of  women  in  Islamic 
1 society.  Finally,  it  is  interesting  to  examine  the 
experience  of  different  countries  and  regions  with  regard 
to  fertility  attitudes  and  behaviour  in  order  to  introduce 
the  spatial  dimension. 
1.1.  THEORETICAL  ISSUES 
1.1.1  The  Search  for  a  "Grand  Theory" 
There  has  been  a  tremendous  amount  of  academic 
research  on  fertility  (levels,  trends,  determinants,  and 
differentials)  (Bongaarts  and  Potter,  1983;  Caldwell,  1982; 
Easterlin,  1983;  Coale,  1986).  Some  researchers  have 
attempted  to  formulate  an  integrated  high  order  theory  of 
demographic  change.  Examples  of  this  kind  of  work  include 
the  theory  of  the  demographic  transition  (Notestein,  1945), 
the  related  theory  of  demographic  response  and  change 
(Davis,  1963)  and  the  theory  of  fertility  decline 
(Caldwell,  1982).  These  kinds  of  theories  attempt  to 
produce  a  comprehensive  framework  for  analysis.  The 
scholars  who  created  these  theories  probably  understood  the 
aim  of  population  analysis  in  particular  and  science  in 
general  as  that  of  explanation,  prediction,  and  control. 
The  widely  recognised  weaknesses  of  early  work  on  the 
demographic  transition,  with  all  the  problems  associated 
with  a  model  implying  a  unilinear  sequence  of  events  for 
all  countries,  resulted  in  a  change  in  the  structure  of 
demographic  thinking  with  regard  to  explanation  and 
prediction.  For  example  Woods  (1982:  9)  has  recently  noted 
that:  "The  interplay  of  factors  which  cause  population 
2 growth  to  occur  and  the  influence  of  that  growth  on  the 
organization  of  society  makes  a  full  understanding  of  the 
demographic  system  unlikely". 
Davis  (1963:  345)  himself  recognised  the  difficulty  of 
achieving  "a  grand  theory"  "The  subject  has  a  frightening 
complexity  -  so  much  so  that  the  temptation  is  great  to 
escape  from  its  intricacies.  One  method  of  escape  is  to 
eschew  any  comprehensive  theory,  simply  describing 
computations  of  working  on  a  single  hypothesis  at  a  time". 
Although  he  personally  did  not  adopt  this  route  (Davis, 
1963:  345),  it  is  one  which  became  popular  in  the  1970s  and 
1980s.  Such  an  approach,  albeit  reductionist,  seems 
preferable  to  adopting  some  convenient  over-simplification, 
such  as  the  assumption  that  population  is  simply  a  matter 
of  two  capacities-  "a  reproductive  urge"  on  the  one  side 
and  a  "means  of  subsistence"  on  the  other  or,  at  the 
opposite  extreme,  adopting  the  view  that  demographic 
behaviour  is  only  a  function  of  a  "traditional  culture"  or 
"value  system".  Writing  more  recently,  Mosher  (1980:  57) 
has  also  explored  the  possibilities  of  achieving  a  general 
theory,  but  considered  the  explanation  of  all  the  diverse 
situations  of  demography  by  one  comprehensive  theory  to  be 
an  excessively  ambitious  goal. 
Increasingly  scholars  have  sought  to  deal  with  only  a 
small  number  of  variables  as  sub-systems  (Woods,  1982:  2), 
and  have  tried  to  produce  more  sophisticated  mathematical 
and  statistical  frameworks  to  explain  short-term  changes 
3 (for  example,  see  Bongaarts  &  Potter,  1983;  Easterlin, 
1978). 
Although  this  new  kind  of  theory  is  valuable,  because 
it  measures  specific  demographic  positions  and  the 
direction  of  population  change,  these  frameworks  do  not 
help  greatly  in  explaining  the  ultimate  nature  and  cause  of 
demographic  change  (Caldwell,  1982:  227;  Cleland  and 
Wilson,  1987:  28,29). 
The  problem  with  these  more  limited  short  term 
analyses  was  one  factor  which  encouraged  the  Australian 
demographer  J.  Caldwell,  to  return  to  the  search  for  a  more 
comprehensive  theory  of  fertility  decline.  Unlike  the  more 
limited  studies  of  Bongaarts  and  Potter  (1983),  Caldwell 
was  concerned  to  investigate  the  ultimate  nature  of 
fertility  change.  As  a  result  he  produced  a  theory 
offering  insights  into  long  term  trends  in  fertility 
(Caldwell,  1976;  1978;  1980;  1982),  which  sought  to  explore 
the  social  and  economic  environment  of  change  rather  than 
being  limited  to  consideration  of  only  the  intermediate 
determinants  of  fertility. 
1.1.2  Changing  Policy  Directions 
At  the  beginning  of  the  fifties  another  change  in  the 
emphasis  of  demographic  research  took  place,  which 
accompanied  the  switch  to  theories  of  short-term  change. 
The  majority  of  researchers,  including  Notestein  and 
Davis,  adopted  a  more  policy-oriented  perspective.  This 
trend  was  most  marked  in  the  experience  of  American 
researchers  (Hodgson,  1983).  However  it  was  a  perspective 
4 that  became  dominant  all  over  the  world.  The  great 
majority  of  demographers  seemed  to  accept  the  view  that 
rapid  rates  of  natural  increase  contributed  to  reducing  the 
growth  rate  of  income  per  head  (Caldwell,  1982:  83).  The 
shift  in  emphasis  towards  policy-orientated  research  was 
far  from  being  strictly  academic  in  nature  (Hodgson,  1983: 
1).  Most  contemporary  researchers  dealing  with  fertility 
from  a  policy  perspective  consider  that  in  relation  to 
economic  development  in  the  less  developed  countries, 
fertility  levels  should  be  lowered  by  using  policy 
interventions  in  order  to  avert  human  suffering  and  to 
improve  the  quality  of  life  of  the  population. 
In  terms  of  population  policies  it  is  interesting  to 
note  how  they  themselves  have  changed  through  time.  The 
first  world  population  conference  which  was  organised  in 
Bucharest  in  1974  emphasised  the  need  for  introducing 
family  planning  programmes  in  order  to  reduce  rates  of 
population  growth.  The  approach  advocated  was  a  very 
direct  one,  with  governments  encouraged  to  set  up  family 
planning  programmes  in  order  to  reduce  fertility  rates. 
By  the  time  of  the  second  world  population  conference,  in 
Mexico  in  1984,  the  emphasis  had  shifted  in  favour  of 
integrating  population  policies  with  other  development 
programmes  (Findlay  and  Findlay,  1987).  Increasingly  rapid 
population  growth  was  viewed  as  a  factor  which  did  not 
encourage  speedy  economic  development  but  which  also  could 
not  be  blamed  for  under-development.  Changes  in  the  socio- 
5 economic  environment  were  by  now  viewed  as  essential  pre- 
requisites  to  fundamental  change  in  the  demographic  regimes 
of  most  developing  countries.  Consequently,  policies  on 
fertility  were  expected  to  operate  indirectly,  and  in 
conjunction  with  other  development  programmes. 
1.1.3  Disciplinary  Perspectives 
There  remain  distinct  contrasts  between  the  different 
disciplinary  approaches  to  populations  studies.  Neo- 
classical  economists  still  analyse  fertility  from  the 
purely  economic  point  of  view,  treating  children  in  the 
same  way  as  other  commodities  (Becker,  1960;  Schultz, 
1973).  Others  have  followed  a  more  inter-disciplinary 
approach.  This  can  be  noticed,  for  example,  in  Easterlin's 
(1983)  work  which  draws  on  a  variety  of  empirical  and 
theoretical  contributions,  both  from  sociological  and 
economic  perspectives.  He.  uses  these  within  a  statistical 
framework  to  undertake  fertility  analysis  (Easterlin,  1983; 
Leibenstein,  1974).  This  analytical  framework  concentrates 
on  choices  which  reflect  the  attitudes  and  norms  of  society 
with  regard  to  fertility  behaviour  (Easterlin,  1978,1980, 
1983). 
The  main  reasons  which  made  some  economists  like 
Leibenstein  and  Easterlin  start  thinking  about  the  social 
dimension  was  the  need  to  account  for  human  decision 
making.  Traditionally,  economists  had  not  given  adequate 
attention  to  the  decision  making  process,  only  emphasising 
the  influence  of  income  and  price  determinants  on  the 
demand  of  children  (Easterlin,  1978:  130). 
6 It  is  also  fair  to  say  that  the  contributions  of 
sociologists,  anthropologists,  and  psychologists,  with 
regard  to  fertility  have  merited  criticism  from  economists. 
Becker  (1976)  considered  that  sociologists,  anthropologists 
and  psychologists  did  not  develop  a  satisfactory  systematic 
framework  for  examining  people's  tastes  on  such  issues  as 
family  size.  This  criticism  may  reflect  the  fact  that  some 
economists  have  assumed  that  tastes  are  a  constant 
variable.  It  is  worth  mentioning  here  that  most  economists 
pay  attention  to  what  people  do  rather  than  what  they  say. 
To  quote  Easterlin  (1986:  522),  "behavioural  positivism, 
has  been  interpreted  as  saying  that  the  test  of  a  model  has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  realism  of  its  assumptions,  but  with 
how  well  it  "explains"  the  data". 
By  reviewing  the  demographic  and  sociological 
literature,  one  can  notice  that  the  rational  economic 
approach  has  been  severely  criticised.  The  mainstream  of 
recent  work  has  adopted  other  perspectives  on  socio- 
demographic  and  socio-economic  issues  rather  than  the 
positivist  views  of  the  neo-classical  economic  approach. 
For  example,  Cleland  and  Wilson  (1987)  who  concentrate  on 
sociological  issues  have  taken  up  an  "ideational  approach" 
in  their  attempt  at  explaining  the  fertility  transition. 
They  note  the  weakness  of  economic  structure  influencing 
fertility  behaviour,  and  suggest  that  instead  cultural  and 
educational  factors  have  been  critical  in  determining  the 
acceptability  of  new  ideas  with  regard  to  family  formation, 
7 family  size  and  birth  control. 
Easterlin  (1986)  considered  that  the  rational 
economic  approach  in  explaining  fertility  behaviour, 
suffers  from  a  problem  of  admissible  evidence  in  relation 
to  its  assumptions.  Similarly,  McCloskey  (1983:  514) 
described  the  way  economists  deal  with  admissible  evidence 
as  "foolish". 
Lesthaeghe  and  Surkyn  (1988)  have  suggested  that 
economists  and  sociologists  should  seek  common  theoretical 
ground  in  their  search  for  an  explanation  of  fertility 
behaviour,  while  Levine  and  Scrimshaw  (1983)  have  argued 
that  the  contributions  of  anthropologists,  and  their  unique 
methods  using  "ethnographic  data",  could  also  be  very 
useful  for  the  scientific  understanding  of  fertility  and 
its  determinants.  They  suggest  that  demographers  need  to 
increase  their  awareness  of  the  anthropological  evidence. 
Although  there  is  a  difficulty  in  knowing  the 
best  way  to  approach  the  set  of  causal  relationships 
which  affect  fertility  from  an  interdisciplinary 
perspective,  such  a  framework  should  become  a  short-range 
goal  for  all  researchers  interested  in  population  issues. 
Without  such  a  framework,  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  major 
progress  being  achieved  in  the  explanation  of  fertility 
trends,  and  current  criticisms  will  remain  unanswered. 
The  strongest  criticism  raised  against  current 
demographic  theory  and  existing  frameworks  remains  the 
failure  to  pinpoint  the  underlying  mechanisms  behind 
demographic  change  (Leete,  1987;  Newell,  1988). 
8 Leibenstein  (1974:  466)  assumed  that  people  of 
different  socio-economic  status  had  different  attitudes  and 
decision  making  processes  with  regard  to  child  bearing.  The 
reasons  for  shifts  in  their  attitudes  is  not  clear.  He 
suggested  that  it  was  likely  to  be  associated  with 
education,  cultural  trends  and  the  type  of  socio-cultural 
background.  He  was  therefore  making  a  first  step  towards 
researching  the  social  dimension.  But  fifteen  years  later 
researchers  have  still  not  managed  to  reconcile  the 
differences  in  explanation  achieved  at  the  micro  and  macro 
levels.  Many  consider  that  changes  in  social  structure  or 
"socialization"  remains  the  best  approach.  Others  consider 
the  best  approach  to  be  through  analysis  of  "social 
control"  which  deals  with  the  imposition  of  values  and 
culture  on  individual  decision  makers. 
In  summary,  adequate  explanation  of  the  fertility 
phenomenon  has  still  not  been  achieved.  There  is  no 
agreement  on  the  level  of  analysis,  the  influence  of 
specific  variables  or  the  appropriate  interdisciplinary 
perspective.  Since  researchers  still  do  not  know  the  exact 
matrix  of  variables  which  sould  be  included  in  their 
analysis,  they  have  not  captured  the  full  complexity  of 
fertility  change. 
1.2.  DEMOGRAPHIC  TRANSITION  THEORY 
The  term  "demographic  transition"  was  first  proposed 
by  Thompson  (1929).  He  divided  this  transition  into  three 
phases.  Later  Blacker  (1947)  claimed  to  distinguish  five 
9 phases,  while  other  writers  have  split  one  of  Thompson's 
phases  to  produce  four  phases.  The  modern  formulation  of 
demographic  transition  theory  is  usually  traced  to.  work  by 
Notestein  (1945).  This  became  established  as  a  high  order 
integrated  theory  of  long-term  change  (Caldwell,  1982: 
117).  This  "theory"  defines  three  `phases  of  demographic 
transition.  The  first  phase  occurs  when  a  modest  rate  of 
population  numbers  are  maintained  through  high  fertility 
and  high  mortality,  with  large  occasional  fluctuations  in 
mortality  rates.  In  the  second  phase  the  rate  of 
population  increase  temporarily  moves  upward  as  mortality 
levels  decline,  but  with  little  adjustment  in  fertility 
levels.  In  the  third  phase,  the  rate  of  population  increase 
once  again  moderates,  declines  or  disappears.  it  is 
characterized  by  stable  low  fertility  and  mortality  levels. 
A  fourth  phase  can  be  added,  where  mortality  is  at  its 
lowest  level  and  fertility  behaviour  fluctuates  at  a  low 
level.  This  phase  is  characterised  by  very  low  levels  of 
population  increase  or  even  decrease.  Notestein's  theory 
attempted  to  link  socio-economic  development  to  changes  in 
the  pattern  of  fertility  and  mortality.  It  implied  the 
assumption  that  mortality  levels  were  partially  affected  by 
living  conditions  and  socio-economic  changes.  These 
caused  the  mortality  rate  to  decline.  This  decline  of 
mortality  increased  the  likelihood  that  the  fertility 
level  would  also  be  reduced.  The  fertility  level  is 
influenced  also  by  the  urban  pattern  of  life.  It  tried  to 
10 explain  culturally,  socially,  and  economically  the 
fertility  and  mortality  levels  at  each  phase  of  economic 
development.  This  attempt  was  initially  seen  as  a 
theoretical  clarification  of  the  nature  of  population 
dynamics.  The  major  relationships  suggested  by 
Notestein's  theory  which  were  generally  considered  as 
inferring  causation  have  been  crudely  formulated  into  a 
model  format  (Figure  1.1)  by  Beaver  (1975).  Another 
formulation  related  to  the  demographic  transition  theory 
was  made  by  Easterlin  (1983)  (Figure  1.2). 
Although  some  causal  models  relating  to  the 
demographic  transition  have  been  put  forward,  as  in  the 
Figures  1.1  and  1.2,  most  commentators  still  feel  that 
demographic  transition  theory  offers  no  clear  causal 
explanations.  Furthermore,  demographic  transition  theory 
cannot  be  easily  tested,  because  it  does  not  offer  simple 
testable  empirical  statements  (Beaver,  1975:  9;  Simmons, 
1985:  31-32;  Hawthorn,  1970:  52;  Richards,  1983:  699; 
Woods,  1986:  24).  Its  critics  considered  it  either  a 
descriptive  model  or  a  tautoligical  framework  by  which 
trends  in  birth  and  death  levels  have  been  summarized 
and  labelled  (Simmons,  1985:  3;  Allman,  1978a:  8). 
Demographic  transition  theory  suffers  from  many 
theoretical,  methodological  and  empirical  problems  (Woods, 
1982:  164-173).  For  example,  there  is  no  list  of  specified 
assumptions,  and  units  of  analysis  are  not  stated  (Beaver, 
1975:  22-23).  This  has  which  affected  the  sufficiency  of 
explanation  and  prediction,  (Newell,  1988;  Chung,  1970; 
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12 Hodgson,  1983;  Leibenstein,  1974;  Caldwell,  1982;  Taeuber, 
1960). 
Problems  of  definition  such  as  what  is  a  "high"  or 
"low"  level,  and  what  is  meant  by  initiation,  course, 
speed,  and  termination,  have  been  raised  (Taeuber,  1960: 
28).  The  experience  of  Japan,  the  first  complete 
transition  outside  the  Western  World  was  not  identical  to 
that  anticipated  by  demographic  transition  theory  (Taeuber, 
1960:  39).  Even  its  generalization  or  its  validity  is  not 
well  founded  in  Western  Europe.  In  England  it  appears  that 
the  demographic  transition  was  not  directly  dependent  upon 
urbanisation  and  industrialization.  According  to 
researchers,  the  transition  theory  over  emphasizes  the 
roles  of  industrialization  and  urbanization  (Woods,  1987: 
285;  Cleland  and  Wilson,  1987:  15-18;  Jones,  1981:  167). 
Mortality  change  is  the  key  factor,  according  to 
Davis'  (1963)  interpretation  of  demographic  transition 
theory,  in  bringing  about  fertility  decline.  The  assumption 
suggested  by  the  theory  is  that  a  fall  in  mortality, 
especially  infant  mortality,  should  stimulate  and  preceed  a 
drop  in  marital  fertility.  European  experience  demonstrated 
that  no  such  straight  forward  link  existed.  The  experience 
of  specific  countries  shows  only  a  weak  correlation  between 
trends  in  infant  mortality  levels  and  trends  in  fertility 
(Cleland  and  Wilson,  1987;  Caldwell,  1982).  Nevertheless, 
it  remains  true  that  there  is  no  country  in  which  fertility 
decline  has  been  recorded  in  'advance  of  mortality  decline. 
It  is  possible  to  agree  with  Hodgson  (1983)  when  he 
13 states  that  if  demographic  transition  theory  lacked 
predictive  capabilities  for  western  countries,  it  is  then 
not  appropriate  to  be  applied  to  developing  countries 
(Hodgson,  1983,19;  Chung  1970,221). 
Despite  the  very  difficult  theoretical  problems  of 
explanation,  prediction  and  generalization  of  the 
demographic  transition,  the  theory's  importance  is  self- 
evident.  Its  weakness  has  encouraged  scholars  to  continue 
to  seek  an  explanation  of  the  empirical  regularities  of 
demographic  change  often  described  as  a  "transition".  For 
example,  Caldwell  (1982),  in  order  to  restate  transition 
theory,  formulated  a  very  important  long-term  theory  to 
explain  fertility  decline.  He  concentrated  on  the  onset  of 
fertility  decline.  This  period  (phase)  of  transition  is 
still  debatable  and  the  conditions  of  this  phase  still  need 
more  work  to  make  it  clear-cut.  Caldwell  explained  the 
conditions  prevailing  at  the  time  of  the  onset  or  shortly 
before  the  onset  of  fertility  decline.  This  will  be 
discussed  in  the  next  section.  Other  examples  of  seeking  a 
solution  based  on  classic  transition  theory  are  the  works 
of  Easterlin  (1983)  and  Beaver  (1975)  who  have  produced 
some  causal  models  related  to  demographic  transition. 
Davis  (1963)  raised  the  larger  question  of  whether 
the  various  phases  of  social  and  economic  modernization 
could  be  deliberately  transposed  and  fore-shortened,  or 
whether  they  need  to  form  a  rigidly  fixed  sequence  of 
necessary  steps.  By  way  of  answering  this  question,  Davis 
14 formulated  a  new  theory:  the  theory  of  demographic  response 
and  change.  Perhaps  the  main  assumption  of  this  theory  is 
that  demographic  response  is  occurring  under  the  increasing 
pressures  of  socio-economic  circumstances  (Davis,  -1963; 
Woods,  1982;  Mosher,  1980).  Davis  (1963:  352)  said  "My  own 
view  is  that  no  society  has  been  geared  to  a  sustained  high 
rate  of  natural  increase  except  by  conquest.  Under  a 
prolonged  drop  in  mortality  with  industrialization,  people 
in  northwest  Europe  and  Japan  found  that  their  accustomed 
demographic  behaviour  was  handicapping  them  in  their  effort 
to  take  advantage  of  the  opportunities  being  provided  by 
the  emerging  economy.  They  accordingly  began  changing 
their  behaviour.  Thus  it  was  in  a  sense  rising  prosperity 
itself,  viewed  from  the  standpoint  of  the  individual's 
drive  to  get  a  head  and  appear  respectable,  that  forced  a 
modification  of  his  reproductive  behaviour".  The  stimulus 
that  caused  the  massive  responses  in  Europe  and  Japan  was 
the  decline  in  mortality.  Over  a  brief  period  many 
different  types  of  responses  -  postponed  marriage,  adoption 
of  contraception,  the  introduction  of  sterilization  and 
abortion  may  be  taken  by  people  in  relation  to  fertility 
(Davis,  1963:  349).  It  is  likely  that  the  specific  culture 
of  a  society  will  determine  which  response  or  responses  are 
taken.  Davis'  theory  of  response  and  change  attempted  to 
explain  the  nature  of  the  transition  in  phases  2,3  and  4, 
but  it  avoided  dealing  with  phase  1.  This  was  perhaps 
inevitable  because  it's  starting  point  was  a  mechanism 
explaining  the  onset  of  demographic  change. 
15 Easterlin  (1983)  found  that  demographic  transition 
theory  as  outlined  both  by  Notestein  and  Davis  did  not 
focus  adequately  on  the  links  between  fertility  decline  and 
the  process  of  modernization  in  different  societies  - 
(Easterlin,  1983:  565).  He  suggested  an  analytical 
framework  which  he  claimed  would  be  applicable  to  a  wide 
variety  of  historical  situations  and  which  could  help  in 
the  study  of  ongoing  trends,  fluctuations,  and 
differentials  in  fertility  (Easterlin,  1978:  120). 
In  terms  of  some  intermediate  variables  (marriage, 
contraceptive  use  and  breastfeeding,  etc.  )  some  researchers 
have  found  in  Europe  that  change  in  marriage  patterns  has 
been  responsible  for  changes  in  overall  fertility  at  the 
onset  of  decline.  In  most  of  Europe  marital  fertility 
started  to  decline  in  a  substantial  fashion  between  the 
second  half  of  the  nineteenth  and  the  first  half  of  the 
twentieth  century  (Coale,  1986;  Coale  and  Treadway,  1986; 
Jones,  1981;  Caldwell,  1982).  The  variant  role  of 
intermediate  fertility  variables,  during  the  different 
stages  of  the  fertility  transition,  has  been  the  focus  of 
scholars'  attention.  It  is  not  surprising,  given  the  higher 
level  of  statistical  explanation  achieved,  to  find  that 
some  researchers  give  the  intermediate  variables  more 
attention  than  ultimate  causal  forces  in  their  search  for 
explanations  of  fertility  change.  Consider  for  example 
Bongaarts  and  Potter  (1983),  who  have  developed  a 
mathematical  framework  to  study  the  so-called  "proximate" 
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determinants  relate  to  the  fertility  transition  is  a  topic 
which  will  be  discussed  in  greater  detail  in  chapter  4. 
It  can  be  concluded  from  the  above  discussion  that 
demographic  transition  theory  has  been  one  of  the  most 
dominant  theories  in  terms  of  fertility  research.  Although 
it  has  some  weaknesses,  its  propositions  have  provided  the 
base  from  which  other  models  and  studies  have  set  out.  It 
is  interesting  in  this  respect  to  quote  Coale's  (1979:  23), 
conclusion  concerning  the  nature  of  the  demographic 
transition  in  different  regions  of  the  world:  "In  spite  of 
the  unifying  concept  that  the  demographic  transition 
promised,  it  becomes  more  complex  -  and  more  interesting  - 
the  more  it  is  studied". 
1.3.  THEORY  OF  FERTILITY  DECLINE 
1.3.1  Basic  Propositions 
By  reviewing  the  sociological,  economic  and 
demographic  literature  Caldwell  derived  his  theory,  known 
as  the  "Theory  of  Fertility  Decline".  His  theory  is  really 
a  body  of  related  observations  and  explanations,  rather 
than  a  theory  in  the  stricter  mathematical  or  scientific 
sense  of  the  word. 
Caldwell's  theory  is  comprehensive  in  its  scope.  He 
adopts  a  deductive  approach  to  connect  a  set  of  empirical 
results  on  topics  such  as  familial  modes  of  production,  the 
traditional  extended  family,  and  aspects  of  economic  and 
demographic  transitions. 
17 Caldwell  (1982:  115-116)  said  there  are  in  essence 
only  two  types  of  fertility  regime:  one  in  which  there  is 
no  economic  gain  to  individuals  from  restricting  fertility 
and  another  in  which  there  is  often  or  eventually  some 
economic  gain  from  placing  a  restriction  on  fertility.  To 
quote  Caldwell  (1982:  141):  "  There  is  then  a  great  divide, 
a  point  where  the  compass  hesitatingly  swings  around  1800, 
separating  the  earlier  situation  in  which  the  net  flow  of 
wealth  is  toward  parents  and  in  which  hence  high  fertility 
is  rational  and  the  later  situation  in  which  the  flow  is 
toward  children  and  in  which  hence  no  fertility  is 
rational".  The  importance  of  Caldwell's  theory  is  that  it 
is  the  only  recent  comprehensive  theory  which  attempts  to 
concentrate  on  fertility  behaviour,  before  and,  at  the 
onset  of  decline.  Its  objective  is  to  understand  the 
conditions  of  stable  high  fertility,  and  the  nature  of 
destabilisation  at  this  early  stage  (Caldwell,  1982). 
His  theory  attempts  to  link  family  functions  and 
fertility,  in  order  to  explain  the  conditions  of  fertility 
transition,  especially  at  the  onset  of  fertility  decline. 
He  considers  the  fertility  transition  as  a  product  of 
social  rather  than  economic  change  (Caldwell,  1982).  To 
quote  him:  "What  is  clear  is  that  there  is  no  economic 
behaviour  distinct  from  social  ends.  Rational  economic 
behaviour  exists  only  in  terms  of  the  structure  of  the 
society"  (Caldwell,  1982:  111).  According  to  Caldwell  the 
function  and  structure  of  the  family  are  affected  by  social 
change.  His  theory  identifies  the  main  issue  in  the 
18 fertility  transition  as  the  direction  of  wealth  flows.  This 
flow  in  primitive  and  traditional  societies  has  been  from 
the  younger  to  the  older  generations.  The  direction.  of  this 
flow  may  start  to  reverse  in  "transitional"  society  ,  as 
the  family  begins  to  become  nucleated.  This  nucleation 
will  firstly  be  emotional  (in  the  sense  of  attitudes, 
values  and  sentiments)  and  then  economic.  This  means  that 
in  the  nuclear  family  the  parents  of  the  family  are  wholly 
in  charge  of  their  own  family  economy  including  the 
expenditure  from  any  earnings  of  their  offspring  (Caldwell, 
1982:  143). 
The  theory  attempts  to  establish  a  better 
understanding  of  the  origins  and  processes  of  fertility 
decline  by  placing  emphasis  on  explanation  at  the  level  of 
the  family.  This  is  done  by  concentrating  on  the  changes 
in  attitudes  and  values  as  well  as  in  economic  and  social 
behaviour  within  the  family  (Caldwell,  1982). 
1.3.2  Philosophy  and  background 
It  is  clear  that  Caldwell's  theory  is  not  unrelated 
to  Marxist  philosophy,  in  as  far  as  social  changes  respond 
to  changes  in  the  economic  sphere.  In  Marxism  this  is 
expressed  by  a  change  in  the  superstructure  being  caused  by 
a  change  in  the  infrastructure. 
Caldwell  (1982:  168)  notes  that:  "A  key  question  in 
times  of  social  change  is  how  stability  is  maintained  in 
productive  relations  (and  in  reproductive  relations). 
Certainly,  old  men  claim  traditional  knowledge  and  the 
19 traditional  hallowing  of  their  power  over  family  members, 
and  they  claim  to  be  either  the  owners  or  the  stewards  of 
ancestral  family  property,  similarly,  with  regard  to  male 
domination  over  females,  claims  to  ownership  of  land  and 
residence  and  to  control  over  the  means  of  production  are 
important".  However,  it  should  be  noticed  that  the 
productive  relations  that  Caldwell  refers  *-o  are  not 
between  employer  and  employee  (  as  in  classic  Marxism), 
but  are  between  the  owner  of  the  means  of  production 
inside  the  family  and  the  other  members  of  the  family. 
"Power  in  economic  decision-making  usually  means  power  in 
demographic  decision-making"  (Caldwell,  1982:  161). 
Going  one  step  further,  Caldwell  raises  the  issue  of 
the  relationship  between  economic  power  and  demographic 
behaviour.  With  regards  to  the  demographic  decisions  of 
the  head  of  household  he  states:  "Perhaps  the  most 
important  question  is  why  these  decisions  are  obeyed. 
Certainly  the  economic  power  of  the  patriarch  is  important" 
(Caldwell,  1982:  172). 
Smith  (1981:  611)  in  developing  Caldwell's  argument 
notes  that  uncontrolled  fertility  is  a  key  aspect  of  the 
"cultural  superstructure"  that  maintains  the  relations  of 
production.  This  is  not  to  claim  that  gender  relations  are 
knowingly  and  overtly  structured-to  this  end,  but  it  is  to 
imply  that  relations  are  implicitly  structured  in  this  way. 
These  arguments  may  offer  a  possible  answer  to  the 
question  raised  by  Cain  (1982:  165),  "If  the  services  and 
privileges  that  older  males  enjoy  as  a  result  of  their 
20 control  over  women  and  children  are  excessively  costly, 
then  why  should  they  not  be  motivated  to  limit  their 
fertility?  ".  The  answer  would  seem  to  be  that  the 
superstructure's  "social  ends"  do  not  change  as  fast  as 
those  of  the  infrastructure.  To  refer  once  again  to  Smith 
(1981:  616):  "This  absence  of  family  limitation  under 
circumstances  in  which  wage  labor  was  so  pervasive  and  in 
which  wealth  flows  were  in  no  sense  upward  from  younger  to 
older  generations  raises  certain  doubts  about  the 
applicability  of  Caldwell's  attempts  to  construct  a  general 
theory  for  the  preconditions  fertility  decline".  It  is, 
therefore,  important  to  say  that  several  of  Caldwell's 
propositions  can  be  subjected  to  question. 
The  importance  given  to  wealth  flow  makes  measurement 
and  definition  of  this  comprehensive  variable  particularly 
critical.  It  is  unfortunate  that  this  key  variable  in  the 
theory  is  composite  and  complex  rather  than  one  that  can  be 
easily  researched.  Caldwell's  theory  does  not  mention  how 
to  measure  such  a  variable  nor  indeed  how  to  study  its 
direction. 
Caldwell's  theory  stresses  that  the  emotional  nuclear 
family  precedes  the  occurrence  of  the  economic  nuclear 
family.  In  this  respect  there  therefore  seems  to  be  a 
philosophical  contradiction.  Since  his  assumptions  state 
that  product  relations  affect  the  social  ends,  one  might 
expect  the  economic  nuclear  family  to  appear  first. 
Finally,  it  should  be  said  that  product  relations  or 
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determinant  of  culture  (superstructure).  Religion  for 
example  has  an  influence  on  culture.  Caldwell  himself 
makes  statements  which  contradict  his  own  argument,  when  he 
shows  that  education  -  which  is  largely  independent  from 
the  mode  of  production  and  mostly  dominated  by  western 
values  -  significantly  affects  the  culture  of  third  world 
countries. 
1.4.  RATIONALITY  OF  FERTILITY  BEHAVIOUR 
The  classical  view  of  the  demographic  transition 
associates  increased  rationality  of  fertility  behaviour 
with  advancing  urbanism  during  the  second  and  third  stages 
of  the  transition  (Woods,  1982;  Caldwell,  1982).  High 
fertility  under  conditions  of  growing  urbanisation  and 
industrialisation  was  considered  by  Davis  (1963:  352)  as 
irrational  behaviour. 
By  contrast,  Caldwell's  theory  suggests  that  all 
societies  are  economically  rational  in  spite  of  the  fact 
that  fertility  in  primitive  societies  is  high.  In  other 
words,  from  his  perspective  either  society  was 
characterised  by  economically  restricted  fertility  or  by 
economically  unrestricted  behaviour.  However,  fertility 
behaviour  is  always  viewed  as  economically  rational  at  a 
macro-scale.  The  outworkings  of  this  rationality  is 
essentially  the  product  of  social  rather  than  economic 
forces  (Caldwell,  1982:  116).  Caldwell's  theory  suggests 
that  the  rationality  of  decision  making  dominantly  reflects 
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within  a  society  in  which  extended  families  are  the  norm  or 
the  dominant  person  in  a  household  in  a  society  made  up 
mainly  of  nuclear  families.  This  assumption  is  the  same  as 
the  traditional  economic  assumption  related  to  the  intra- 
family  allocation  of  responsibilities  which  assumed  a 
parental  control  model  of  the  household  (Parsons,  1984: 
41). 
Caldwell's  theory  considers  achieved  fertility  in 
each  society  as  coming  close  to  a  rational  response  to  the 
circumstances  governing  wealth  flows  in  that  society.  His 
theory  points  to  a  fundamental  dichotomy  between  those 
societies  "in  which  it  is  economically  rational  for 
fertility  to  be  even  lower,  but  in  which  a  floor  is 
interposed  by  non-economic  considerations",  and  those  in 
which  "it  is  rational  for  it  to  be  even  higher"  (Caldwell, 
1982:  127). 
Research  on  fertility  in  some  African  countries  has 
specifically  examined  the  rationality  of  high  fertility. 
The  results  of  these  studies  suggested  that  in  specific 
contexts  high  fertility  may  indeed  be  a  rational  form  of 
behaviour  (Adepoju,  1977;  Mendonsa,  1977).  It  was  found, 
for  example,  that  high  fertility  amongst  the  Yoruba  was  not 
incompatible  with  the  tribe's  socio-economic  structure 
(Adepoju,  1977). 
One  other  interesting  point  should  be  stressed:  It 
is  that  Caldwell  concentrated  on  the  economic  rationality 
of  high  fertility  regimes.  This  concentration  can  be 
23 understood  by  considering  Caldwell's  philosophical 
assumption.  Culture  is  viewed  as  one  outcome  of  the 
relations  of  production.  Other  social  commentators, 
however,  view  forces  such  as  religion  as  independent 
influences  (or  at  least  interdependent  ones)  on  culture, 
especially  in  the  Third  World.  This  introduces  the 
possibility  of  a  range  of  other  factors  determining 
fertility  behaviour. 
Finally,  it  should  be  noted  that  rationality  is  not 
an  easy  term  to  evaluate  in  terms  of  fertility  behaviour. 
For  example,  measurement  problems  still  surround  many 
aspects  of  research  on  decision  making  (Hollerbach,  1983; 
Fawcett,  1983),  while  some  social  scientists  have  advocated 
the  use  of  the  terms  "bounded  rationality",  recognising  the 
difficulty  of,  ever  determining  in  an  objective  fashion  the 
nature  of  "complete"  rationality. 
1.5.  THE  FAMILY  AS  A  CONCEPT 
As  noted  earlier  social  science  theory  has  focussed 
on  the  one  hand  at  the  micro  level  of  individual  decision 
makers  and  on  the  other  at  the  macro  scale  of  social  units 
such  as  the  tribe,  ethnic  group  or  societal  unit. 
Intermediate  in  scale  is  the  family.  This  is  a  social  and 
biological  grouping  which  has  achieved  remarkably  little 
attention,  yet  it  is  of  concern  to  demographers, 
sociologists  and  economists.  Attempts  to  force  micro  and 
macro  level  models  to  advance  analysis  of  the  family  have 
been  rather  unsuccessful.  The  micro-economic  approach  has 
24 taken  households  as  individual  decision  making  units  and 
has  tried  to  relate  them  to  decision  making  models.  These 
failings  of  the  micro-economic  perspective  on  fertility 
behavior  has  highlighted  the  need  for  a  better 
understanding  of  the  importance  of  family  structure.  Ben- 
Porath  (1980),  Burch  (1983)  and  Kelley  (1980)  have 
developed  several  empirical  models  to  study  the  effect  of 
varying  family  sizes  and  structures  on  savings  and  income. 
They  have  also  examined  the  effect  of  selected  economic 
influences  on  decisions  about  family  size. 
The  family  as  a  demographic  topic  of  study  has  become 
a  controversial  subject.  Some  demographers  like  Caldwell 
(1982)  and  Ryder  (1983)  have  studied  family  transformation, 
both  structurally  and  functionally,  in  order  to  analyse 
fertility  change.  By  contrast  Burch  (1983)  has  claimed 
that  the  determinants  of  fertility  in  less  developed 
nations  cannot  be  examined  at  the  familial  level. 
Analagous  to  arguments  about  the  intermediate  determinants 
of  fertility,  he  claimed  ultimate  explanations  could  not  be 
found  at  the  level  of  the  family.  He  considered  that  the 
family  institution  was  shaped  by  ecological,  economic, 
demographic,  and  socio-cultural  factors.  Smith  (1981)  too 
has  ignored  the  effects  of  family  structure  and  kinship 
networks  and  has  sought  explanation  in  terms  of  the  broader 
cultural  context. 
CaldwellIs  theory  is  unlike  most  others  in  that  it 
does  consider  changes  in  the  family  as  being  of  causal 
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This  occurs  because  of  Caldwell's  concern  with  the  mode 
of  production.  From  Caldwell's  perspective  the  mode  of 
production  may  be  split  into  two  cases:  the  familial  and 
non-familial  modes  of  production.  In  pre-capitalist 
society  the  familial  mode  is  of  course  of  greatest 
significance.  Generally  in  this  society  networks  of 
relatives  affect  the  fertility  decision  .  The  children  are 
considered  to  belong  primarily  to  the  group  rather  than  to 
individual  parents.  Usually  net  inter-generational  wealth 
flows  occur  from  younger  to  older  generations.  Secondly 
Caldwell  examines  the  non-familial  mode  of  production  which 
operates  in  capitalist  society.  *  Here  the  nuclear  family 
is  dominant  and  decisions  on  fertility,  are  taken  almost 
exclusively  by  the  parents  (Caldwell,  1978).  Most 
developing  countries  experience  both  of  these  two  modes  of 
production,  but  to  varying  degrees.  In  general  the 
transformation  from  familial  to  capitalist  production  is  a 
gradual  process  rather  than  a  sudden  change,  and  the  two 
modes  may  exist  in  parallel  for  long  periods  (Caldwell, 
1978:  555). 
While  most  researchers  have  tried  to  link  fertility 
and  family  structure,  Caldwell's  theory,  in  contrast, 
concentrates  on  fertility  as  a  function  of  kin  networks, 
and  economic  exchanges  (Burch,  1983:  554).  Transformation 
of  family  relations  and  the  appearance  of  the  nuclear 
family  in  the  West  prior  to  industrialization,  meant  that 
there  was  no  necessary  connection  between  the  emergence  of 
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association  between  them  was  a  matter  of  historical 
accident  (Thadani,  1978:  464).  Thus  the  context  of  family 
change  in  the  West  become  mostly  a  matter  of  ideology. 
These  ideological  influences  were  indigenous  in  the  West 
while  in  the  developing  countries  they  were  exogenous 
(Caldwell,  1982;  Thadani,  1978;  Goode,  1963). 
Caldwell's  theory  minimizes  the  role  of  social 
and  structural  elements,  in  terms  of  the  pre-conditions  for 
the  emergence  of  emotional  and  economic  nucleation.  He  has 
been  accused  of  exaggerating  the  role  of  changes  in 
attitudes  and  sentiment  (Dow  and  Werner,  1983:  79),  and  as 
a  result  of  placing  his  theory  very  close  to  the  approach 
of  those  sociologists  who  analyze  the  family  at  the  macro 
level  (Stone,  1977,  Ryder,  1983).  In  particular  his 
conceptualization  of  the  process  of  the  fertility 
transition  has  more  to  do  with  the  transformation  of  the 
family  than  with  the  economic  cost  and  benefits  of  children 
to  parents  (Cain,  1982:  159). 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  Caldwell's  theory  is 
affected  by  what  happened  to  the  family  in  Europe  before 
industrialization.  As  noted  above  cultural  conditions 
affected  family  form  before  industrialization  took  hold  in 
the  West.  There  is  as  a  result  no  agreement  on  the  relative 
importance  of  these  cultural  factors  in  bringing  about 
economic  and  demographic  change. 
Thadani  (1978:  488)  has  discussed  the  idea  that 
27 emotional  nucleation  may  follow  economic  nucleation  rather 
than  the  reverse  sequence  as  suggested  by  Caldwell. 
Thadani's  position  would  seem  to  be  supported  by  the 
Marxist  point  of  view,  which  provides  a  sound  logic  for 
the  sequence  of  events  with  regard  to  family  nucleation 
being  the  inverse  of  that  proposed  by  Caldwell. 
Given  this  possible  inconsistency  in  Caldwell's 
theory  it  therefore  becomes  pertinent  to  pay  greater 
attention  to  other  research  on  the  family.  While 
demographers  have  traditionally  concentrated  on  family 
structure,  it  is  noticeable  that  sociologists  have,  for 
example,  researched  other  aspects  of  the  family  such  as 
women's  status,  conjugal  relations  and  kin-network 
relations.  Goode  (1963)  has  hypothesised  that  family. 
patterns  all  over  the  world  are  moving  towards  the  so- 
called  "ideal"  typical,  western  model  of  the  conjugal 
family.  This  hypothesis  of  global  convergence  could 
underline  the  importance  of  spatial  analysis  of  family 
change,  in  order  to  derive  other  ideas  about  the  nature  of 
social  and  geographic  change.  This  might  lead  to  a  greater 
understanding  of  mechanisms  of  change  operating  within  the 
family  with  all  the  potential  that  this  holds  for 
explaining  variations  in  demographic  patterns  and  most 
notably  in  fertility  in  different  parts  of  the  world. 
Where  research  of  this  kind  has  been  undertaken  it 
has  produced  interesting  and  potentially  fruitful  results. 
For  example,  consider  the  work  of  Khatri  (1977)  on  the 
Hindu  family:  "It  is  hypotheized  here  that  the  nature  and 
28 direction  of  social  change  in  the  Hindu  family  during  the 
last  hundred  years  or  so  have  been  influenced  considerably 
by  contact  with  the  British  culture,  specifically  exposure 
to  British  education,  their  family  organization  their 
ideology  of  democracy,  liberty,  and  equality"  (Khatri, 
1977:  69).  In  the  Arab  world  "Islam  remains  the  basis  and 
dynamic  force  of  the  Arab  family"  (Salman,  1987:  7).  These 
two  examples  raise  the  importance  of  studying  different 
cultures  in  order  to  enable  scholars  to  understand  more 
fully  the  nature  of  the  social  and  cultural  ideologies 
which  underpin  family  change,  and  which  help  to  explain  the 
nature  of  family  transition  toward  the  conjugal  family. 
1.6  WOMEN  WITHIN  THE  ISLAMIC  FAMILY 
It  is  importa  nt  when  talking  about  the  family  to  also 
talk  specifically  about  the  role  of  women  within  the 
family.  Women's  status  in  the  Arab  world  has  been 
considered  by  anthropologists,  demographers  and 
geographers. 
Anthropologists  seem  to  stress  the  ideological,  or 
cultural  factors  which  affect  the  status  of  women.  They 
have  studied  the  honour  system  in  order  to  understand  the 
status  and  role  of  women  in  the  society  (Myntti,  1978), 
where  the  traditional  values  by  which  honour  is  determined 
are  derived  mainly  from  Islamic  law. 
Some  analysts  have  suggested  that  Arab  women  are 
still  suffering  from  sex  segregation  and  female  seclusion. 
They  go  further  to  suggest  that  Islam  or  Islamic  law  is 
29 responsible  for  their  suffering  (Salman,  1987),  while  other 
analyses  hold  the  contrary  view  and  argue  that  Islamic  law 
allows  a  woman  to  own  property  and  carry  out  business 
transactions  albeit  at  her  husband's  discretion.  There  can 
be  little  doubt,  however,  about  the  general  male  dominance 
of  Arab  society  concerning  matters  such  as  divorce  and  the 
family  (Botman,  1987;  Weeks,  1988).  -It  is  worth  mentioning 
here  when  talking  about  the  role  of  Islam  in  influencing 
women's  status  that  some  Muslims  practice  Islam  as  a  social 
ideology  and  do  not  necessarily  claim  to  understand  the 
spiritual  meaning  associated  with  their  religion.  For 
example,  Mernissi  (1976:  315)  highlights  differences 
between  the  theoretical  and  the  practical  outcomes  of 
Islamic  belief  with  regard  to  matters  such  as  sexual 
inequality.  The  concept  of  such  inequality  is  utterly  alien 
to  traditional  Islamic  law  which  indicates,  for  example, 
that  there  should  be  equal  punishment  for  both  adulterous 
men  and  women.  In  practice  there  is  a  great  inequality  in 
the  application  of  such  laws.  Myntti  (1978)  also 
illustrates  this  with  reference  to  the  legal  rights  of  the 
Muslim  wife.  She  does  tend,  however,  to  emphasise  what 
people  perceive  to  be  the  nature  of  gender  relations  rather 
than  what  is  actually  stated  in  either  Islamic  law,  or  the 
Christian  canons  with  regard  to  women's  roles. 
Women's  status  in  the  Arab  world  appears  to  be 
changing  but  it  is  difficult  to  provide  evidence  to 
consistently  substantiate  this  view  for  all  Arab  countries. 
30 There  seems  to  have  been  some  progress  in  terms  of  a 
substantial  increase  in  the  access  of  women  to  education 
and  employment.  Traditional  patterns  of  sex  segregation 
and  female  seclusion  are  beginning  to  change  (Allman, 
1978b:  xl),  and  there  is  some  evidence  of  increased  joint 
decision  making  by  both  husband  and  wife  concerning 
household  organization  (Myntti,  1978:  287;  Altorki  and 
Cole,  1989). 
Although  traditional  Islamic  Arab  culture  still 
strongly  affects  the  family  (Faour,  1983:  31;  Salman,  1987: 
7),  all  the  findings  of  recent  studies  on  the  Arab  family 
indicate  the  increasing  dominance  of  the  nuclear  family 
form  in  the  cities  of  the  region.  With  this  change,  there 
has  also  been  a  change  of  attitude  and  decision  making 
processes  on  a  wide  range  of  demographic  issues.  The  Arab 
family  as  the  cornerstone  of  the  region's  social 
organization  merits  much  further  research  and  holds  many 
answers  to  intriguing  demographic  questions. 
Many  of  the  traditional  traits  of  the  Arabic  family 
are  diminishing  (Allman,  1978b:  XI)  (e.  g  polygymous 
marriages,  marriage  between  cousins,  etc)  due  to  the 
effects  of  continuous  western  influence  and  the  spread  of 
external  ideologies  involving  greater  individualism  and 
egalitarianism.  These  influences  are  propagated  by  mass 
communications  systems  which  are  supported  by  the  forces 
favouring  so-called  "modernization".  Some  other 
traditional  family  traits  still  persist  strongly,  such  as 
patrilinearity,  family  allegiance  and  the  authority  of 
31 elder  kinsmen.  As  a  result  cultural  factors  in  social 
control  remain  forceful  in  resisting  further  change. 
1.7  FERTILITY  STUDIES  IN  GEOGRAPHY 
Before  drawing  this  chapter  to  a  conclusion,  it  is 
useful  to  comment  finally  on  the  importance  of  the  spatial 
analysis  of  fertility.  Fertility  studies  are  still 
relatively  neglected  by  geographers  by  contrast  with  other 
aspects  of  population  geography  (Coward,  1986:  58;  Jones, 
1981:  90).  Nevertheless  they  are  important  in  developing  an 
understanding  of  the  changes  described  above.  Undoubtedly 
several  reasons  are  behind  this  neglect.  It  may  be  because 
of  the  absence  of  basic  geographical  data  sources, 
especially  in  developing  countries  (Woods,  1979:  152),  but 
this  explanation  is  becoming  progressively  less  convincing 
now  that  this  sort  of  data  are  becoming  increasingly 
available  at  the  national  and  sub-national  level  for  most 
developing  countries.  The  world  fertility  survey,  for 
example,  provides  a  useful  source  for  studying  the  spatial 
pattern  of  fertility  by  giving  a  reliable  data  source,  for 
no  less  than  41  developed  and  developing  countries.  Some 
suggest  that  the  real  reason  for  lack  of  progress  lies  in 
the  absence  of  an  agreed  definition  of  the  content  of 
population  geography  (Woods,  1986:  17;  Schnell  and 
Monmonier,  1983:  7). 
The  awareness  of  the  need  for  a  spatial  analysis  of 
fertility  has  increased  as  the  study  by  other  disciplines 
of  fertility-related  variables  has  progressed.  It  is 
32 necessary  to  explain  why  universal  models  do  not  apply  and 
to  seek  more  accurate  geographical  explanations  of 
variations  in  demographic  structures  between  and  within 
cultural  regions.  Differences  in  fertility  trends  relate 
notably  to  the  historical  development  of  regions  (Pacione, 
1986:  4;  Woods,  1979:  130-164)  but  also  to  their 
contemporary  socio-economic  composition. 
Allman  (1978a:  8)  notes  that:  "A  major  weakness  in 
all  theories  of  fertility  change  is  the  almost  complete 
absence  of  attention  to  the  phenomenon  of  differential 
fertility".  It  can  be  considered  that  the  spatial 
analysis  of  fertility  is  one  instrument  by  which  the 
role  of  general  models  of  fertility  change  could  be 
assessed  (Pacione,  1986:  4)  and  greatly  improved. 
Geographers,  like  other  social  scientists,  have  still  much 
work  to  do,  if  an  adequate  and  robust  theory  of  fertility 
change  is  to  emerge. 
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THE  CONTEXT  OF  POPULATION  CHANGE  IN  JORDAN 
2.1.  THE  GEOGRAPHIC  SETTING 
Jordan  (East  Bank)  was  established  in  1923  under  the 
name  of  Transjordan.  In  1950  the  West  Bank,  which  is  part  of 
'Palestine,  was  annexed  to  Transjordan,  and  the  name  of 
state  became  the  Hashemite  Kingdom  of  Jordan.  This 
annexation  lasted  up  to  1967  when  Isreali  forces  occupied 
the  West  Bank. 
The  East  Bank,  which  is  the  current  Kingdom  of 
Jordan,  has  an  area  of  89200  square  kilometers.  The  Badia 
(semi-desert)  occupies  89  percent  of  this  area  (Department 
of  Statistics,  1983a:  1).  Average  annual  rainfall  ranges 
from  500  mm  in  the  north  -  west,  where  the  most  fertile 
land  is  to  be  found,  to  100  mm  in  the  east  and  south  where 
most  of  the  area  is  arid  desert  (Fisher,  1972:  204). 
Although  Jordan  is  not  rich  in  natural  resources,  it  leads 
the  world  in  producing  phosphate.  It  also  produces  other 
minerals  such  as  potash,  Dead  Sea  brines,  oil  shale,  and 
cement  (Ministry  of  Planning,  1986:  471). 
Jordanian  society  according  to  the  census  of  1961 
consisted  of  three  main  social  groups,  urbanites,  a  settled 
rural  population  and  Bedouins  (nomadic  tent  dwellers).  In 
the  census  of  1979  the  main  social  groups  were  classified 
slightly  differently  ;  urbanites,  settled  rural  population 
and  semi-nomads  (Fisher,  1972:  206;  Ministry  of  Planning, 
1986:  1).  The  majority  of  semi-nomads  inhabit  Badia  which 
34 is  the  eastern  and  southern  parts  of  the  kingdom.  The 
nomads  used  to  move  seasonally  between  grazing  lands  and 
watering  points.  The  Jordanian  government  has,  however, 
introduced  some  projects  to  encourage  them  to  settle 
(Ministry  of  Planning,  1986).  Sedentarization  has  occured 
both  voluntarily  and  as  a  result  of  government  policies. 
Settlement  is  evident  in  permanent  dwellings  among 
scattered  villages  such  as  Wadi-Musa  in  the  south  of 
the  country.  It  is  expected  that  sedentarization  will 
continue  because  the  government's  policy  remains  in  place, 
with  the  1986-1990  plan  containing  some  new  sedentarisation 
projects  (Department  of  Statistics,  1983a:  1;  Samha,  1984: 
92).  Some  nomads  have  left  rural  life  altogether  and  have 
migrated  to  live  in  Jordan's  larger  cities. 
Transition  in  the  character  of  the  nomadic  population 
from  a  mobile  to  a  sedentary  existence,  as  well  as  the  use 
of  several  definitions  of  the  terms  "rural"  and  "urban", 
make  the  enumeration  of  populations  difficult.  Rural 
populations  are  often  defined  using  the  residual  method  of 
specifying  the  urban  and  nomadic  population  and  subtracting 
them  from  the  total  population,  with  the  remainder  being 
"rural".  Since  the  1950's  rural  areas  in  Jordan  have 
witnessed  out-migration  to  urban  areas,  and  especially  to 
the  large  cities  (Samha,  1980).  This  has  eroded  the  role 
and  functions  of  key  rural  units  such  as  the  family  farm, 
and  has  contributed  amongst  other  factors  to  the  need  to 
import  non-Jordanian  labour  (Ministry  of  Planning,  1986: 
35 533). 
Table  2.1  shows  that  the  population  of  Jordan  is 
unevenly  distributed  with  most  people  living  in  the  north- 
western  corner  of  the  country  (Figure  2.1).  This  pattern 
can  be  accounted  for  mainly  by  three  factors.  The  first  is 
the  natural  environment.  Desert  occupies  the  east  and 
south  of  Jordan  where  the  low  and  infrequent  rain  and 
infertility  of  the  soil  make  permanant  settlement  difficult 
except  in  areas  such  as  Azraq  and  Aqaba.  The  second  factor 
is  proximity  to  the  West  Bank.  The  Palestinian  refugee 
influx  of  the  late  1940's  and  late  1960's  overwhelmingly 
affected  the  north  west  of  Jordan  (East  bank).  It  was  in 
these  regions  that  most  refugees  remained  after  the  Arab- 
Israeli  war  of  1967.  The  third  is  that  social  and  economic 
forces  have  focussed  development  mainly  in  the  major  cities 
of  the  north-west.  The  lack  of  adequate  regional  planning 
has  meant  that  many  rural  areas  are  deficient  in  basic 
services  and  has  strengthened  the  existing  urban  bias 
favouring  population  redistribution  towards  the  cities  of 
the  north-west.  Spatial  uneveness  in  the  socio-economic 
characteristics  and  opportunities  offered  by  urban  and 
rural  areas  is  considerable.  The  economic  system'  is  most 
notably  biased  towards  the  two  largest  cities  (in  the  north 
west)  relative  to  the  rest  of  the  country  (Ministry  of 
Planning,  1986:  163;  Faour,  1983:  41).  This  imbalance  has 
encouraged  considerable  rural  to  urban  population 
migration,  as  well  as  inter-regional  flows  towards  the 
north-western  region  of  Jordan. 
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Fig.  2.1:  Population  size  of  urban  settlement  in  Jordan, 
(Adapted  from  Findlay  and  Seccombe,  1986). 
37 Although  the  three  factors  mentioned  above  could 
directly  or  indirectly  have  affected  the  pace  of 
urbanisation  in  the  country,  it  can  be  said  that  rural- 
urban  and  refugee  migration  are  the  main  processes 
responsible  for  the  high  rates  of  growth  of  urban  areas  in 
the  north.  Rural-urban  and  refugee  migration  have  had  a 
far  stronger  effect  on  the  rate  of  urban  growth  than  the 
rate  of  natural  increase.  Despite  this  one  should  not 
ignore  the  fact  that  urban  areas  have  witnessed  sustained 
high  levels  of  fertility  and  a  rapid  decline  of  mortality 
in  the  1970's  and  1980's.  These  processes,  when  taken 
together  have  raised  the  rate  of  natural  increase  (Samha, 
1984:  90).  The  wars  between  Israel  and  surrounding  Arab 
nations,  and  the  related  political  situation  have  caused 
waves  of  Palestinian  refugees  to  enter  Jordan  in  1948  and 
1967.  There  have  been  several  distinct  geographical  as 
well  as  historical  stages  in  these  refugee  movements 
(Rowley,  1984).  Some  of  the  refugees  went  directly  to  the 
main  cities  in  the  north,  other  refugess  farmers  went  first 
to  the  Jordan  valley  in  the  hope  of  finding  agricultural 
work.  Because  of  the  continuation  of  the  war  in  Jordan 
valley  between  1967-1970,  commonly  known  as  the  war  of 
attrition,  the  refugees  also  left  that  area  and  resettled 
in  the  towns  to  the  east  and  especially  in  Amman  (Harris, 
1978). 
During  the  last  three  decades  Jordan  has  experienced 
substantial  social  and  economic  development.  Jordan  has 
sought  to  set  up  a  basic  national  infrastructure.  It  has 
38 established  some  industries,  plus  national  education, 
social  and  health  services.  The  education  system  has 
progressed  considerably  and  its  services  have  been  widely 
distributed  throughout  Jordan.  As  a  result  the  illiteracy 
rate  declined  from  67%  in  1961  to  28%  in  1985  (Ministry  of 
Planning,  1986). 
Industry  in  Jordan  has  also  grown  significantly 
(Ministry  of  Planning,  1986;  Khamees,  1987).  Although 
there  are  few  large  industries  such  as  phosphates,  potash, 
cement,  and  petroleum  refining,  industry  is  still 
characterised  by  a  prevalence  of  small-scale  and  medium- 
sized  industries  such  as  is  found  in  food  products, 
textiles  and  clothing,  and  building  materials.  Several 
problems  face  the  further  development  of  industry  in 
Jordan;  for  example,  the  small  size  of  the  domestic  market 
(Bader,  1987;  Ministry  of  Planning,  1986).  Recently, 
especially  in  the  1980's,  industry  in  Jordan  has  been  hard 
hit  by  shortages  of  foreign  exchange.  This  has  been  a 
particularly  acute  problem  for  those  industries  which 
depend  on  imported  raw  materials. 
Since  1948  the  structure  of  the  labour  market  has 
substantially  shifted  from  agriculture  towards  services. 
The  percentage  of  manpower  in  the  agricultural  sector  was 
33.5%  in  1961,11.5%  in  1979,  and  only  7.8%  in  1985.  In 
the  service  sector  it  was  34.2%  in  1961,46.7%  in  1979,  and 
46.7%  in  1985  (Ministry  of  Planning,  1986).  Considerable 
expansion  of  the  service  sector  has  permitted  an  increasing 
39 participation  of  women  in  the  labour  force,  from  3.1%  in 
1961,  to  7.7%  in  the  1979,  and  to  about  12.5%  in  1985.  * 
Some  of  the  basic  traits  of  the  traditional  Jordan 
household  have  begun  to  change.  The  influence  of  the  tribe 
on  household  structure  has  progressively  weakened  over  the 
last  three  decades.  Fewer  marriages  are  arranged  by 
families  between  cousins,  and  there  has  been  a  strong 
tendency  for  the  nuclear  family  to  replace  the  extended 
system.  These  changes  in  family  pattern  have  been 
encouraged  by  a  continuous  western  influence  and  the 
spread  of  an  ideology  of  individualism  and 
egalitarianism,  propagated  by  the  mass  media.  Neverthless 
family  loyality  remains  relatively  strong  and  should  not  be 
ignored  in  evaluating  how  the  individual  relates  to  society 
(Faour,  1983:  31,32). 
2.2  THE  DEMOGRAPHIC  SETTING 
2.2.1  Population  growth 
The  population  of  Jordan  (East  Bank)  numbered  680,000 
in  1952**,  900,800  in  1961.  It  rose  to  2.13  million  in 
1979,  and  2.67  million  in  1985.  Most  of  the  population  of 
Jordan  lives  in  just  two  cities,  Amman  (capital)  and  Zarka, 
which  in  1961  accounted  for  48.2%  of  population,  rising  to 
54.9%  and  57%  in  1979  and  1985  respectively  (Table  2.4). 
*  Source  of  these  percentage  is  ministry  of 
Planning,  1986:  59,63,65. 
**  Housing  census  in  1952  (Department  of 
Statistics,  1983a:  3) 
40 Table  2.1  indicates  that  a  regional  imbalance  in  the 
population  is  also  evident  with  almost  two  thirds  of  the 
population  living  in  Amman  governorate. 
Table  2.1 
Jordan's  population  according  to  governorate  and  sex. 
Amman  Irbid  Balga  Karak  Maan 
(central-north)  (north)  (north-west)  south  (south) 
1961 
Male  230762  137524  40277  34680  26164 
Female  202856  136452  38780  32531  20750 
Total  433618  273976  79057  67211  46914 
1979 
Male  596793  307043  75699  65108  41948 
Female  555146  295171  70707  59944  32460 
Total  1151939  602214  146406  125052  74408 
1985 
Male  788825  369850  93121  77659  52180 
Female  733777  355550  86797  91499  40377 
Total  1522602  725400  179918  149158  92557 
Source:  Ministry  of  Planning,  1986:  62. 
The  beginning  of  the  seventies  was  a  period  of  high 
natural  population  increase.  The  period  witnessed  a  rapid 
decline  of  the  death  rate  and  at  the  same  time  the 
continuation  of  high  fertility.  This  created  a  demographic 
environment  in  which  high  rates  of  natural  increase  were 
apparently  unavoidable.  Without  fertility  decline  this 
regime  of  rapid  population  growth  seemed  likely  to 
continue.  During  the  second  half  of  the  seventies 
fertility  did,  however,  start  to  decline  which  in  turn  led 
to  reduction  in  the  rate  of  natural  increase  (Table  2.2). 
41 One  should  note  that  the  researchers  who  have  tried 
to  measure  the  level  of  fertility  have  not  ended  up  with 
the  same  figure  for  the  same  year.  These  differences  in 
results  are  due  to  variations  in  the  techniques  used  by 
different  researchers.  For  example,  Abu-Jaber  et  al  (1980) 
measured  the  total  fertility  rate  for  1961  by  using  Brass's 
method,  while  the  total  fertility  rate  for  1972  was 
calculated  by  using  Trussell's  method  in  spite  of 
reservations  about  the  accuracy  of  this  method  (Table  2.2). 
They  also  carried  out  a  measurement  for  1976  by  using 
parity  changes  between  1972  and  1976,  and  arrived  at  a 
total  fertility  rate  of  7.8.  The  Department  of  Statistics 
in  Jordan  gave  a  total  fertility  rate  of  7.7  for  the  year 
1976,  and  6.6  for  the  year  1983  by  using  Bongaarts  method 
(Department  of  Statistics,  1983a:  104).  Hill  (1985:  193) 
gave  a  total  fertility  rate  of  7.5  for  the  year  1976,  by 
using  the  Brass  method.  Given  the  assumption  upon  which 
Brass's  method  was  based  (that  fertility  should  be 
constant)  and  the  fact  that  fertility  in  Jordan  was  clearly 
declining  during  the  1970s,  it  is  inevitable  that 
considerable  problems  arise  in  basing  any  analysis  on 
figures  derived  using  this  method.  Also  there  are  some 
reservations  about  using  Bongaarts  technique,  which  will  be 
discussed  in  the  next  chapter.  In  this  study  the  total 
fertility  rates  (TF)  for  1976  and  1983  were  measured  by 
using  the  direct  method  as  outlined  in  Newell  (1988).  The 
results  confirm  a  rapid  drop  in  fertility  during  the  late 
1970s  and  early  1980s. 
42 Table  2.2 
Some  demographic  indicators  in  Jordan  between  1961  -1983. 
1961  1972  1976  1983 
Crude  birth  rate  (per  1000)  49  49  43*  33* 
Crude  death  rate  (per  1000)  19  10  9- 
Natural  increase  (per  1000)  30  39  34  - 
Total  fertility  rate  7.3  7.6  7.5*  6.6* 
Source:  Abu-Jaber  et  al,  1980:  35. 
*  Calculated  by  the  researcher  from  the  1976  survey  and  the 
1983  survey. 
Table  2.3  shows  that  the  percentage  of  the  population 
in  urban**  areas  is  increasing.  Two  main  factors  increased 
the  rate  of  growth  of  urban  areas.  One  of  them  was  forced 
migration  in  the  form  of  a  large  influx  of  Palestinians.  In 
1967  the  number  of  refugees  who  left  the  West  Bank  and 
came  to  the  East  Bank  was  estimated  to  be  385,273  (Samha, 
1984:  82).  The  other  factor  was  voluntary  internal 
migration  from  rural  areas  and  small  cities  to  the  larger 
urban  centres  (Table  2.4). 
**  The  definition  of  urbanization  used  in  Jordan  is  not 
constant  (see  Department  of  Statistics,  1984:  xi; 
Department  of  Statistics,  1979:  7;  Findlay  and  Seccombe, 
1986:  562;  Fisher,  1972:  207),  so  differences  in 
comparative  figures  quoted  by  researchers  arise  simply  due 
to  lack  of  a  standard  definition  as  well  as  being  a  result 
of  urban  growth. 
43 Table  2.3 
Percentage  of  population  living  in  urban  areas  by  sex  and 
selected  years. 
1961*  1972*  1976*  1979*** 
Male  49.4  52.9  56.4  58.9 
Female  48.9  52.7  55.8  58.8 
Total  49.1  52.8  56.1  58.8 
*Faour,  1983:  29 
***Calculated  by  researcher,  from  census  1979. 
44 Table  2.4 
Growth  rate  of  the  governorates  of  Jordan,  1961  -  1979 
Annual  growth  Net  annual  growth  rate 






























































Source:  Samha,  1984:  87 
45 2.2.2  Demographic  data 
Since  the  Department  of  Statistics  was  established  in 
1949,  it  has  undertaken  three  censuses  in  1952,1961,  and 
the  1979.  Several  fertility  and  mortality  surveys  have  also 
been  carried  out  in  the  1970s,  and  1980s.  These  surveys 
were  urgently  needed  because  of  the  under  registration  of 
births  and  deaths,  and  the  inaccuracy  and  incompletenss  of 
other  data  sets.  Even  so,  indirect  methods  are  still 
necessary  in  order  to  measure  the  level  of  mortality  and 
fertility. 
Data  on  fertility  in  Jordan  is  available  mainly  from 
the  following  sources: 
1-  Census  1961. 
2-  National  fertility  survey  1972. 
3-  Jordan  fertility  survey  (WFS)  1976. 
4-  Census  1979. 
5-  Jordanian  demographic  survey  1981. 
6-  Fertility  and  family  health  survey  1983. 
One  cannot-use  all  of  the  above  mentioned  sources  to 
analyse  fertility  characteristics  in  depth.  The  surveys  of 
1976,  and  1983,  both  held  on  a  magnetic  tape,  were  the  only 
two  surveys  to  which  the  researcher  had  access  which 
offered  detailed  information  relevant  to  his  research. 
Data  on  mortality  is  seriously  under  reported.  Recent 
surveys  mostly  provide  data  on  infant  and  child  mortality. 
Thus  mortality  analysis  in  Jordan  remains  more  difficult 
than  fertility  studies. 
46 2.2.3  Age  Sex  structure 
The  age  structure  of  a  population  is  one  of  the  most 
important  demographic  variables.  "There  is  hardly  an 
aspect  of  individual  or  communal  life  which  is  not  affected 
by  age;  economic  and  social  activities,  military  service, 
political  propensities,  social  attitudes,  mobility. 
Furthermore  age  structure  is  directly  influenced  by  three 
variables  mortality,  fertility,  and  migration"  (Clarke, 
1972:  66).  , 
Data  on  age  in  Jordan  has  been  secured  both  by  asking 
a  direct  question  on  age  and  by  asking  about  date  of  birth. 
In  standard  statistical  sources,  it  is  tabulated  and 
published  for  single  year  and  five  year  cohorts.  Table 
2.5  shows  the  very  youthful  nature  of  the  Jordanian 
population.  One  can  note  a  very  slight  reduction  in  the 
proportion  under  15  years  and  above  65  years  between  1979 
and  1983,  and  an  associated  increase  in  the  proportion  of 
the  group  in  the  15-64  years  age  cohorts.  This  trend  may 
have  happened  on  the  one  hand  because  of  a  decline  in 
fertility  and  on  the  other  hand  because  of  a  return 
migration. 
The  overall  reduction  in  the  proportion  of  the 
population  over  65  years  of  age  is  more  surprising.  It 
would  appear  that  better  medical  services  and  improved 
hygiene  conditions  have  mainly  served  to  reduce  child 
mortality  rather  than  in  greatly  raising  life  expectancies 
amongst  the  older  population.  The  government's  efforts 
47 have  apparently  been  directed  mainly  towards  the  reduction 
of  infant  mortality  levels.  Infant  mortality  was  151  per 
thousand  in  1961.  In  1984  it  was  only  60  per  thousand 
(Ministry  of  Planning,  1986:  215),  so  the  proportion  of 
children  would  tend  generally  to  rise  unless  similar 
improvements  in  life  expectancy  were  being  experienced  by 
other  age  cohorts.  Despite  the  reduction  of  infant 
mortality  in  Jordan  the  proportion  of  children  is 
decreasing.  This  may  be  because  of  the  recent  reductions 
in  fertility  levels.  This  would  suggest  that  the  number  of 
births  and  the  birth  rate  have  had  a  quite  dominant  role  in 
determining  the  proportion  of  young  children. 
In  assessing  the  social  and  economic  consequences  of 
high  fertility  and  demographic  ageing,  the  dependency  ratio 
is  an  important  measurement.  In  terms  of  the  dependency 
ratio  Table  2.6  reveals  that  the  dependency  ratio  in  Jordan 
as  a  whole  and  in  its  governarates  -  in  particular  Amman, 
Irbid,  Balqa  and  Karak+Maan  -  was  low  in  1961  compared  with 
later  dates.  This  may  be  interpreted  in  two  ways:  first 
reporting  may  have  been  incomplete  or  inaccurate  in  1961. 
Second  emigration  was  low  in  1961,  while  the  emigration 
level  was  very  high  in  the  1970s,  thus  reducing  the 
proportion  of  the  active  population  present  within  the 
country. 
The  highest  dependency  ratio  was  found  in  Irbid 
during  1970s  which  probably  reflects  the  high  level  of 
internal  and'international  migration.  Emigration  -  internal 
and  international-  may  cause  the  high  level  of  dependency 
48 in  all  cities  except  Amman.  As  capital,  Amman  received  most 
of  the  country's  internal  migration  thus  offsetting 
international  emigration. 
At  the  end  of  the  1970s  and  begining  of  the  1980s  the 
dependency  ratio  started  declining  in  Jordan  and  in  the 
cities  shown  in  Table  2.6.  This  may  have  been  because  of 
return  migration,  it  should  be  noticed  that  most  of  the 
dependency  burden  came  from  the  youth,  because  of  the  high 
percentage  of  the  children  in  the  population. 
Comparison  of  the  population  age  structure  in  1979 
and  1983  suggests  that  there  was  a  slight  increase  in  the 
median  age,  from  14.6  to  15.8  years.  The  trend  is  most 
marked  in  Amman  and  Balga. 
49 Table  2.5 
Percentage  of  population  according  to  age  groups 
Under  15  15-64  65+  Total 
Jordan 
1961  45.1  50.1  4.5  100 
1979  51.6  45.6  2.8  100 
1983  48.5  49.1  2.4  100 
Amman 
1961  45.4  51.6  3.0  100 
1979  50.7  46.8  2.5  100 
1983  46.4  51.4  2.2  100 
Irbid 
1961  46.7  48.7  4.6  100 
1979  53.1  43.7  3.2  100 
1983  49.9  47.2  2.9  100 
Balaa 
1961 
1979  51.5  45.2  3.2  100 
1983  48.3  49.4  2.4  100 
Karak+Maan 
1961  43.5  52.7  3.8  100 
1979  52.2  44.8  3.0  100 
1983  51.2  47.2  1.6  100 
Source:  Calculated  by  researcher  from  censuses  1961,1979 
and  survey  of  1983. 
50 Table  2.6 
Dependency  ratio,  youth  dependency  ratio  and  old  age 
dependency  ratio. 
Dependency  Youth  dependency  old  age  dependency 
ratio  ratio  ratio 
Jordan 
1961  99.4  90.5  8.9 
1979  119.5  113.3  6.2 
1983  101.4  96.7  4.8 
Amman 
1961  93.6  87.8  5.7 
1979  113.8  108.5  5.3 
1983  94.5  90.3  4.2 
Irbid 
1961  105.0  96.0  9.5 
1979  129.1  121.7  7.4 
1983  111.9  105.7  6.2 
Bal  a 
1961 
1979  121.1  114.0  7.2 
1983  102.5  97.8  4.7 
Karak+Maan 
1961  95.9  87.4  8.5 
1979  123.2  116.5  6.7 
1983  111.9  108.4  4.7 
Source:  Calculated  by  researcher,  from  the  censuses  1961 
and  1979  and  the  survey  of  1983. 
51 Table  2.7 
Median  age  in  Jordan 
1979  1983 
Jordan  14.6  15.8 
Amman  14.8'  16.3 
Irbid  13.9  14.0 
Balga  14.5  15.6 
Karak+Maan  14.3  14.5 
Because  Jordan  has  witnessed  changes  in  age 
structure,  the  median  age  is  a  more  sensitive  indicator  of 
these  changes  in  age  structure  than  the  ratio  of  population 
above  age  65/population  under  age  15.  This  is  because  the 
median  reflects  the  absolute  age  distribution  of  the  entire 
population  in  a  way  that  the  dependency  ratio  does  not. 
Since  the  age  structure  is  skewed  the  median  is  also  a 
preferable  measure. 
Even  although  shifts  in  the  annual  number  of  births, 
deaths,  and  migration  do  produce  important  fluctuations  in 
a  national  population  pyramid  from  one  age  cohort  to 
another,  the  year  to  year  fluctuations  observed  in  Figure 
2.2  are  more  likely  to  reflect  faulty  reporting.  Despite 
the  age-heaping  displayed  in  Figure  2.2,  the  preference  to 
register  ages  ending  in  0  or  5  appears  to  be  decreasing. 
The  Myers  index  of  digit  preferences  (ages  10-79  on  a  scale 
from  0-180),  was  12  for  males  and  15  for  females  in  the 
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Fig.  2.2:  Population  pyramid  for  Jordan,  1983. 
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surveys.  The  same  index  was  42  and  49  for  men  and  women 
respectively  for  the  Jordanian  fertility  survey  of  1976 
(Department  of  Statistics,  1983b:  17).  Despite  this 
heaping,  the  general  shape  of  population  pyramids  for 
Jordan  (Figures  2.2,2.3,2.4,2.5)  have  not  been  affected 
by  age  mis-reporting. 
The  population  pyramids  for  Jordan,  Figures  2.2,2.3, 
2.4,2.5,  show  that  there  is  an  excess  of  males  under  15 
years  of  age  in  1961  and  1979,  and  also  at  the  older  ages. 
This  excess  is  likely  to  be  due  to  a  combination  of  a 
higher  female  mortality  rate,  which  is  often  recorded  in 
societies  with  a  strong  child  preference  in  favour  of  males 
over  females,  and  differential  age  misreporting  and 
possibly  female  under-enumeration.  There  was  a  deficit  of 
males  between  ages  20  and  40  in  1961,  and  ages  20  to  30  in 
1979.  This  deficit  can  be  attributed  in  the  pyramid  for 
1979  to  the  massive  emigration  of  Jordanian  males. 
Return  migration  may  offer  some  explanation  for 
the  reversion  to  an  excess  of  males  at  age  30  and  above  in 
1979  and  1983  (Figures  2.4,2.5).  The  increasing  percentage 
of  males  at  ages  20  to  25,  evident  when  Figure  2.5  is 
compared  with  the  other  figures,  may  reflect  the  increased 
difficulty  being  experienced  by  young  men  in  finding 
emigration  opportunities  especially  in  the  Arab  Gulf 
region,  where  migration  policies  adopted  in  the  early  1980s 
have  been  increasingly  selective.  The  oil-rich  labour 
importing  economies  have  looked  more  and  more  for  skilled 
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Fig.  2.3:  Population  pyramid  for  Jordan,  1961. 
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METHODOLOGY  CHAPTER 
It  was  noted  in  the  literature  review  of  chapter  1 
that  Caldwell's  (1982)  theory  of  fertility  decline  made  a 
number  of  important  propositions  in  relation  to  the 
fertility  transition.  These  propositions,  amongst  other 
suggestions,  identified  the  study  of  change  in  the  family 
system  as  a  priority  area  for  research. 
Some  of  these  propositions  involve  multi-facetted 
dimensions,  such  as  those  relating  to  wealth  flows.  This 
makes  them  difficult  to  test.  Caldwell  (1982:  337) 
remarks:  "How  comprehensive  wealth  flows  are.  The  ability 
of  a  man  not  to  lift  a  finger  in  the  house  and  to  have  his 
every  whim  satisfied  immediately  has  been  a  fundamental 
type  of  wealth  in  most  societies".  In  spite  of  the 
measurement  difficulties,  it  is  possible  to  develop  general 
frameworks  to  examine  some  of  these  propositions.  The 
analytical  part  of  this  study  will  attempt  to  do  this. 
3.1.  THE  MAIN  AIMS  OF  THE  STUDY 
The  main  part  of  this  thesis  tries  to  analyse  the 
following  key  issues: 
1.  Aspects  of  change  evident  in  the  1980s  in  the  family 
system  in  Jordan,  and  in  particular:  - 
a-  social  and  economic  kin-relationships. 
b-  wealth  flow  directions  within  the  family. 
2.  Fertility  attitudes  in  relation  to  contrasting  social 
contexts. 
58 3.  Some  of  the  causes  of  regional  variations  in  fertility 
levels  in  Jordan. 
3.2.  IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  STUDY 
It  can  be  said  that  the  majority  of  fertility  studies 
in  Jordan  have  concentrated  mainly  on  measurements  of 
fertility  levels.  This  study  seeks  to  make  a  distinctive 
contribution  by  throwing  some  light  on  the  explanation  of 
fertility  change  by  investigating  the  role  of  the  family 
and  its  structure  in  explaining  fertility  attitudes  and 
behaviour.  This  is  done  using  a  framework  based  on 
Caldwell's  theory  to  derive  some  specific  propositions 
relating  to  fertility  trends  which  can  be  examined. 
It  is  assumed  that  fertility  decline  will  be  the 
result  of  certain  changes  in  the  family's  internal  and 
external  social  and  economic  structure.  In  order  to  adopt 
this  approach  it  is  necessary  to  examine  the  perceived 
internal  and  external  family  relationships  which  exist  in 
terms  of  investigating  a)  the  scale  and  character  of  mutual 
economic  obligations  (or  feelings  of  financial 
responsibility)  which  exist  within  families,  b)  the  nature 
of  the  family  budget  (to  what  extent  a  common  household 
budget  exists  as  opposed  to  a  budget  divided  into  separate 
units  related  to  individual  wage  earners),  c)  relations 
between  the  father  and  his  children  in  terms  of  obedience, 
societal  and  family  norms  (even  when  the  family  is 
geographically  separated  as  a  result  of  migration),  d)  the 
coherence  and  structure  of  the  family  system  (is  it  a 
closed  or  open  nuclear  family  or  does  it  still  have 
59 elements  of  the  extended  family?  ),  women's  roles  and  status 
within  the  family,  e)  wealth  flow  directions  (or  family 
power  structure). 
The  theoretical  importance  of  this  study  lies  in  the 
fact  that  it  is  the  first  study  to  carry  out  such  a 
comprehensive  analysis  in  Arab  society  based  on  Caldwell's 
theory. 
3.3.  HYPOTHESIS 
Although  many  ideas  are  tested  in  this  thesis,  one  is 
more  important  than  all  the  others  in  terms  of  its 
significance  in  understanding  the  relation  between  family 
structure  and  fertility  attitudes  and  behaviour.  This 
relates  to  the  sequence  by  which  family  structure  changes. 
The  evolution  of  the  family  from  an  extended  to  a  nuclear 
form  has  been  well  documented  in  many  anthropological 
studies,  but  more  important  than  the  change  in  the  physical 
size  and  structure  are  the  social  and  economic  mechanisms 
within  the  family  which  produce  this  transition.  It  is 
hypothesized  here  that  the  so-called  "economic  nuclear 
family"  will  emerge  first  and  then  at  a  later  stage  the 
"social  nuclear  family"  will  be  formed.  This  sequence  is 
correct,  and  evidence  to  support  this  position  in  Jordan  is 
presented  later  in  the  thesis.  If  this  sequence  can  be 
substantiated,  then  it  implies  that  economic  links  within 
the  family,  and  between  the  family  and  its  broader  economic 
context,  will  initiate  demographic  changes.  Only  at  a 
later  stage  will  social  linkages  become  of  importance  in 
60 influencing  fertility  behaviour.  It  is  assumed  therefore 
that  fertility  attitudes  are  significantly  affected  by 
social  and  economic  kin-relationships,  and  wealth  flow 
directions. 
3.4.  DATA 
3.4.1.  Secondary  data 
First  of  all  a  number  of  secondary  data  sources  will 
be  used  in  order  to  satisfy  the  third  aim  of  this  study: 
namely  to  provide  a  context  for  field  research  by 
evaluating  fertility  differentials  in  Jordan  at  a  regional 
scale.  Two  main  data  sources  exist  which  provide  recent 
insights  on  Jordanian  fertility.  These  are  a)  the  Jordan 
fertility  survey  (1976)  carried  out  as  part  of  the  World 
Fertility  Survey  (WFS).  This  survey  consists  of  two 
samples:  one  sample  included  responses  from  3,612  ever- 
married  women.  It  was  an  individual  survey.  Other  samples 
included  14,493  households,  b)  the  other  major  national 
survey  is  the  Jordan  fertility  and  family  health  survey 
(1983).  It  also  consists  of  two  samples,  one  sample 
included  3,939  ever  married  women  (again  an  individual 
survey).  The  other  one  included  5,049  households. 
3.4.2.  Primary  Data 
3.4.2.1  Sample  Design 
With  regard  to  the  data  of  the  1988  survey  carried 
out  by  the  author,  three  areas  were  selected  for  study. 
These  areas  represented  the  three  major  physical  and  social 
environments  which  exist  in  Jordan:  - 
1.  An  environment  dominated  by  nomadic  culture.  This 
61 environment  consists  of  bedouin  societies,  or 
sedenterised  people  who  were  originally  bedouins. 
These  people  are  found  mainly  in  the  east  and  south  of 
I 
the  country. 
2.  An  environment  which  is  mainly  dominated  by  peasant 
agriculture.  These  peasant  societies  are  mainly  found 
in  western  Jordan  and  especially  in  the  north-western 
corner  of  the  country. 
3.  An  environment  mainly  dominated  by  modern  culture  or 
urban  life.  This  sort  of  environment  is  found  in  the 
main  cities  and  especially  in  the  capital  city  of 
Amman. 
The  author's  sample  was  drawn  from  the  following 
areas:  - 
a)  Amman  (the  capital).  From  this  area  a  sample  was 
selected,  representing  the  urban  area.  An  attempt  was  made 
to-cover  both  middle  and  lower  class  residential  areas.  In 
the  context  of  Jordan  it  is  difficult  to  apply  the  concept 
of  class  in  the  same  way  as  in  Western  Europe,  given  the 
country's  distinctive  history  and  political  economy. 
Unlike  most  of  Western  Europe,  Jordanian  society  has  not 
experienced  the  structuring  influence  on  the  division  of 
labour  introduced  by  an  Industrial  Revolution  and 
subsequent  economic  development.  Nevertheless,  any  social 
scientist  studying  change  within  urban  society  in  Jordan 
quickly  becomes  aware  of  the  differentiation  of  society. 
Wealth  and  access  to  new  sources  of  income  undoubtedly  have 
62 had  a  strong  influence  in  structuring  urban  society  in 
Jordan.  In  the  context  of  this  thesis  the  terms  "middle" 
and  "lower  class"  are  therefore  used  in  recognition  of  the 
division  of  society  on  the  basis  of  income,  but  not 
necessarily  on  the  same  basis  as  in  Western  Europe. 
b)  Ketm,  a  village  selected  from  the  peasant  societies  of 
the  north-west.  Within  this  village  a  systematic  sample  of 
78  households  was  drawn  by  interviewing  at  every  third 
house.  This  gave  a  coverage  of  33%  of  the  village 
population. 
c)  Basta,  a  village  from  the  south  of  Jordan  representing 
sedentarised  bedouin  society.  Since  this  was  quite  a  small 
village  the  entire  population  of  the  village  which  was 
present  was  included  in  the  survey.  This  yielded  96 
households  responses.  Figure  3.1  shows  the  location  of  the 
survey  areas. 
Ketm  and  Basta  were  selected  at  random  from  the 
Jordanian  settlement  system.  This  was  achieved  as 
follows:  - 
A  co-ordinate  system  covering  all  possible  locations 
in  Jordan  was  placed  over  a  map  of  Jordan.  A  random  number 
table  was  then  used  to  select  the  specific  locations.  The 
villages  lying  closest  to  the  randomly  selected  locations 
were  chosen  for  study. 
In  Amman  it  was  decided  that  site  selection  should  be 
influenced  by  the  morphological  and  social  structure  of  the 
city  (see  Findlay  and  Samha,  1986).  In  total,  five  sites 
within  the  built  up  area  were  selected  using  maps  of  the 
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64 
i urban  areas  prepared  by  the  Amman  Balga  Urban  Planning 
Authority  from  aerial  photographs.  The  first  site  was 
selected  using  random  numbers  from  the  urban  area  as  it 
existed  in  1936.  The  procedure  was  repeated  for  the  area 
of  urban  growth  between  1936-1956.  Further  sites  were 
selected  at  random  from  the  areas  of  urban  growth  which 
emerged  in  the  1960s,  1970s  and  1980s.  This  method  of  site 
selection  produced  sample  areas  in  the  west,  east,  south 
and  south-east  of  the  city,  in  addition  to  one  in  the 
central  areas  (see  map,  Figure  3.2).  The  five  sites  as 
selected  on  a  chronological  basis  described  above  can  be 
re-grouped  into  two  main  social  categories,  middle  and 
lower  class. 
The  total  urban  sample  of  418  households,  was  divided 
as  follows;  178  of  the  households  which  had  been  selected 
were  located  in  middle  class  areas  in  the  west  of  Amman, 
240  households  were  located  in  lower  class  areas  in  the 
east  and  south  east  of  Amman.  Households  were  selected  by 
interviewing  all  households  in  an  area  of  15,000m2  around 
the  co-ordinate  location  chosen  using  random  numbers. 
3.4.2.2  Questionnaire 
The  questionnaire,  which  was  in  Arabic,  had  3  main 
parts: 
1.  Basic  information  about  household  members.  This  part 
covered  age,  sex,  educational  attainment,  marital 
status,  work  status,  etc. 
2.  Social  and  economic  relationships,  both  within  the 
family  and  externally. 
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"  Location  of  survey  work  in  Amman. 3.  Information  about  fertility  attitudes,  including  the 
desired  number  of  children  and  the  social  and  economic 
motivations  influencing  fertility. 
Appendix  I  lists  the  questions  included  in  the  survey. 
3.4.2.3  Questionnaire  pre-test 
In  the  urban  area  (Amman)  a  pretest  of  the 
questionnaire  was  carried  out  between  25th  and  27th 
January,  1988.  Covering  30  households  in  two  sites  (15 
households  from  the  middle  class,  and  15  households  from 
the  lower  class). 
In  the  villages,  Ketm  and  Basta,  another  pretest  of 
the  questionnaire  was  carried  out;  29th  -  30th  January  1988 
in  Ketm,  and  2nd  -  3rd  February  1988  in  Basta.  This 
pretest  covered  12  households  in  Ketm  and  12  households  in 
Basta. 
After  only  minor  modifications  to  the  questionnaire 
the  full  survey  was  launched  on  5th  February,  1988.  The 
field  work  for  the  pretest  was  carried  out  by  the  author 
and  by  a  research  assistant  in  Amman,  while  in  the  two 
villages  it  was  carried  out  by  the  author  himself. 
3.4.2.4  Recruitment  and  Training  of  Field  Staff  and 
Representativeness  of  the  Survey 
11  interviewers  were  deployed  for  the  field  work.  4 
of  those  recruited  were  school  teachers  from  the  village 
of  Basta.  The  importance  of  local  area  recruitment  was 
great  .  given  the  need  for  familiarity  of  the  staff  with 
local  conditions.  It  also  reduced  travel  and  per  diem 
costs.  The  interviewers  were  given  a  brief  training.  The 
67 training  centred  around  the  questions,  purpose  of  the 
study,  and  objectives  of  the  study,  etc. 
With  regard  to  the  middle  class  in  Amman  there  was  a 
problem  of  low  response  rates.  Many  households  refused  to 
participate  in  the  interviews.  For  example,  one  day  an 
interviewer  visited  43  households  but  only  found  8 
households  willing  to  cooperate  and  answer  questions.  To 
overcome  this  problem  interviewers  had  to  extend  the  survey 
area  in  middle  class  areas. 
It  was  not  possible  to  draw  an  entirely 
representative  sample  from  Amman,  for  several  reasons. 
Amman  has  more  than  one  million  people  yet  there  is  no 
recent  reliable  sampling  frame  available.  Therefore,  a 
representative  sample  would  have  been  very  costly  in  terms 
both  of  time  and  money.  Many  areas  of  the  city  have  been 
built  and  occupied  since  the  time  of  the  last  national 
census  in  1979.  For  example,  one  of  the  sites  selected  for 
survey  was  in  west  Amman,  known  as  Shmaisani,  has  grown 
dramatically  and  changed  in  character  since  the  last 
census.  The  population  size  of  this  area  is  not  accurately 
known,  even  by  the  municipal  authorities,  and  the  same  is 
true  for  some  of  the  other  sites  where  the  survey  was 
undertaken. 
3.4.2.5  Field  work 
The  main  questionnaire  phase  of  the  field  work  began 
on  5th  February  1988  and  was  completed  on  10th  March,  1988. 
The  head  of  the  household  (male)  was  the  preferred 
respondent. 
68 Several  reasons  lie  behind  the  choice  of  interviewing 
the  head  of  household  rather  than  other  members  of  the 
family.  Social  and  economic  kin-relationships  and  the 
power  structure  of  families,  involving  wealth  flow,  were 
key  issues  in  the  study  and  in  Arab  society  it  is  the  man 
who  claims  to  be  responsible  for  structuring  family 
relationships.  In  Jordan  there  can  be  little  doubt  that 
society  is  characterised  by  a  male  dominated  culture 
(Weeks,  1988;  Findlay,  1987a;  Ghazwi,  1985).  This  is 
especially  true  in  rural  areas,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  in 
urban  areas.  Therefore,  it  was  considered  appropriate  to 
collect  data  from  those  who  are  assumed  to  dominate  family 
life,  even  although  women's  attitudes  and  preferences  are 
clearly  also  of  great  importance  in  understanding  fertility 
trends. 
It  is  worth  mentioning  that  most  other  previous 
fertility  surveys  in  Jordan  were  directed  towards  women. 
This  was  maybe  necessary  because  these  fertility  surveys 
focussed  on  fertility  measurements  requiring  detailed 
information  from  the  female  population.  Only  one  of  the 
surveys  was  directed  towards  husbands.  This  was  the  survey 
conducted  in  1985  which  was  based  on  a  sample  drawn  from 
the  previous  fertility  survey  of  1983.  Results  of  the  1985 
survey  reveals,  not  surprisingly,  that  there  are  some 
differences  between  the  answers  of  husbands  and  wives  in 
terms  of  fertility  attitudes  and  behaviour.  The  survey 
reveals  that  husbands  are,  in  general,  more  traditional. 
69 It  was  therefore  considered  useful  in  the  context  of  the 
author's  work  to  collect  more  data  about  fertility  from  the 
perspective  of  husbands  in  order  to  get  a  better 
understanding  of  fertility  behaviour. 
The  fieldwork  was  carried  out  by  three  teams:  - 
1.  A  team  of'  6  interviewers  (including  1  supervisor)  was 
selected  for  the  survey  in  Amman.  The  author  worked 
with  them  whenever  he  was  in  Amman. 
2.  The  team  in  Basta  consisted  of  4  interviews  (teachers) 
under  the  direct  supervision  of  the  author. 
3.  A  team  of  2  interviewers  worked  in  Ketm,  under  the 
direct  supervision  of  the  author. 
3.5.  CAUSAL  MODELS 
More  than  one  type  of  causal  model  will  be  used  in 
order  to  analyse  fertility  attitudes  and  wealth  flow. 
There  are  four  general  models  which  are  investigated: 
a)  Model  1  studies  the  determinants  of  wealth  flow 
direction. 
b)  Model  2  studies  the  determinants  influencing  the 
perception  of  the  best  number  of  children  to  have. 
C)  Model  3  studies  the  determinants  of  transition  in 
social  and  economic  motivations  underpinning  fertility 
behaviour. 
d)  Model  4  studies  the  determinants  of  using 
contraceptives. 
It  should  be  said  that  each  of  the  general  models 
mentioned  above  was  subsequently  disaggregated  into  two 
70 sub-models.  One  of  these  related  to  urban  areas  and  the 
other  to  rural  areas. 
3.6.  DEPENDENT  VARIABLES 
In  parallel  with  the  four  causal  models  listed  above, 
there  are  four  dependent  variables  which  had  to  be 
extracted  from  the  survey  data: 
1.  Wealth  flow  direction  (WEALTH).  Change  in  wealth  flow 
direction  is  crucial  in  terms  of  fertility  change.  As 
long  as  the  wealth  flow  direction  is  upward,  family 
size  norms  can  be  assumed  to  favour  high  stable 
fertility.  If  it  is  downward,  this  will  serve  to 
destabilise  relationships  and  to  reduce  fertility 
levels. 
2.  Best  number  of  children  (BESTNC).  Respondents  were 
asked  what  they  considered  to  be  the  best  number  of 
children  to  have.  One  can  ask  this  question  in 
different  ways,  using  the  words  "ideal"  or  "desired"  or 
"wanted"  instead  of  "best".  The  author  chose  to  use 
the  term  "best"  to  come  as  close  as  possible  to 
Caldwell's  terminology. 
3.  Social  and  economic  motivation  underpinning  high 
fertility  (MOTIV).  It  was  considered  that  family  size- 
norms  will  tend  to  correspond  to  several  motivations 
(social  and  economic)  that  maximise  the  net  utility 
from  having  high  fertility. 
4.  Contraceptive  use  (CONUSE).  It  was  considered  that  the 
family  system  and  family  relationships  were 
fundamental  issues  in  influencing  contraceptive  use 
71 (Caldwell,  1982).  Therefore,  it  was  very  important  to 
examine  family  characteristics  in  terms  of 
contraceptive  use. 
The  first  and  third  dependent  variables  were 
constructed  from  a  number  of  surrogate  variables  included 
in  the  survey.  Since  these  dependent  variables,  and  the 
scores  of  different  groups  in  the  population  in  relation  to 
these  variables,  form  a  major  part  of  the  analysis  of  later 
chapters,  it  is  important  to  discuss  in  detail  here  their 
construction  and  interpretation. 
Firstly,  what  measures  were  used  to  examine  the 
transition  in  the  social  and  economic  motivations 
underpinning  fertility  levels  (MOTIV).  Respondents  were 
asked  about  their  perception  with  regard  to  their  social 
and  economic  motivations.  Respondents  who  answered  that 
they  did  not  believe  that  their  social  and  economic  status 
would  be  guaranteed  by  high  fertility,  were  given  a  score 
of  1.  Those  who  were  unsure  but  thought  that  it  might  be, 
were  given  a  score  of  2.  If  respondents  agreed  strongly 
that  there  was  an  association  of  status  and  high  fertility 
were  given  a  score  of  3  (Table  3.1).  This  scoring 
procedure  was  applied  to  five  different  categories  of 
motivations  in  relation  to  fertility. 
-  Family  name 
-  Prestige 
-  Security  in  old  age 
-  Economic  benefits  from  children 
72 -  Happiness  (contentment  resulting  from  having  a  large 
family) 
Applying  this  scoring  system  meant  that  a  minimum 
score  of  5,  and  maximum  score  of  15  was  attained  for  each 
household.  The  above  scores  were  then  grouped  into  four 
categories  as  follows: 
-  Traditional  familes  were  defined  as  those  with  scores  of 
14  or  15 
-  Early  "transitional"  familes  scored  11-13 
-  Advanced  "transitional"  familes  scored  8-10 
-  "Modern"  familes  were  defined  by  scores  of  5  -7 
Table  3.2  shows  the  spread  of  scores  which  were 
achieved.  It  can  be  seen  that  events  are  adequately  spread 
between  the  four  categories,  identified  above.  It  is 
noticeable  that  the  distribution  of  scores  around  the  mean 
has  a  U-shape  (Figure  3.3). 
The  distribution  does  not,  unfortunately,  conform  to 
the  parameters  of  a  normal  or  Gaussian  curve. 
Nevertheless,  in  the  absence  of  either  a  positive  or 
negative  skew,  it  was  decided  to  analyse  the  data  in  an 
untransformed  manner.  This  means  that  care  is  required 
when  parametric  statistics  are  used,  but  in  practice  most 
of  the  statistical  modelling  which  was  used  involved  non- 
parametric  techniques  suitable  for  handling  categorical 
data. 
With  regard  to  wealth  flow  direction,  the  same 
procedure  of  scoring  was  used,  but  diferent  variables  were 
used  (see  Table  3.3). 
73 Applying  this  scoring  system  meant  that  a  minimum 
score  of  10,  and  maximum  score  of  26  could  be  achieved. 
These  scores  were  regrouped  into  two  categories: 
-  Upward  wealth  flow  direction  defined  by  scores  of  10-15 
-  Downward  wealth  flow  direction  defined  by  scores  of  16-26 
Table  3.1 
Scores  for  social  and  economic  motivations  for  having  high 
fertility. 
Variables  Score  of  Minimum  maximum 
possible  possible  possible 
answer  score  score 
Motivations  for  having 
high  fertility: 
*Keep  family  name  - 
Strongly  agree  33 
Possibly  true  2 
Do  not  accept  11 
*Security  in  old  age  - 
Strongly  agree  33 
Possibly  true  2 
Do  not  accept  11 
*Prestige  - 
Strongly  agree  33 
Possibly  true  2 
Do  not  accept  11 
*Economic  benefits  from 
children  - 
Strongly  agree  33 
Possibly  true  2 
Do  not  accept  11 
*Happiness  - 
Strongly  agree  33 
Possibly  true  2 
Do  not  accept  11 
TOTAL  5  15 
74 Table  3.2 
Spread  of  scores  in  terms  of  motivations  for  high  fertility 
and  group  definition. 
Score  Frequency  Percent  Category 
5-  112  20.3 
6-  41  7.4  Modern 
7-  38  6.9 
8-  28  5.1  Advanced 
9-  51  9.2  Transitional 
10-  30  5.4 
11-  40  7.2  Early 
12-  32  5.8  Transitional 
13-  54  9.8 
14-  19  3.4  Traditional 
15-  107  19.4 
Mean  =  9.9 
S.  D.  =  3.7 
Figure  3.3 
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O Table  3.3  (Contd.  ) 
Construction  of  the  wealth  flow  direction. 









*Husband's  responsibility 
for  economic  decisions  - 
0%  -  30%  of  decisions 
made  by  husband  3  3 
30%  -  75%  of  decisions 
made  by  husband  2 
75%  of  decisions  made  by 
husband  1  1 
*Earning  from  children  - 
No  earning  from  children  2  2 
Yes  earning  from  children  1  1 
*Expected  earning  from 
children  - 
Not  expected  2  2 
Yes  expected  1  1 
*Relation  between  father 
and  children  - 
Weak  relation  3  3 
Average  relation  2 
Strong  relation  1  1 
TOTAL  10  26 
77 Table  3.4  gives  the  spread  of  scores  which  were 
achieved  in  terms  of  wealth  flow  direction.  The 
distribution  of  scores  around  the  mean  shows  a  very  slight 
skew  towards  scores  with  low  values.  No  transformation  of 
the  data  was  considered  necessary.  It  can  be  seen  from 
Figure  3.4  that  the  division  of  the  population  into  two 
categories  based  on  a  score  of  15.5  is  somewhat  arbitary, 
but  no  natural  break  occurs  in  the  distribution. 
Table  3.4 
Spread  of  scores  in  terms  of  wealth  flow  direction. 
Score  Frequency  Percent  Category 
10-  00  0.0 
11-  20  3.6 
12-  23  4.2 
13-  28  5.1 
14-  32  5.8 
15-  52  9.4 
16-  56  10.1 
17-  67  12.1 
18-  63  11.4 
19-  81  14.7 
20-  56  10.1 
21-  34  6.2 
22-  23  4.2 
23-  12  2.2 
24-  4  0.7 
25-  0  0.0 
26-  1  0.2 
Mean  =  17.3 
S.  D.  =  3.0 
Upward  wealth  flow 
Downward  wealth  flow 
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3.7  INDEPENDENT  VARIABLES 
Table  3.5  shows  the  independent  variables  which  will 
be  used  in  the  different  causal  models.  Two  of  the 
independent  variables,  "transition  in  social  kin- 
relations",  and  "transition  in  economic  kin-relations",  are 
composite  variables  derived  from  a  scoring  system  of  the 
kind  described  above. 
Table  3.6  shows  how  these  two  independent  variables 
were  constructed: 
a)  With  regard  to  the  transition  in  social  kin-relations 
a  new  variable  was  constructed  from  five  other  variables. 
These  five  variables  measured  the  strength  of  the  social 
kin-relationships  between  the  respondent  household  and  five 
other  related  groups. 
79 The  scoring  was  as  follows: 
A  respondent  who  answered  that  he  had  weak  social  relations 
with  brothers  and  sisters  was  given  a  score  of  4.  If  he 
answered  that  he  had  a  normal  relationship  he  was  given  a 
score  of  5,  and  if  the  answer  was  that  he  had  a  strong 
relationship  he  was  given  a  score  of  6.  In  terms  of  a 
respondent's  social  relationship  with  uncles  and  aunts, 
scores  of  3,4  and  5  were  given  for  weak,  normal  and  strong 
relationships  respectively.  Similarly,  with  regard  to 
social  relations  with  other  relatives,  scores  of  2,3  and  5 
were  given  for  weak,  normal  and  strong  relations 
respectively. 
Table  3.5 
Explanatory  variables. 
Explanatory  variables  No.  of  Categories 
Social  kin-relationships  (RELSOC)  3 
Economic  kin-relationships  (RELECO)  3 
Area  of  interview  (AREAINT)  3 
Wealth  flow  direction  (WEALTH)  2 
Education  level  of  husbands  (RIEDUC)  3 
Education  level  of  wives  (R2EDUC)  3 
Source  of  income  (INCSOU)  2 
Age  of  husbands  (RIDOBYR)  3 
Actual  number  of  children  (CHILD)  3 
80 It  should  be  noted  that  these  values  were  not 
allocated  in  an  arbitary  fashion.  The  researcher 
investigated  and  tested  several  different  scoring.  systems 
prior  to  selecting  the  one  described  above,  because  it 
offered  what  seemed  to  be  appropriate  weights  to  each  type 
of  relationship.  Since  the  strength  of  relationships  were 
not  considered  of  equal  importance  for  all  five  groups  of 
relatives,  it  was  decided  to  give  greater  weighting  to 
brothers  and  sisters,  lower  weighting  to  uncles  and  aunts 
and  the  lowest  weighting  to  relationships  with  other 
relatives. 
Applying  this  scoring  system  meant  that  a  minimum 
score  of  16,  and  maximum  score  of  26  was  attained.  Scores 
were  then  grouped  into  four  categories  as  follows: 
-  Traditional  social  kin-relationships:  25-26 
-  Early  transitional  social  kin-relations:  22-24 
-  Advanced  transitional  social  kin-relations:  19-21 
-  Modern  social  kin-relations:  16-18 
Table  3.7  shows  the  spread  of  scores  which  are 
achieved  in  terms  of  social  kin-relations.  This  spread 
indicates  a  marked  skew  with  distinctly  more  households 
falling  into  the  early  transitional  and  traditional 
categories  than  into  the  other  two  classes. 
b)  With  regard  to  economic  kin-relationships,  a  composite 
variable  was  constructed  by  using  the  same  scoring 
procedure  as  above.  The  same  five  groups  of  relatives  were 
used.  Therefore,  the  same  minimum  and  maximum  scores 
81 resulted  (Table  3.8).  These  scores  were  grouped  into  four 
categories  as  follows: 
-  Traditional  economic  kin-relationships:  25-26 
-  Early  transitional  economic  kin-relations:  22-24 
-  Advanced  transitional  economic  kin-relations:  19-21 
-  Modern  economic  kin-relations:  16-18 
Table  3.9  gives  the  spread  of  scores  which  are 
achieved  in  terms  of  economic  kin-relations.  The  values 
are  spread  across  the  scoring  range  but  appear  to  cluster 
on  particular  scores  such  as  18,20,23  and  26.  This  makes 
justification  of  the  division  of  the  distribution  into  four 
discrete  categories  much  easier.  The  mean  score  of  20.6 
(Table  3.9;  Figure  3.6)  shows  that  on  average  households 
remain  in  the  advanced  transitional  phase  of  their  economic 
development. 
The  type  of  approach  adopted  here  is  helpful  when 
variables  are  needed  to  measure  abstract  concepts  of  the 
kinds  described.  A  similar  type  of  scoring  system  has  been 
used  by  other  researchers  (Dow  and  Werner,  1983;  Weeks, 
1988). 
82 Table  3.6 
Construction  of  transition  in  social  kin-relationships. 









*Social  relationships 
with  brothers  - 
weak  &  no  relation  4  4 
ordinary  relation  5 
strong  relation  6  6 
*Social  relationships 
with  sisters  - 
weak  &  no  relation  4  4 
ordinary  relation  5 
strong  relation  6  6 
*Social  relationships 
with  uncles  - 
weak  &  no  relation  3  3 
ordinary  relation  4 
strong  relation  5  5 
*Social  relationships 
with  aunts  - 
weak  &  no  relation  3  3 
ordinary  relation  4 
strong  relation  5  5 
*Social  relationships 
with  far  relatives  - 
weak  &  no  relation  2  2 
ordinary  relation  3 
strong  relation  4  4 
TOTAL  SCORES  16  26 
83 Table  3.7 
Spread  of  scores  of  social  kin-relationships. 
Score  Frequency  Percent  Categories 
16-  14  2.5  Modern  social 
17-  2  0.4  kin-relationships 









Mean  =  22.6 
S.  D.  =  2.7 
Figure  3.5 
1  0.2  Advanced  transitional 
68  12.3  social 
47  8.5  kin-relationships 
57  10.3  Early  transitional 
116  21.0  kin-relationships 
19  3.4 
60  10.9  Traditional  social 
116  21.0  kin-relationships 
COUNT  VALUE  ONE  SYMBOL  EQUALS  APPROX.  4.00  OCCURRENCES 
14  16.00  **** 
2  17.00 
52  18.00  ************* 
1  19.00 
68  20.0  ***************** 
47  21.00  ************ 
57  22.0  ************** 
116  23.0  ***************************** 
19  24.0  ***** 
60  25.0  *************** 
116  26.0  ***************************** 
I.........  I.........  I.........  I.........  I 
0  40  80  120  160 
HISTOGRAM  OF  SOCIAL  KIN-RELATIONSHIPS 
84 Table  3.8 
Construction  of  transition  in  economic  kin-relationships. 









*Economic  relationships 
with  brothers  - 
weak  &  no  relation  4  4 
ordinary  relation  5 
strong  relation  6  6 
*Economic  relationships 
with  sisters  - 
weak  &  no  relation  4  4 
ordinary  relation  5 
strong  relation  6  6 
*Economic  relationships 
with  uncles  - 
weak  &  no  relation  3  3 
ordinary  relation  4 
strong  relation  5  5 
*Economic  relationships 
with  aunts  - 
weak  &  no  relation  3  3 
ordinary  relation  4 
strong  relation  5  5 
*Economic  relationships 
with  far  relatives  - 
weak  &  no  relation  2  2 
ordinary  relation  3 
strong  relation  4  4 
TOTAL  SCORES  16  26 
85 Table  3.9 
Spread  of  scores  of  economic  kin-relationships 
Score  Frequency  Percent  Categories 
16-  67  12.1  Modern  social 
17-  2  0.4  kin-relationships 









Mean  =  20.6 
S.  D.  =  3.2 
1  0.2  Advanced  transitional 
87  15.8  social 
50  9.1  kin-relationships 
32  5.8  Early  transitional 
65  11.8  social 
7  1.3  kin-relationships 
11  2.0  Traditional  social 
86  15.6  kin-relationships 
Figure  3.6 
COUNT  VALUE  ONE  SYMBOL  EQUALS  APPROX.  4.00  OCCURRENCES 
67  16.00  ***************** 
2  17.00 
144  18.00  ************************************ 
1  19.00 
87  20.0  ********************** 
50  21.00  ************* 
32  22.0  ******** 
65  23.0  **************** 
7  24.0  ** 
11  25.0  *** 
86  26.0  ********************** 
I.........  I.........  I.........  I.  1.......  I 
0  40  80  120  160 
HISTOGRAM  OF  ECONOMIC  KIN-RELATIONSHIPS 
86 3.8  STATISTICAL  METHODS 
Some  descriptive  statistics  are  used  throughout  the 
dissertation  (such  as  mean,  percentage,  etc.  ),  which  need 
no  further  comment  here.  In  addition,  inferential 
statistics  such  as  chi-square  are  used  in  order  to  examine 
whether  significant  differences  can  be  detected  between 
sub-populations  of  the  sample  survey. 
In  order  to  study  the  above  mentioned  causal  models 
advanced  categorical  statistical  methods  are  also  used. 
All  of  the  respondent  variables  derived  from  the  survey 
were  categorical  in  nature  (e.  g.  dichotomous  response 
variables)  and  were  therefore  unsuitable  for  conventional 
parametric  statistics.  Therefore,  a  statistical  model 
which  is  capable  of  handling  dichotomous  response  variables 
was  used.  There  are  three  possible  models  which  can  be 
used  in  the  circumstances:  logistic,  logit  and  probit 
(Wrigley,  1985;  Bowlby  &  Silk,  1982).  The  logit  model  is 
produced  from  a  cumulative  logistic  probability  function. 
Probit  produces  very  similar  results  to  the  logit  model  in 
the  case  of  dichotomous  response  variable  (Wrigley,  1985: 
28-30).  Thus  these  statistical  methods  are  similar. 
Stepwise  logistic  regression  will  be  used  in  order  to 
examine  the  proposed  causal  models.  By  this  stepwise 
method,  the  most  significant  explanatory  variables  can  be 
selected  and  explored.  To  get  the  most  significant 
explanatory  variables  using  non-parametric  stepwise 
regression  involves  parameter  elimination  within  a 
hierarchical  structure.  Those  explanatory  variables  which 
87 account  for  the  greatest  amount  of  variation  in  terms  of 
the  response  variables  amongst  the  sub-population  are  then 
selected.  Therefore,  selection  of  explanatory  variables  is 
based  on  an  asymptotic  covariance  matrix.  As  a  result  "F- 
statistics"  are  used  to  judge  the  significance  of  the 
results.  The  use  of  "F-statistics"  is  somewhat  similar  to 
the  "inclusion  and  termination"  statistics  involved  in  chi- 
square  analysis  (Wrigley,  1985:  144). 
Finally,  it  is  important  to  consider  one  assumption  of 
conventional  regression.  This  is  that  circularity  between 
dependent  and  independent  variables  should  be  avoided  if 
possible.  This  is  the  case  both  for  statistical  and 
explanatory  reasons.  On  a  statistical  basis  it  is 
important  simply  because  one  wants  to  maintain  independence 
between  the  variables  under  study  (one  of  the  assumptions 
of  many  inferential  tests).  For  explanatory  reasons, 
circularity  is  a  problem  since  clearly  causal  modelling  is 
greatly  weakened  if  dependent  and  independent  variables  are 
constructed  using  the  same  or  similar  data  source. 
In  social  studies,  and  particularly  in  demographic 
ones  it  is  often  very  difficult  to  avoid  circularity, 
because  of  the  complex  inter-relationships  between  the 
social  phenomena  being  analysed.  In  this  study  there  are 
some  composite  variables,  for  example,  wealth  flow,  and 
kin-relationships  in  which  there  is  a  danger  of 
circularity.  It  is,  therefore,  important  for  the  reader  to 
note  from  the  outset  that  there  are  some  similar  elements 
used  in  these  two  composite  variables  which  introduces  the 
possibility  of  circularity  between  the  two  sides  of  the 
logistic  regression  equation  in  some  of  the  research 
reported  later  in  the  thesis.  In  the  author's  view  this 
does  not,  however,  undermine  the  main  findings  of  the 
research  reported  in  later  chapters. 
88 CHAPTER  4 
DIFFERENTIALS  IN  FERTILITY  LEVELS  AND  FERTILITY 
PREFERENCES  IN  JORDAN 
4.1  FERTILITY  LEVELS  AND  DIFFERENTIALS 
In  Jordan  both  urban  and  rural  areas  are  experiencing 
a  downward  trend  in  fertility. 
Table  4.1  shows  that  the  total  fertility  rate  for 
Jordan  varied  between  6.7  (urban)  and  9.2  (rural)  in  1976 
and  6.0  (urban),  and  8.0  (rural)  in  1983.  The  results  also 
show  both  in  urban  and  rural  areas  that  age  specific 
fertility  rates  between  1976  and  1983  declined  at  ages 
below  30,  while  women  above  30  years  of  age  experienced  an 
increase.  This  type  of  pattern  is  usually  observed  in 
populations  during  the  early  stages  of  fertility  decline.  A 
possible  interpretation  of  this  pattern  is  that  natural 
marital  fertility  increased  (see  Table  4.2)  and  that 
contraceptive  use  is  still  not  effective  among  women  over 
35  years  of  age.  Srinivasan  et  al  (1984)  noticed  in  India 
that  greater  use  of  contraceptives  would  imply  lower 
fertility,  but  greater  use  of  contraceptives  would  be 
accompanied  by  a  high  natural  marital  fertility.  The 
relation  of  use  to  actual  marital  fertility  is  not  evident 
a  priori.  This  is  also  suggested  by  Bongaarts  (1985)  who 
found  that  marital  fertility  decreased  only  slightly  during 
the  early  stages  of  the  fertility  transition  because 
increase  in  contraceptive  use  did  little  more  than  offeset 
any  increase  in  natural  marital  fertility.  As  noted  later 
89 in  the  chapter  in  relation  to  Bongaarts'  model,  there  is 
strong  evidence  that  some  countries  such  as  South  Korea  and 
Taiwan  have  experienced  a  major  increase  in  marital 
fertility  prior  to  fertility  decline,  and  this  follows 
historical  patterns  set  in  Europe  where  this  feature  was 
explained  by  a  decline  in  breastfeeding  (Dyson  and  Murphy, 
1985:  425). 
The  decline  in  the  level  of  fertility  among  women 
below  30  years  of  age  reflects  the  increase  in  age  at  first 
marriage  (Table  4.1).  At  the  first  stage  of  fertility 
transition  overall  fertility  decreased  mainly  as  a  result 
of  changes  in  the  pattern  of  marriage,  this  was  the 
experience  of  Europe  (Caldwell,  1978:  82;  Jones,  1981:  95). 
Although  there  have  been  some  attempts  to  control 
fertility,  -  fertility  levels  suggested  that  uncontrolled 
natural  fertility  still  prevail  in  Jordan.  In  Jordan  the 
level  is  quite  consistent  with  that  of  a  natural 
fertility  pattern.  Therefore,  one  can  conclude  that  the 
period  between  1976-1983  was  almost  entirely  characterized 
by  a  regime  of  natural  fertility  within  marriage,  with  only 
very  limited  effective  family  planning  taking  place. 
90 Table  4_1 
Observed  age  specific  fertility  rates  and  total 
fertility  rates 
Age  specific  fertility  rates  (per  1000) 
Region  Year  TFR  ----------------------------------------- 
15-19  20-24  25-29  30-34  35-39  40-44  45-49 
Jordan 
Urban  1976  6.7  63  271  342  312  215  98  38 
Urban  1983  6.0  31  162  291  317  224  120  48 
Rural  1976  9.2  85  407  484  366  272  165  62 
Rural  1983  8.0  33  228  337  373  323  212  98 
Amman  1976  6.1  61  270  323  270  181  87  29 
1983  5.8  32  157  271  313  226  100  52 
Irbid  1976  7.5  73  273  358  369  256  122  44 
1983  6.4  31  178  327  319  231  154  34 
Balga  1983  6.8  0  95  299  499  243  220  0 
Urban  1983  6.4  45  262  438  238  130  158  18 
Other 
Urban*  1976  7.1  57  270  366  346  244  84  48 
-----  - 
1983 
--  -- 
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Karak,  Maan,  and 
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some  sm 
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all  t 
----- 
owns. 
*  Urban  (198  3)  Karak,  Maan. 
Source:  Jordan  fertility  survey  197  6,  fertility  and  family 
heal  th  survey  1983. 
91 Table  4.2 
Observed  total  marital  fertility  rates  and  proportion  of 
total  marital  fertility  accounted  for  by  women  after  their 
30th  birthday 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
1976  1983 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Region  TMF  Fertility  accounted  TMF  Fertility 
for  by  women  after  accounted  for  by 
their  30th  birthday  women  after  their 
%  30th  birthday  % 
Jordan 
Urban  10.1  36  9.8  41 
Rural  11.4  40  11.6  48 
Amman  9.5  33  9.6  40 
Irbid  11.0  39  10.6  40 
Balga  8.3  60 
Other  10.2  39  10.3  28.1 
urban 
Trussell* 
10.3  50.5  10.3  50.5 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
*  Schedule  of  natural  fertility  derived  from  empirical  data 
by  Coale,  Trussell,  1974,1978. 
Source:  Jordan  fertility  survey  1976,  fertility  and  family 
health  survey  1983. 
As  can  be  seen  in  Figure  4.1  the  strength  of  marital 
fertility  is  extremly  great.  This  becomes  more  appearnt 
when  the  value  for  the  age  group  20-24  in  each  schedule  is 
taken  as  100.  Figure  4.1  shows  also  the  similarity  of 
values  for  different  geographical  environments.  There  would 
appear  to  be  a  relatively  homogenous  pattern  of  age 
specific  marital  fertility  rates.  This  is  supported  by  the 
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Fig.  4.1:  Index  values  of  ASMFRS  of  Jordan 
1976-1983  (villages  and  urban  areas) 
93 of  Jordanian  women  with  respect  to  their  aspirations 
concerning  family  size  and  family  planning  (Abdel-Aziz, 
1983:  20). 
Table  4.2  expands  on  the  data  presented  in  Figure  4.1 
by  considering  in  greater  detail  the  fertility 
characteristics  of  women  after  their  30th  birthday. 
Table  4.2  shows  the  proportions  of  total  marital  fertility 
which  is  accounted  for  by  women  of  30  years  of  age  and 
above.  In  populations  where  family  limitation  is 
widespread  the  proportion  drops  to  a  very  low  level,  while 
in  societies  which  are  characterised  by  natural  fertility, 
it  stays  not  surprisingly  close  to  50  per  cent  (Wilson, 
1984:  230). 
Several  theories  have  been  proposed  in  attempts  to 
explain  fertillity  change  in  relation  to  urbanization, 
education,  community  customs  and  other  factors.  As  outlined 
in  Chapter  1  demographers,  social  historian  and  economists 
have  made  a  lot  of  efforts  to  explain  the  fertility 
transition  examining  the  initiation,  course,  speed,  and 
termination. 
An  explanation  of  the  context  which  surrounds  the 
fertility  changes  in  Jordan  will  be  discussed  in  the 
following  chapters,  by  throwing  light  upon  some  family 
aspects.  The  remainder  of  this  chapter  will  concentrate  on 
describing  at  the  macro  scale  fertility  changes  and  changes 
in  proximate  determinants  of  fertility  by  using  Bogaarts' 
Model.  The  need  for  examining  the  differentials  and  changes 
of  proximate  determinants  of  fertility  over  the  course  of 
94 the  fertility  transition  is  very  necessary,  especially  at 
the  onset  of  fertility  transition  when  fertility  rates 
increase  through  the  erosion  of  traditional  restraints, 
such  as  prolonged  lactation  and  nuptiality  ...  etc.  So  it  is 
important  at  this  step  to  evaluate  the  effect  of  proximate 
determinants  on  fertility  by  using  the  available  data  from 
the  surveys  of  1976  and  1983. 
4.2  INTERMEDIATE  VARIABLES 
4.2.1  Pattern  of  marriage 
There  is  an  indication  of  changes  in  the  pattern  of 
marriage  in  Jordan.  These  changes  have  been  both  in  the  age 
at  marriage  and  in  the  proportion  married.  These  changes 
are  expected  during  the  onset  of  the  fertility  transition 
and  have  been  recorded  in  the  demographic  experience  of 
Latin  America  in  the  twentieth  century,  and  in  Western 
Europe  in  the  nineteeth  century  (Dyson  and  Murphy,  1985: 
424). 
Table  4.3  shows  that  the  values  of  the  average  age  at 
marriage  of  females  in  Jordan  was  18  for  Urban  areas  and 
16.8  for  Rural  areas  in  1976.  These  values  rose  to  19.4 
(Urban)  and  18.6  (Ruzal)  by  1983.  The  increase  in  the 
average  age  at  marriage  is  also  reflected  by  the  decline  in 
the  proportion  of  females  ever  married  in  the  15-19,20- 
24,  and  even  in  the  25-29  age  groups  (see  Table  4.4).  The 
negative  relation  between  age  at  marriage  and  proportion  of 
ever  married,  reflects  the  same  trend  in  marriage  patterns. 
95 The  modal  age  of  females  at  marriage  in  1976  was 
between  ages  14  to  18.  This  shifted  upward  in  1983  to 
between  ages  16-19. 
Table  4.3 
Average  age  at  marriage  (female). 
1976  1983 
Jordan 
Urban  18.0  19.4 
Rural  16.8  18.6 
Irbid  17.7  19.5 
Amman  18.2  19.4 
Balga  -  19.6 
Other  Urban  17.8  19.1 
Source:  Jordan  fertility  survey  1976,  fertility  and  family 
health  survey,  1983. 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  age  at  marriage  in  rural 
areas  increased  more  than  in  the  urban  areas.  Table  4.4 
reveals  the  same  result. 
Table  4.3  shows  that  differences  in  age  at  marriage 
between  the  different  regions  are  relatively  small.  The 
average  age  at  marriage  varies  regionally  from  17.7  to  18.2 
in  1976  and  from  19.1  to  19.6  in  1983.  Other  urban  areas 
came  at  the  lower  end  of  the  range  in  1983  and  also  had  the 
highest  proportion  of  married  females  in  the  15-19  and  20- 
24  age  groups  in  1983  (Table  4.4). 
As  can  be  seen  in  Table  4.5  widowhood  is  the  major 
cause  of  the  disolution  of  marriage  in  Jordan.  The  number 
96 of  currently  widowed  and  divorced  women  in  all  the  regions 
was  small  according  to  the  1983  survey. 
Several  reasons  lie  behind  the  changes  in  pattern  of 
marriage.  It  is  not  the  concern  of  this  study  to'provide  a 
comprehensive  socioeconomic,  demographic,  and  cultural 
explanation  of  marriage  changes,  but  it  remains  useful  to 
summarise  the  main  reasons.  One  major  factor  has  been  that 
the  proportion  of  marriages  occuring  between  relatives  has 
diminished  (Faour,  1983:  31).  This  diminution  may  reflect 
the  reduced  influence  of  the  tribe  and  extended  family  in 
arranging  marriages,  especially  in  the  urban  areas  where 
the  alternatives  to  early  marriage  such  as  higher  education 
and  opportunities  for  employment  of  women  in  the  labour 
force  are  greater,  and  at  the  same  time  religious  forces 
are  weaker  (Faour,  1983:  123).  It  seems  unlikely  that 
changes  in  the  pattern  of  marriage  had  a  strong  relation  to 
any  conscious  decision  to  limit  the  size  of  family.  It 
seems  more  probable  that  they  happened  as  a  reflection  of 
changes  in  the  conditions  of  marriage  within  society,  and 
as  result  of  some  economic  constraints. 
97 Table  4.4 
Percentage  of  women  ever  married  by  age  in  Jordan. 
Year  Age 
15-19  20-24  25-29  30-34  35-39  40-44  45-49  19-49 
Jordan 
Urban  1976  16.1  58.5  84.5  94.4  96.4  97.7  98.1  66.3 
Urban  1983  8.6  40.6  74.1  88.8  94.7  97.6  96.8  54.8 
Rural  1976  28.7  77.8  94.1  97.4  99.6  98.6  99.1  76.6 
Rural  1983  11.4  45.7  81.5  93.8  95.9  95.9  100.0  59.1 
Irbid 
1976  16.7  58.2  86.9  95.2  96.9  99.2  98.1  66.6 
1983  9.6  38.0  70.4  84.1  95.2  100.0  95.3  53.3 
Amman 
1976  15.6  58.1  82.6  93.2  96.0  96.7  97.8  65.5 
1983  8.4  42.1  73.1  90.3  94.5  97.1  97.6  55.3 
Balga 
1983  5.2  30.0  82.5  96.4  90.9  93.9.92.6  52.6 
Other 
Urban  1976  16.7  60.1  86.3'  96.3  96.8  97.7  98.9  67.9 
1983  12.5  47.6  92.0  90.5  100.0  100.0  100.0  61.9 
Source:  Jordan  fertility  survey  1976,  Fertility  and  family 
health  survey  1983. 
98 Table  4.5 
Percentage  of  widowed  and  divorced  among  ever  married 
women  1983. 
Divorced  Widowed 
Jordan 
Urban  .  007  .  034 
Rural  .  006  .  035 
Irbid  .  005  .  039 
Amman  .  008  .  034 
Balga  .  000  .  042 
Karak+Maan  .  008  .  016 
Source:  Fertility  and  family  health  survey  1983. 
4.2.2  Breastfeeding 
Table  4.6  reveals  that  the  duration  of  breastfeeding 
is  decreasing.  The  decrease  in  rural  areas  is  more  rapid 
than  in  urban  areas.  Women  in  Amman  recorded  the  shortest 
average  duration  of  breastfeeding  (1983  survey),  while 
Balga  had  the  longest  one.  Regional  differences  both  in 
1976  and  1983  were  not  however  very  big. 
Recently  most  studies  of  breastfeeding  have  been 
more  concerned  with  type 
,  and  frequency  of 
breastfeeding.  The  contraceptive  role  of  breastfeeding 
is  not  a  matter  of  duration  so  much  as  of  the 
intensity  of  breastfeeding,  and  whether  the  breastfeeding 
is  full  or  partial  (Bracher  and  Santow,  1982:  426;  Hill, 
1985). 
99 Table  4.6 
Mean  duration  of  breastfeeding*  in  Jordan  (month,  ). 
1976  1983 
Jordan 
Urban  11.0  9.5 
Rural  15.4  10.5 
Irbid 
Amman 
10.6  9.6 
10.8  8.7 
Balga  -  11.5 
Other  urban  12.2  11.0 
*  Calculated  by  the  researcher  for  ever  married  women  who 
breast  fed  their  last  child  and  are  not  currently 
breastfeeding  on  the  basis  of  the  1976  and  1983  fertility 
survey  tapes. 
Tables  4.7  and  4.8  indicate  that  in  Jordan  weaning  is 
occuring  gradually  and  that  only  partial  breastfeeding 
occurs  throughout  Jordan.  A  considerable  percentage  of 
women  gave  their  children  non-maternal  milk  and  nourishment 
at  very  early  ages.  This  pattern  of  partial  breastfeeding 
was  evident  in  all  the  regions  of  Jordan.  Table  4.9  also 
shows  that  a  considerable  percentage  of  women  in  all  of  the 
regions  had  nursed  their  children  less  than  six  times  a 
day. 
100 Table  4.7 
Percentage  of  currently  married  women  who  are 
simultaneously  breastfeeding  and  giving  non-maternal  milk 




of  child 
6-8 
(month) 
9-11  12+  Total 
Jordan 
Urban  28.6  22.3  9.6  2.6  36.9  100 
Rural  26.6  15.8  8.9  2.4  46.3  100 
Irbid  34.1  19.2  6.1  1.0  39.7  100 
Amman  29.0  23.2  10.0  3.4  34.4  100 
Balga  11.3  25.8  19.4  1.6  42.0  100 
Karak+Maan  20.5  18.2  6.8  0.0  54.5  100 
Source:  Fertility  and  family  health  survey  1983. 
It  would  appear  that  the  marital  fertility  in  Jordan 
is  very  high  among  those  who  are  partially  breastfeeding 
and  do  not  use  contraceptives.  The  presence  of  partial 
breastfeeding  would  make  the  index  of  breastfeeding  -  as 
one  of  the  proximate  determinants  of  fertility-  higher  than 
it  should  be. 
It  should  be  noticed  that  women  who  use 
contraceptives  among  those  who  are  currently  breastfeeding 
would  also  cause  some  overlap  and  make  the  index  of 
contraception  higher  than  it  should  be.  This  overlap  occurs 
in  Jordan  especially  in  the  urban  areas  and  in  Amman  in 
particular  (Table  4.9).  This  overlap  would  produce  an 
underestimation  of  fertility  levels  if  using  Bongaarts 
model. 
101 Table  4.8 
Percentage  of  currently  married  women  who  are  breastfeeding 
and  giving  nourishment  according  to  age  of  child  in  1983 
0-2  3-5  6-8  9-11  12+  Total 
Jordan 
Urban  8.0  50.2  22.5  3.2  16.1  100 
Rural  7.5  57.3  20.5  3.5  11.2  100 
Irbid  6.1  59.2  15.5  2.8  16.4  100 
Amman  8.5  47.1  23.8  3.5  17.1  100 
Balga  6.5  46.8  42.0  0.0  4.8  100 
Karak+Maan  11.4  59.1  9.1  4.5  15.9  100 
Source:  Fertility  and  family  health  survey  1983. 
102 Table  4.9 
Percentage  of  currently  married  women  who  are  breastfeeding 
and  who  nursed  their  children  less  than  6  times  in  the  24 
hours  before  the  1983  fertility  and  family  health  survey, 
and  who  currently  were  using  contraception. 
Nursed  less  than  6  times  Currently  using 
contraceptives 
Jordan 
Urban  41.4  16.2 
Rural  36.0  9.1 
Irbid  43.3  12.1 
Amman  40.9  23.6 
Balga  26.7  8.9 
Karak+Maan  32.4  11.8 
Source:  Fertility  and  family  health  survey  1983. 
103 4.2.3  Contraceptive  use 
As  can  be  seen  in  Table  4.10  the  proportion  of 
couples  of  childbearing  age  practicing  contraception 
increased  in  all  urban  and  rural  areas  between  1976  and 
1983.  There  were  remarkable  regional  differences. 
According  to  the  1983  fertility  and  family  health 
survey.  Amman  and  Irbid  witnessed  a  slight  decrease,  but 
this  seems  likely  to  be  a  result  of  sampling  error  rather 
than  representative  of  a  real  trend. 
Table  4.10 
Percentage  of  currently  married  women  currently  using 
contraceptives. 
Year  Pill  IUD  F.  M.  Sterilization  Others  Total 
Jordan 
Urban  1976  13.6  2.7  2.0  11.3  29.6 
Urban  1983  9.0  10.5  4.0  8.3  31.8 
Rural  1976  3.4  0.1  0.9  2.7  7.1 
Rural  1983  4.3  2.0  2.5  3.6  12.4 
Irbid  1976  9.1  1.2  2.1  7.8  20.2 
1983  7.9  5.3  1.4  5.0  19.6 
Amman  1976  17.6  4.6  1.9  15.0  39.1 
1983  9.9  12.6  5.2  9.6  37.3 
Balga  1983  6.7  11.0  2.5  8.6  28.8 
Other  1976  10.9  2.0  2.0  9.2  24.1 
Urban  1983  6.8  11.1  5.1  11.1  34.1 
Source:  Jordan  fertility  survey  1976,  Fertility  and  family 
health  survey  1983. 
104 Table  4.11  indicates  that  the  majority  of  women  used 
contraceptives  for  controlling  rather  than  for  spacing 
births.  The  tendency  towards  birth  control  is  evident  in 
all  regions  and  in  both  urban  and  rural  environments. 
This  general  trend  is  also  supported  by  the  figures  of 
Table  4.10  where  the  proportion  of  women  who  used  highly 
effective  methods  increased  between  1976  and  1983  in  all 
regions. 
The  proportion  of  women  who  used  the  Pill  in  urban 
areas  is  decreasing  and  the  proportion  of  women  who  used 
IUD  is  increasing.  This  reveals  that  the  users  of 
contraceptives  prefer  IUD  to  the  Pill  despite  the  fact  that 
both  methods  have  approximately  the  same  effectiveness. 
Table  4.11 





Birth  controlling 
1976  1983 
Jordan 
Urban  32.5  25.1  76.5  74.9 
Rural  34.2  24.2  65.8  75.8 
Irbid  30.1  35.0  69.9  65.0 
Amman  31.5  23.4  68.5  76.6 
Balqa  -  26.3  -  73.7 
Other  urban  34.2  22.9  65.8  77.1 
Source:  Jordan  fertility  survey  1976,  fertility  and  family 
health  survey  1983. 
105 4.3  EFFECT  OF  PROXIMATE  DETERMINANTS  ON  FERTILITY 
A  convenient  approach  to  quantifying  the  effect  of 
the  proximate  determinants  is  to  consider  them  as 
inhibitors  of  fertility  (Bongaarts,  et  al,  1984;  Singh,  et 
al,  1985;  Hobcraft  and  Little,  1984).  The  term  "proximate 
determinants"  was  introduced  by  Davis  and  Blake  (1956). 
Bongaarts  made  an  important  advance  in  relation  to  this 
framework  by  using  aggregate  data  for  41  different 
populations  (Bongaarts,  1978)  and  by  developing  a 
mathematical  model  that  quantifies  the  relationship  between 
fertility  and  its  proximate  determinants  (Bongaarts  and 
Potter,  1983). 
Figure  4.2  explains  the  relationship  between 
fertility  inhibition  effects  of  proximate  variables  and 
various  measures  of  fertility  .  If  the  effect  of  the  index 
of  marriage  is  zero,  and  changes  in  fertility  levels  are 
absent,  fertility  will  increase  to  level  TM  (total  marital 
fertility  rate).  If  the  effect  of  contraceptive  use  and 
induced  abortion  are  eliminated,  fertility  will  rise 
further  to  level  TN  (total  natural  marital  fertility),  and 
if  post-partum  infecundability  is  absent  then  it  will  rise 
to  TF  (total  fecundity). 
A  comparison  between  estimated  and  observed  total 
fertility  rates,  reveals  that  there  is  good  agreement 
between  estimated  and  observed  fertility  levels  (Bongaarts 
and  Potter,  1983:  91).  Despite  this  agreement  the  model  was 
not  formulated  to  produce  a  new  method  of  estimating 
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Fig.  4.2:  Relationships  between  the  fertility- 
inhibiting  effects  of  the  intermediate 
variables  and  various  measures  of 
fertility  (Bongaarts,  1985:  154). 
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fertility  levels.  Indeed  Bongaarts  (1985)  has  listed  a 
wide  range  of  errors  implicit  in  his  methodology. 
By  comparing  estimated  total  fertility  rates  with 
observed  total  fertility  rates  in  Jordan,  it  was  found  that 
the  levels  of  observed  total  fertility  and  observed  total 
marital  fertility  rates  are  more  than  those  estimated  by 
applying  Bongaarts'  model  (see  Tables  4.1,4.2,4.12).  The 
small  differences  between  the  observed  and  predicted  values 
do  not  appear  to  arise  from  the  total  fecundity  rate  (TF), 
because  TF  is  relatively  invariant.  The  differences  mostly 
come  from  the  underestimation  of  natural  marital  fertility 
rates  and  marital  fertility  rates,  probably  because  of  the 
overlap  discussed  above  and  the  pattern  of  breastfeeding. 
The  equation  used  to  estimate  postpartum  amenorrhea  does 
not  take  partial  breastfeeding  into  consideration.  The  type 
and  intensity  of  breastfeeding  are  just  as  important  as  the 
duration  of  breastfeeding  in  predicting  fertility  levels 
(Bongaarts  and  Potter,  1983;  Hill,  1985;  Huffman  et  al, 
1978). 
The  main  reason  for  introducing  discussion  of  the 
proximate  determinants  in  this  chapter  is  not  however,  to 
arrive  at  precise  fertility  estimates.  Rather  it  is  to  use 
the  proximate  determinants  approach  to  illumine  aspects  of 
the  fertility  transition  in  Jordan  . 
In  examining  the  transition  from  natural  to 
controlled  fertility  Bongaarts  model  was  developed  to 
examine  changes  in  fertility  measures  over  the  course  of 
the  transition.  This  development  comes  by  using  a 
108 comparative  analysis  of  populations  at  different  points  in 
the  transition.  The  result  of  this  is  an  outline  of  a 
typical  synthetic  transition  of  the  kind  found  in 
contemporary  developing  countries  in  contrast  to  the 
observed  pattern  of  fertility  . 
Table  4.12  summarizes  the  estimated  values  of  the 
proximate  determinants  and  the  associated  fertility 
measures.  The  presented  evidence  gives  a  basis  for 
evaluating  the  nature  of  fertility  change  in  Jordan.  As 
mentioned  previously,  Jordan  and  its  different  regions  both 
urban  and  rural  are  experiencing  decline  in  observed  and 
estimated  fertility. 
It  is  obvious  that  the  natural  marital  fertility 
rates  are  increasing  in  Jordan  because  of  the  rapidly 
decreasing  influence  of  post-partum  infecundability  between 
1976  and  1983.  It  appears  that  this  increase  has  been  more 
rapid  in  rural  than  in  urban  areas.  One  should  note  that 
the  increase  of  marital  fertility  rates  has  not  stopped  the 
overall  decline  of  total  fertility  rates  because  of  the 
effects  of  the  changing  index  of  marriage  and  of 
contraceptive  use  are  more  than  the  effect  of  the  index  of 
post-partum  infecundability. 
Table  4.13,  reveals  that  contraceptive  use  is  the 
major  component  which  affects  fertility  in  urban  Jordan 
both  in  1976  and  1983.  Contraception  plays  the  same  major 
role  in  Amman  and  other  urban  in  1976  and  1983.  Increasing 
the  quantity  and  quality  of  contraceptive  use  was  the 
109 reason  behind  its  more  effective  role  in  urban  areas.  Rural 
areas  have  witnessed  remarkable  progress  in  the  use  of 
contraception.  But  its  effect  is  still  weak  in  rural  areas 
by  comparison  with  the  cities.  It  appears  that  the  pattern 
of  marriage  had  the  most  important  influence  on  fertility 
in  rural  areas  in  1983. 
In  summary.  Table  4.14  suggests  that  the  fertility 
regime  in  Jordan  is  typical  of  a  country  at  the  onset  of 
fertility  decline.  Urban  areas  are  approaching  or  are 
experiencing  the  second  phase  of  the  fertility  transition. 
This  phase  is  generally  characterized  by  increasing  marital 
fertility  and  at  the  same  time  increasingly  effective  use 
of  contraceptives. 
Amman  is  the  only  environment  which  could  be  said  by 
1983  to  be  approaching  the  third  phase.  Rural  areas 
mostly  have  high  stable  fertility  levels.  There  were  no 
important  changes  in  rural  areas  between  1976  and  1983 
except  with  regard  to  changes  in  the  pattern  of  marriage 
and  post  partum  infecundability,  which  suggests  that  rural 
areas  remained  firmly  in  the  first  phase  of  the  transition. 
Finally  it  should  be  noted  that  some  regions  other  than 
Amman  appear  to  have  recently  entered  the  second  phase  of 
the  fertility  transition. 
In  general  fertility  in  Amman  is  witnessing  a 
departure  from  natural  to  controlled  fertility  ,  and  this 
departure  is  accompanied  by  a  shortening  of  post-partum 
infecundability,  an  increase  in  effective  contraceptive 
use,  and  a  decline  in  the  proportion  ever  married.  The 
110 other  regions  are  witnessing  a  slow  departure  from  natural 
to  controlled  fertility.  In  the  rural  areas  the  movement 
from  natural  to  controlled  fertility  has  not  yet  occurred. 
Post-partum  infecundability  and  marriage  factors  are  more 
effective  than  the  impact  of  contraceptive  use  in 
determining  fertility  levels.  In  summarising,  it  would  be 
fair  to  say  that  this  pattern  resembles  the  pattern  of 
transition  experienced  in  many  developing  countries. 
111 Table  4.12 
The  indices  of  intermediate  fertility  variables  and  total, 
marital,  and  natural  marital  fertility  rates  in  Jordan. 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Jordan  Irbid  Amman 
Year  Urban  Rural 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
1-Prevalence  of  contr-  1976  .  296  .  071  .  202  .  391 
aceptive  use 
1983  .  318  .  124  .  196  .  373 
2-Index  of  marriage  1976  .  663  .  807  .  682  .  642 
1983  .  612  .  690  .  604  .  604 
3-Index  of  contrac-  1976  .  733  .  936  .  817  .  649 
eptive  use 
1983  .  699  .  883 
.  815  .  646 
4-Index  of  post-  1976  .  800  .  710 
.  808  .  804 
partum  infecun- 
dability  1983  .  831  .  811  .  829  .  847 
5-Total  fertility  1976  5.9  8.2  6.9  5.1 
rate 
1983  5.4  7.6  6.2  5.1 
6-Total  marital  1976  9.0  10.2  10.1  8.0 
fertility  rate 
1983  8.9  11.0  10.4  8.4 
7-Total  natural  1976  12.2  10.9  12.4  12.3 
marital  fertility 
rate  1983  12.7  12.4  12.7  13.0 







----------------------------  ----------  ------- 
Urban 
-------------- 
1-Prevalence  of  con-  1976  -  .  241 
traceptive  use 
1983  .  288  .  341 
2-Index  of  marriage  1976  -  .  696 
1983  .  819  .  621 
3-Index  of  contra-  1976  -  .  784 
ceptive  use 
1983  .  730 
.  681 
4-Index  of  post-  1976  -  .  776 
partum  infecund- 
ability  1983  .  784 
.  800 
5-Total  fertility  1976  -  6.5 
rate 
1983  7.2  5.2 
6-Total  marital  1976  -  9.3 
fertility  rate 
1983  8.8  8.3 
7-Total  natural  1976  -  11.9 
marital  fertility 
rate  1983  12.0  12.2 
Source:  Jordan  fertility  survey,  1976,  fertility  and 
family  health  survey,  1983. 
113 Table  4.13 
Percentage  of  the  reduction  of  total  fecundity  rate 
contributed  by  index  of  post  partum  infecundability  Ci, 
index  of  contraception  Cc,  and  index  of  marriage  Cm. 
Index  Ci 





Index  Cm 






Urban  33  26  34  38  33  36  100  100 
Rural  62  38  9.9  18  28  44  100  100 
Irbid  35  29  27  25  38  46  100  100 
Amman  29  23  42  45  29  32  100  100 
Balga  -  40  -  40  -  20  -  100 
Other 
urban  39  31  30  39  31  30  100  100 
Source:  Jordan  fertility  survey  1976,  fertility  and  family 
health  survey  1983. 
114 Table  4.14 
The  phase  of  the  fertility  transition  in  Jordan  as 
indicated  by  the  intermediate  fertility  variables,  and  the 
total  and  natural  marital  fertility  rates 
Jordan  Irbid  Amman 
Year  Urban  Rural  t 
1-Prevalence  of  con-  1976  II  I  I  III 
traceptive  use 
1983  II  I  I  III 
2-Index  of  marriage  1976  II  I  II  II 
1983  II  II  II  II 
3-Index  of  contra-  1976  II  I  I  III 
ceptive  use 
1983  II  I  I  III 
4-Index  of  post  1976  II  I  II  II 
partum  infecun- 
dability  1983  II  II  II  III 
5-Total  fertility  1976  II  I  I  II 
rate 
1983  II  I  I  II 
6-Total  marital  1976  I  I  I  II 
fertility  rate 
1983  I  I  I  II 
7-Total  natural  1976  II  I  II  II 
marital  fertility 
rate  1983  II  II  II  III 
115 Table  4.14  (Contd.  ) 
Year  Balga  Other 
Urban 
1-Prevalence  of  con-  1976  -  II 
traception  use 
1983  II  II 
2-Index  of  marriage  1976  -  II 
1983  II  II 
3-Index  of  contrac-  1976  -  I 
eptive  use 
1983  II  II 
4-Index  of  post  1976  -  II 
partum  infecunda- 
bility  1983  II  II 
5-Total  fertility  1976  -  I 
rate 
1983  I  II 
6-Total  marital  1976  -  I 
fertility  rate 
1983  I  II 
,ý 
7-Total  natural  1976  -  II 
marital  fertility 
rate  1983  II  II 
Source:  Jordan  fertility  survey  1976,  fertility  and  family 
health  survey,  1983. 
116 4.4.  DIFFERENTIALS  IN  FERTILITY  PREFERENCES 
Fertility  preferences  are  generally  believed  to  be 
very  important  in  influencing  behaviour  (Lightbourne,  1984; 
Lightbourne  and  MacDonald,  1982;  Abdulah  and  Harewood, 
1984;  Berent,  1983).  There  is  evidence  from  many  countries 
which  suggests  that  a  significant  fertility  decline  is 
preceded  by  a  reduction  in  fertility  preferences 
(Lightbourne  and  MacDonald,  1982).  Fertility  preferences 
have  an  influence  on  patterns  of  childbearing,  with  for 
example,  those  wishing  to  have  a  lower  number  of  children 
being  much  more  likely  to  use  contraceptives.  This  in  turn 
affects  fertility  levels  (Abdulah  and  Harewood,  1984). 
There  have  been  many  studies  which  have  shown  that 
contraceptive  behaviour  by  which  fertility  behaviour  is 
affected,  is  highly  influenced  by  fertility  preferences 
(Kim  and  Choi,  1981;  Abdulah  and  Harewood,  1984). 
Several  variables  have  been  used  by  researchers  as 
indicators  of  fertility  preferences:  - 
1.  Whether  more  children  are  wanted. 
2.  Whether  the  last  live  birth  or  current  pregnancy  was 
wanted. 
3.  Whether  "total  number  of  children  desired"  exceeds, 
equals  or  is  less  than  the  actual  number  of  living 
children. 
4.  Total  number  of  children  desired. 
These  above  listed  variables  could  be  argued  to  be 
alternatives  to  each  other.  For  example,  comparing  the 
ratio  of  total  number  of  children  desired  to  the  actual 
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proportion  of  couples  not  wanting  the  last  live  birth  (if 
the  actual  number  of  children  exceeds  the  total  number 
desired).  Similarly,  this  measure  is  closely  related  to 
the  proportion  of  couples  wanting  no  more  children.  The 
similarities  of  these  measures  may,  however,  be  deceptive. 
For  example,  when  respondents  claimed  that  the  last  live 
birth  or  current  pregnancy  was  not/has  not  been  wanted,  it 
could  be  argued  either  that  respondents  wanted  no  more 
children  or  that  they  desired  a  greater  spacing  between  the 
birth  of  their  children.  Adding  the  question  "How  many 
additional  children  do  you  want?  "  to  the  question  about 
total  desired  number  of  children  is  therefore  not  mere 
duplication,  but  helps  in  constructing  a  variable  defining 
"wanted  family  size"  (Lightbourne  and  MacDonald,  1982). 
4.4.1  Studies  of  fertility  preferences  in  Jordan 
The  world  fertility  survey  (WFS)  in  Jordan,  1976, 
collected  data  which  covers  all  four  of  these  fertility 
preference  variables.  By  contrast  the  Jordanian  fertility, 
and  family  health  survey  of  1983  contained  only  the  first 
two  variables  mentioned  above.  Both  of  these  two  fertility 
surveys  (1976,1983)  asked  married  women  about  their 
fertility  preferences.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  in 
1985  the  Department  of  Statistics  drew  another  sample  using 
the  1983  fertility  survey  as  the  sampling  frame.  In  the 
1985  survey,  husbands  were  asked  about  their  fertility 
preferences. 
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answers  in  1985,  in  terms  of  fertility  preferences,  it  was 
found  that  wives  were  approximately  three  times  more  likely 
than  their  husbands  to  answer  that  their  last  pregnancy  was 
unwanted  (Department  of  Statistics,  1985).  Furthermore, 
30%  of  wives  who  had  declared  that  they  did  not  want  more 
children  in  1983  had  had  an  additional  birth  in  the 
interval  between  1983  and  1985  (Department  of  Statistics, 
1985).  This  result  may  suggest  that  husbands  in  Jordan 
still  control  the  fertility  decision. 
Another  interesting  result  revealed  by  the  1985 
survey  was  that  more  than  half  of  all  husbands  held  a 
fatalistic  attitude  towards  family  size.  For  example, 
their  attitudes  toward  contraception  are  negative,  and 
their  concern  about  regulated  fertility  is  low.  But  at  the 
same  time  it  seems  that  the  education  of  husbands  is 
inversely  related  to  the  likelihood  of  them  holding  a 
fatalistic  attitude  towards  family  size.  For  example,  it 
was  found  that  husbands  with  higher  education  desired 
smaller  family  sizes  than  those  with  lower  educational 
attainment.  The  1985  survey  also  revealed  that  knowledge 
of  methods  of  contraception  was  strongly  correlated  with 
husband's  education.  Therefore,  fertility  decline  is 
impeded  by  male  attitudes  to  family  size  and  fertility 
behaviour. 
For  comparative  purposes  this  thesis  considers  only 
two  of  the  fertility  preference  indicators:  whether  more 
children  are  wanted,  and  whether  the  last  live  birth  was 
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4.4.2.  Proportions  wanting  no  more  children,  Jordan, 
1976,1983. 
Analysis  of  the  percentage  of  women  who  do  not  want 
more  children  provides  one  measure  of  how  widespread  is  the 
desire  to  control  fertility  and  to  stop  childbearing. 
Table  4.15  shows  that  there  was  a  higher  percentage  of 
currently  married  Jordanian  women  who  do  not  want  more 
children  in  1983  than  in  1976.  This  was  true  in  all 
regions  of  the  country  as  well  as  in  both  urban  and  rural 
environments. 
It  can  be  noticed  that  the  percentage  change  was 
higher  among  those  women  with  only  a  small  number  of  living 
children  and  that  this  held  for  all  regions.  For  example, 
in  urban  areas  the  percentage  change  was  108.1  and  49.8  for 
those  women  who  had  one  and  two  living  children 
respectively.  In  rural  areas  these  percentage  changes  were 
86.6  and  51.8  for  the  same  groups  of  women.  These  results 
may  simply  reflect  the  fact  that  in  1976  a  relatively  high 
proportion  of  women  with  a  large  number  of  living  children 
already  wanted  no  more  children.  This  meant  that  anv 
increase  in  the  proportions  of  these  women  wishing  no 
further  children  was  constrained  simply  because  of  the 
nature  of  closed  ratio  statistics.  By  contrast,  among 
those  women  with  only  a  small  number  of  living  children, 
the  proportion  of  women  who  wanted  no  more  children  in  1976 
was  relatively  small  which  provided  the  opportunity  for  a 
high  percentage  change.  In  addition  to  the  above 
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changes  had  taken  place  in  attitudes  toward  family  size 
preferences  among  women  with  a  small  number  of  living 
children,  particularly  among  young  married  women. 
The  overall  conclusion  suggested  by  Table  4.15  is 
that  the  proportion  of  women  wanting  no  more  children 
increased  markedly  through  time  with  increasing  family 
size.  An  interesting  secondary  effect  is  that  percentage 
change  was  less  in  larger  families  although  it  was  nearly 
always  present.  For  example,  in  urban  areas  amongst  women 
with  only  one  child  there  was  an  increase  in  the  proportion 
wanting  no  more  from  9.9%  to  20.6%  of  the  total  (i.  e.  more 
than  a  doubling  of  the  proportion),  while  amongst  women 
with  more  than  seven  children  the  shift  was  small  from 
78.5%  to  81.1%  wanting  no  more  children  (a  shift  of  only 
just  over  3%).  The  pace  at  which  preferences  for  small 
families  is  growing  is  therefore  most  marked  as  reflected 
in  these  surveys.  It  is  also  noticeable  that  in  Amman 
prefered  family  size  is  much  smaller  than  elsewhere  in 
Jordan. 
4.4.3.  Proportions  not  wanting  the  last  live  birth 
Table  4.16  reveals  that  unwanted  fertility  rose 
remarkably  with  the  age  of  mother  (both  in  1976  and  1983). 
For  example,  between  ages  15-19  in  urban  areas,  10.4%  of 
women  did  not  want  the  last  birth.  This  percentage  jumped 
to  50.0%  for  women  between  ages  45-49  in  1983.  In  rural 
areas  the  same  pattern  can  be  seen,  where  the  percentages 
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respectively.  In  general,  Table  4.16  shows  approximately 
the  same  situation  for  all  regions. 
Table  4.16  also  reveals  that  unwanted  fertility 
proportions  fluctuate  between  ages  30-34  to  45-49  in  1976 
and  1983.  One  can  notice  that  some  negative  signs  appear 
with  regard  to  percentage  change,  especially  for  older 
women.  Such  cases  could  be  interpreted  as  a  reflection  of 
a  higher  percentage  of  older  women  seeking  to  control  their 
fertility.  Positive  percentage  changes  could  reveal  that  a 
higher  percentage  of  women  are  now  aware  of  their  fertility 
preferences,  although  at  the  time  of  the  survey  they  may 
not  have  had  effective  control  over  their  preferences 
because  their  husbands  continued  to  control  the  fertility 
decision. 
Data  on  the  proportion  of  unwanted  last  live  births 
can  be  used  to  estimate  its  effect  on  the  fertility  level 
(Lightbourne  and  MacDonald,  1982;  Lightbourne,  1985; 
Lightbourne,  1984).  Estimating  the  effect  can  be  done  by 
relating  the  number  of  recent  births  (number  of  births  to 
respondents  in  the  12  months  preceding  the  interview)  to 
the  total  number  of  women  in  the  productive  age  cohorts. 
The  estimation  of  the  wanted  total  fertility  rate 
requires  the  following  steps: 
1.  Calculate  percentage  of  births,  which  are  unwanted  by 
age  of  mother  in  the  cohorts  15-49  years. 
2.  Calculate  age  specific  fertility  rates  (ASFRS). 
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2.  The  result  will  be  the  "estimated"  reduction  in 
ASFRs. 
4.  Finally,  the  wanted  total  fertility  rate  (WTFR)  can  be 
calculated.  The  wanted  total  fertility  rate  can  be 
considered  as  an  alternative  measure  of  desired  family 
size  (Lightbourne,  1984). 
Table  4.17  demonstrates  that  there  is  a  gap  between 
the  actual  total  fertility  rate  and  the  wanted  total 
fertility  rate,  in  the  different  regions  of  Jordan.  The 
gap  is  greater  in  1983  than  in  1976  in  all  regions  except 
in  the  category  "other  urban".  The  small  size  of  sample  in 
"other  urban"  could  cause  this  exceptional  figure,  where 
there  were  fewer  than  15  married  women  in  two  of  the  five 
age  groups. 
It  is  worth  mentioning  here  that  Lightbourne  (1985: 
188)  studied  the  differences  between  actual  total  fertility 
rate  and  wanted  total  fertility  rate  covering  several 
countries.  He  considered  that  the  differences  between 
actual  and  wanted  total  fertility  represented  the  potential 
for  fertility  decline,  through  fertility  control.  This 
potential  reduction  was  considered  "negligible"  if  the 
differentials  ranged  between  0.10  and  0.20  births,  and 
"moderate"  for  differentials  ranging  between  0.3  and  0.5 
births.  Gaps  of  0.6  births  and  over  relative  to  the  TFR 
were  considered  as  a  situation  offering  a  high  potential 
fertility  decline.  Accordingly,  in  Jordan  (Table  4.17, 
Col.  3)  it  would  suggest  that  there  is  a  high  potential  for 
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The  estimated  reduction  which  could  be  achieved  is 
listed  in  Col.  3  of  table  4.17.  This  reveals  that  the  level 
of  potential  reduction  is  about  two  births  in  all  regions 
except  Irbid  where  the  gap  between  TFR  and  WTFR  is  even 
greater.  There  was  relatively  little  variation  in  the 
estimated  potential  reduction  between  regions  evident  in 
1976.  While  in  1983  estimated  reduction  was  equal  to  or 
exceeded  two  births  except  in  the  category  in  "other 
urban",  there  was  again  relatively  little  variation  in  the 
estimated  reduction  between  regions. 
Table  4.17  shows  that  potential  fertility  decline 
remained  stable  in  urban  areas  between  1976  and  1983; 
estimated  reduction  in  TFR  was  1.9  in  both  years.  In 
contrast,  the  potential  fertility  reduction  which  could  be 
achieved  rose  to  2.3  births  in  rural  areas  in  1983.  on  the 
assumption  that  fertility  preferences  do  influence 
fertility  trends,  one  can  predict  the  most  significant 
future  decline  in  rural  areas. 
The  assumption  stated  above  is,  however,  a 
considerable  one  to  make  in  a  male  dominated  Islamic 
society  (Weeks,  1988).  Clearly,  if  the  assumption  had  held 
a  much  greater  decline  in  fertility  would  already  have 
taken  place  in  all  regions  of  Jordan  during  the  period  of 
study.  A  full  implementation  of  fertility  preferences 
clearly  did  not  occur  however.  Nor  is  such  a  full 
implementation  of  preferences  likely  to  happen  in  the 
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dominated  by  husbands  within  the  Arab  household. 
4.5  CONCLUSIONS 
It  can  be  concluded  from  this  chapter  that  overall 
national  fertility  levels  were  experiencing  the  onset  of 
fertility  decline  between  1976-1983.  The  decline  was  more 
rapid  in  urban  than  in  rural  areas.  In  contrast,  marital 
fertility  levels  were  relatively  stable  or  slightly 
increasing  in  some  regions. 
Data  suggests  that  short  duration  of  breastfeeding 
negatively  affected  natural  marital  fertility  levels  in  all 
regions  other  than  Amman,  where  contraceptive  use  seemed  to 
have  a  significant  role.  It  is  possible  to  say  that  change 
in  marriage  patterns  has  had  the  most  influential  role  on 
overall  fertility.  The  above  results  are  to  be  expected  in 
a  society  like  Jordan  which  is  experiencing  the  onset  of 
fertility  decline. 
It  was  found  that  the  intermediate  variables  are 
changing;  age  at  marriage  for  women  is  increasing,  duration 
of  breastfeeding  is  decreasing,  and  the  practice  of 
contraception  is  increasing. 
There  are  no  big  differences  between  regions  in  terms 
of  age  at  marriage  and  duration  of  breastfeeding,  but 
spatial  variations  are  remarkable  with  regard  to 
contraceptive  use. 
There  was  a  higher  percentage  of  Jordanian  women  who 
did  not  want  more  children  in  1983  than  in  1976.  This  is 
true  in  all  regions  of  the  country  as  well  as  in  both  urban 
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proportion  of  women  wanting  no  more  children  increased 
markedly  through  time  with  increasing  family  size.  It  is 
noticeable  that  in  Amman  prefered  family  size  is  much 
smaller  than  elsewhere  in  Jordan. 
The  results  demonstrate  that  there  is  a  gap  between 
the  actual  total  fertility  rate  and  the  wanted  total 
fertility  rate  in  the  different  regions  of  Jordan.  These 
results  also  suggest  that  there  is  a  high  potential  for 
reduction  of  the  TFR  in  all  regions  of  the  country.  The 
potential  for  fertility  decline  remained  stable  in  urban 
areas  between  1976  and  1983.  In  contrast,  it  had  risen  in 
rural  areas  by  1983. 
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Proportions  of  married  women  who  wanted  no  more  children, 
by  region  and  year. 
Regions  and  Number  of  living  children 
years  01234.56  7+ 
Jordan 
Urban  1976  3.1  9.9  21.1  38.9  41.1  63.7  63.3  78.5 
1983  0.0  20.6  31.6  40.0  58.6  62.9  74.0  81.1 
change  108.1  49.8  2.8  42.6  -1.3  16.9  3.3 
Rural  1976  2.5  6.7  13.9  14.0  26.4  31.7  43.2  63.8 
1983  0.0  12.5  21.1  33.8  32.0  44.1  58.2  72.1 
change  86.6  51.8  141.4  21.2  39.1  34.7  13.0 
Amman  1976  4.3  9.4  27.6  43.0  44.1  63.6  73.2  78.2 
1983  .  0.0  22.4  33.3  44.4  63.5  67.6  77.8  84.9 
change  138.3  20.7  3.2  44.0  6.3  6.3  8.6 
Irbid  & 
Zarka  1976  2.8  7.5  11.8  35.1  37.2  73.2  48.0  78.1 
1983  0.0  20.0  24.1  23.5  43.1  55.0  64.3  69.3 
change  166.7  104.2  -33.0  15.9  -24.9  34.0  -11.3 
Other 
urban  1976  0.0  16.7  8.3  30.6  35.1  52.9  55.6  75.5 
1983  0.0*  0.0*  30.8  31.3  52.9  50.0  73.1  82.5 
change  271.1  2.3  50.7  -5.5  31.5  9.3 
*  Cases  less  than  15. 
Source:  Jordan  Fertilit  y  Survey  1976,  Fertility  and  Family 
Hea  lth  Survey,  1983. 
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Percentage  of  births  which  were  unwanted,  by  age  of  their 
mother,  region  and  year  (births  in  the  year  preceding 
survey). 
Region  and 
Year  15-19  20-24 
Age  of 
25-29 
mother 
30-34  35-39  40-44  45-49 
Jordan 
Urban  1976  0.0  6.3  21.9  35.4  46.6  68.0  16.7 
1983  10.4  18.0  30.8  35.6  35.2  35.2  50.0 
change  -  185.7  40.6  0.6  -24.5  -48.2  199.4 
Rural  1976  2.9  7.4  11.1  24.1  30.0  52.4  20.0 
1983  10.5  22.2  26.4  26.4  37.7  33.3  35.7 
%  change  262.1  200.0  137.8  9.5  25.7  36.5  78.5 
Amman  1976  0.0  6.0  22.4  28.0  57.1  66.7  0.0 
1983  5.9  20.0  32.8  37.5  34.1  35.5  53.8 
%  change  -  233.3  46.4  33.9  -40.3  -46.8  - 
Irbid  & 
Zarka  1976  0.0  2.7  25.0  54.2  33.3  72.7  50.0 
1983  18.2  18.4  33.3  30.6  48.3  38.5  33.3 
change  -  581.5  33.2  -43.5  45.0  -47.0  -33.4 
Other 
urban  1976  0.0  13.6  17.1  31.8  38.9  60.0  0.0 
1983  33.3*  9.1  10.1  20.0  0.0  66.7  50.0* 
%  change  -  -33.1  -40.9  -37.1  0.0  11.2  - 
Balga  1983  0.0*  0.0  18.2  41.7  12.5  14.3  0.0 
*  Cases  les  s  than  15 
Source:  Jo  rdan  Fertility  Survey  1976,  Fertility  and  Family 
He  alth  Survey  1983. 
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Estimating  the  reduction  to  the  total  fertility  rate  (TFR) 
if  all  unwanted  births  were  prevented,  by  regions  and  year. 
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Jordan 
Urban  1976  6.7  4.8  1.9  28.4 
1983  6.0  4.1  1.9  31.7 
Rural  1976  9.2  7.4  1.8  19.6 
1983  8.0  5.7  2.3  28.8 
Amman  1976  6.1  4.5  1.6  26.2 
1983  5.8  3.9  1.9  32.8 
Irbid  & 
Zarka  1976  7.5  5.0  2.5  33.3 
1983  6.4  4.2  2.2  34.4 
Other 
urban  1976  7.1  5.3  1.8  25.3 
1983  6.4  5.6  0.8  12.5 
Balga  1983  6.8  4.8  2.0  29.4 
Source:  Jordan  fertility  survey  1976,  fertility  and  family 
health  survey,  1983. 
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FAMILY  CHANGE 
5.1.  INTRODUCTION 
The  nature  of  family  change  has  been  much  'debated, 
especially  in  relation  to  changes  in  the  bases  for  family 
structures.  Important  research  on  this  subject  has  tended 
to  reflect  the  experience  of  European  family  change 
(Caldwell,  1982;  Stone,  1977;  Goode,  1963).  Attempts  to 
model  family  change  in  developing  countries  have  often 
assumed  a  transfer  of  the  European  situation  to  other 
contexts.  Caldwell  (1982:  149,150)  for  example,  has 
suggested  that  the  developing  countries  have  to  a  greater 
or  lesser  degree  adopted  the  Western  ideology  of  the 
family.  In  his  work  and  that  of  others  (Stone,  1977), 
family  change  in  developing  countries  is  expected  to  follow 
a  parallel  course  to  those  experienced  in  N.  W.  Europe  from 
before  the  industrial  revolution  through  until  the 
twentieth  century.  Caldwell  emphasizes  that  some  cultural 
changes,  involving  modification  of  social  norms,  occured 
before  industrialization  in  the  west.  These  changes 
affected  familial  relationships  and  led  him  to  the 
conclusion  that  structural  economic  changes  were  not 
necessarly  the  prime  catalyst  of  social  change.  Indeed  he 
goes  as  far  as  to  state  that  in  pre-industrial  society 
there  is  no  need  for  there  to  be  a  structural  economic 
mechanism  for  there  to  be  changes  in  family  relations 
(Caldwell,  1982:  135). 
Some  commentators  would  find  these  arguments 
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important  social  values  cannot  happen  independently  from 
structural  economic  changes.  Indeed  historical  evaluations 
indicate  that  there  were  significant  structural  economic 
changes  in  progress  in  pre-industrial  England  which 
provided  the  background  for  the  changes  in  social  values 
and  in  family  structure  (Thadani,  1978;  Moore,  1966; 
Goodsell,  1915). 
The  interrelationship  between  structural  changes  and 
value  changes  can  well  be  illustrated  from  the  European 
case.  In  Europe  from  the  fifth  to  ninth  centuries  tribal 
groups  were  the  prime  social  unit  influencing  the  family 
system.  Family  relationships  were  affected  by  the  ideology 
and  values  of  the  tribe.  "The  great  family  or  'rippe' 
among  Germanic  races  was  the  fundamental  institution  of 
private  law  ...  In  consequence  the  'sippe'  had  large 
powers  over  each  household  as  well  as  over  the  individuals 
composing  it.  The  family  as  a  whole  could  protect  a  child 
even  from  his  father"  (Goodsell,  1915:  183). 
When  this  institution  gave  way  to  the  church,  the 
church  provided  the  values  determinig  new  social  structures 
and  governing  existing  social  units.  This  change 
inevitably  influenced  the  family's  values,  and 
relationships.  For  example,  during  the  last  centuries  of 
the  'Anglo-Saxon  Regime'  the  church  attempted  to  persuade 
oppressed  women  to  live  in  religious  houses  and  arranged  a 
"spiritual  marriage"  for  them  (Goodsell,  1915;  Murstein, 
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The  above  historical  examples  are  evidence  of  changes 
in  family  structure,  authority  and  relationships  resulting 
from  broader  social  and  societal  change  in  pre-industrial 
Europe.  These  types  of  change  can  have  profound  effects  on 
childbearing  within  the  family,  as  can  be  shown  both 
historically,  and  in  contemporary  cases  in  the  less 
developed  countries.  The  point  of  relevance  to  this  thesis 
is  that  change  in  family  structure  and  in  family 
relationships  may  be  inspired  by  broader  societal  and 
cultural  changes  rather  than  directly  being  a  response  to 
economic  forces.  This  is  not  to  say  that  changes  in  family 
structure  do  not  have  economic  implications  and  give  rise 
to  economic  conflicts.  These  conflicts  arise  because  they 
are  inherent  in  the  relations  of  production.  As  Caldwell 
has  noted  (1982:  160):  "Potential  conflict,  antagonism,  and 
opposed  interests  are  inherent  in  the  relations  of 
production". 
5.1.1.  Family  change  in  Tribal  Society 
It  is  necessary  now  to  consider  the  nature  of  the 
relations  of  production  which  existed  in  primitive 
societies.  Primitive  society  would  in  the  case  of  Jordan  be 
defined  here  as  a  tribal  society  in  which  the  influence  of 
the  state  was  absent.  The  chief  of  a  tribe  had  absolute 
authority  over  all  of  his  people.  The  economy  of  the 
society  was  on  a  subsistence  level  with  all  of  the  people 
of  the  tribe  cooperating  to  achieve  this  subsistence  level. 
While  Caldwell  recognised  the  economic  significance  of  even 
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how  production  was  organized.  For  example,  he  notes 
(1982:  164)  "The  importance  of  family  relationships  in 
"primitive"  economies  has  been  taken  to  demonstrate  the 
dominance  of  social  goals  rather  than  the  essence  of  the 
organization  of  production".  From  this  it  can  be  inferred 
that  social  mechanisms  inducing  change  are  fundamental  even 
in  primitive  societies,  yet  how  these  changes  are  achieved 
is  not  obvious.  In  Jordan,  it  could  be  claimed  that  even  as 
recently  as  the  1950s  society  in  large  parts  of  the  desert 
regions  of  the  country  came  close  to  the  definitions  of 
primitive  society  stated  above. 
The  economy  depended  overwhelmingly  on  self 
sufficient  tribes,  where  camel  herding  was  the  main  means 
of  producing  food  and  shelter  as  well  as  a  limited  range  of 
commodities  for  exchange  or  barter  with  other  groups.  The 
tribe  itself  was  a  big  extended  family  grouping  consisting 
of  up  to  five  generations  (Lancaster,  1981;  Musil,  1928). 
Women  worked  from  early  morrning  until  late  at  night,  while 
men  stopped  work  in  the  afternoon.  The  woman  in  this 
society  was  a  very  hard  worker.  To  quote  Lancaster 
(1981:  70):  "A  woman  just  does  not  have  a  lot  of'  spare 
time:  the  children  have  to  look  after  themselves  and  each 
other.  The  woman  runs  the  tent;  she  makes  it,  repairs  it 
and  adjusts  it  to  the  weather  as  well  as  putting  it  up  and 
taking  it  down.  She  collects  firewood,  makes  the  bread, 
plans  the  meals  and  cooks  them,  washes  up,  collects  the 
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them  in  repair.  She  looks  after  children,  doctors  them  and 
her  husband  ....  The  preserving  and  storing  of  food  is 
under  her  care,  as  is  the  butter-  and  cheese-making  if  the 
family  has  sheep;  carding,  spinning  and  weaving  of  wool  are 
her  concern,  and  she  must  be  ready  at  any  time  to  entertain 
her  husband's  guests  and  visitors  or  down  tent  and  migrate. 
On  top  of  this  she  may  well  be  pregnant". 
At  the  beginning  of  the  fifties  some  important 
structural  changes  took  place.  The  economy  of  these 
societies  became  progressively  monetized,  and  the  modern 
state  became  more  influential.  The  modern  state  affected 
the  position  of  the  chief  of  the  tribe  by  making  him  an 
agent  of  government.  Once  the  chief  of  the  tribe  became  an 
agent,  the  government  started  asking  him  to  apply  state  law 
strictly  to  the  tribe.  This  new  function  caused  some 
tension  between  him  and  the  other  tribesmen.  At  the  same 
time  the  Jordanian  state  began  to  recruit  the  best 
educated  for  jobs  in  the  public  sector.  This  gave  some 
young  men  a  new  independence  from  tribal  authority 
(Lancaster,  1981).  As  education  spread  in  Jordan  during  the 
1950s  and  1960s,  so  also  the  occupational  mobility  of  all 
elements  in  the  population  including  tribal  elements 
increased.  The  spread  of  education  reduced  the  percentage 
of  illiteracy  in  Bedouin  societies  from  70  per  cent  (1952) 
to  29.3  per  cent  (1979)  (Jureidini  and  Mclaurin,  1984). 
With  regard  to  economic  changes,  the  economy  of  the 
tribe  had  been  entirely  dependent  on  camel-herding.  The 
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educated  young  tribesmen  found  that  they  could  enrol  for 
"paid  jobs"  as  soldiers  in  the  army.  Their  remittances  sent 
to  their  families  and  relatives  helped  to  buy  more  camels, 
but  undermined  the  economic  basis  of  the  nomadic  lifestyle. 
The  skill  of  becoming  a  camel  herder  needs  long-term 
training  from  an  early  age,  but  gradually  these  skills  were 
seen  as  having  low  status  and  were  ignored.  This  process 
was  accentuated  by  government  attempts  to  encourage  all 
children  to  attend  school. 
Money  became  more  important  to  all  tribal  members, 
making  paid  jobs  more  attractive  to  young  men  and 
establishing  a  cycle  of  tribal  decay.  There  was  therefore 
an  increased  rate  of  migration,  especially  among  the  young 
tribesmen,  from  the  depth  of  the  desert.  This  migration 
seriously  affected  camel-herding,  initiating  a  change  from 
camel-herding  to  sheep-herding.  While,  camel-herding  allowed 
the  tribesmen  to  stay  in  the  desert,  sheep-herding  forced 
them  to  move  from  the  heart  of  the  desert  to  its  margins, 
because  sheep  need  water  daily,  whilst  camels  survive  for 
days  without  water.  Thus  economic  forces  even  within  the 
pastoral  economy  advanced  the  movement  towards  the  edges  of 
the  desert  and  towards  settlement  in  small  villages  in  the 
north  west,  south,  and  south  west  of  Jordan. 
Tribal  law  continued  to  be  exercized  over  the 
tribesmen  of  the  villages.  But  while  there  was  an  emphasis 
on  kin-relationships  there  was  a  decline  in  the  depth  of 
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generations  as  in  the  past,  but  now  involving  only  three 
generations.  The  woman's  role  was  also  changing.  In  spite 
of  the  fact  that  the  government  encouraged  them  to  enter 
agriculture  as  part  of  the  process  of  population 
sedenterization,  it  seems  that  many  of  them  preferred 
public  jobs  over  the  work  in  agriculture  (Jureidini  and 
Mclaurin,  1984). 
Table  5.1 
Percentage  of  income  from  agriculture  in  rural  areas,  1988. 
Percentage  of  income  from  agriculture 
------------------------- 
0-10  10-30  30-50  50+  Total  no. 
-----  ------  ------  ----  -------- 
Rural,  South  65.6  29.2  2.1  3.1  96 
(tribal  village) 
Rural,  north  60.5  15.8  6.6  17.1  76 
Source:  Author's  survey 
Table  5.1  shows  that  only  a  small  minority  of 
households  in  the  two  rural  survey  areas  were  dependent  on 
agriculture  for  the  majority  of  their  income.  By  contrast 
66%  of  households  in  the  south  and  60.5%  in  the  north 
received  no  income  or  very  little  income  from  agriculture. 
Most  of  this  group  in  fact  were  employed  in  a  public  sector 
job.  The  table  therefore  shows  conclusively  that  although 
these  sample  populations  were  rural  in  terms  of  their 
location  and  the  characteristics  of  their  place  of 
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force. 
5.1.2  Change  in  Settled  Agricultural  Communities 
While  in  the  past  nomadism  prevailed  over  much  of  the 
territory  of  the  present  day  Hashemite  state  of  Jordan,  in 
the  highlands  of  north  west  Jordan,  sometimes  referred  to 
as  the  "green  corner",  peasant  agricultural  society  has 
existed  for  many  centuries  and  followed  a  slightly 
different  historical  course  from  nomadic  society.  The 
peasants  of  the  north  west  mainly  depended  on  agricultural 
production. 
Before  the  economy  of  the  peasant  villages  became 
monetized,  familial  production  was  dominant.  People  of  the 
village  of  Ketm  used  to  produce  a  wide  variety  of  different 
crops.  They  also  used  to  rear  animals  such  as  cows  and 
sheep,  etc.  These  animals  ýprcvided  them  with  milk,  meat, 
wool,  etc.  These  agricultural  products  were  produced  by 
involving  all  the  family.  Some  of  the  agricultural 
products  used  to  be  kept  until  the  next  season,  or 
exchanged  for  other  products.  This  familial  production 
system  lasted  approximately  until  the  1950s,  and  then 
gradually  started  to  diminish  when  many  of  the  young  men 
left  to  join  the  army. 
As  the  villages  became  more  monetized,  it  created  a 
need  for  a  more  complex  marketing  system  so  that  rural 
produce  could  be  exchanged.  Some  rural  producers  started  to 
go  to  nearby  cities  to  buy  and  sell  goods.  As  agriculture 
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result  was  inevitably  that  the  market  played  an  ever  more 
important  role  in  the  organization  of  rural  areas  and  of 
rural  society. 
It  was  noticeable  that  the  government  increasingly 
became  more  powerful  in  peasant  villages  and  that  the 
nature  of  state  intervention  was  direct  in  tribal  villages. 
One  example  seems  to  illustrate  the  rather  diferent  level 
of  intervention.  A  shepherd  in  "Ketm"  who  was  interviewed 
by  the  author  mentioned  that  the  government  did  not  allow 
peasants  to  keep  their  own  flocks  of  sheep,  or  of  any  other 
animals,  near  to  village  housing.  In  southern  tribal 
villages  no  such  statute  existed  or  was  enforced. 
5.1.3  Change  in  Urban  Settlements  of  Jordan 
In  1921  when  the  Hashemite  Kingdom  of  Jordan  was 
established,  the  territory  had  no  truly  "urban"  settlements 
and  even  Amman,  which  was  to  become  the  capital,  had  only 
5000  inhabitants.  During  the  1930s  and  1940s  a  small  number 
of  urban  areas,  and  especially  Amman,  became  the  economic, 
commercial,  and  financial  centres  of  the  country.  These 
settlements  received  all  the  administrative,  political,  and 
educational  institutions.  This  concentration  of 
governmental  services  on  urban  areas  further  encouraged 
rural-urban  migration.  This  migration  in  turn  significantly 
affected  the  social  structure  of  the  urban  areas. 
From  the  1950s  onwards  the  pace  of  rural-urban 
migration  in  Jordan  accelerated.  Most  of  the  rural  migrants 
settled  in  Amman  and  particularly  on  the  eastern  side  of 
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initially  settled  within  small  well  defined  communities 
within  the  city  amongst  other  migrants  from  the  same 
region.  For  example  there  is  a  small  area  in  Amman  named 
"Haret  al-Tafaileh".  This  name  means  the  place  of 
Tafaileh,  indicating  that  those  who  settled  there  were  from 
the  area  of  Tafilah  which  is  located  in  the  south  of 
Jordan.  Indeed,  many  of  the  emergent  suburbs  of  eastern 
Amman  look  like,  small  villages  rather  than  metropolitan 
residential  areas.  In  effect  "urbanisation"  has  occurred 
prior  to  the  integration  of  the  migrants  into  an  urban  way 
of  life  ("urbanism"). 
In  Amman,  urbanisation  has  been  severely  affected  not 
only  by  rural  migration  but  also  be  the  Palestinians 
refugee  influx,  after  the  wars  of  1948  and  1967  (Samba, 
1979;  Rowley,  1984).  This,  more  than  any  other  factor, 
explains  Amman's  rapid  expansion  over  the  last  two 
decades  (Findlay,  1988;  Tewfik,  1989),  but  detailed 
description  of  the  morphological  and  social  evolution  of 
Amman  lies  beyond  the  scope  of  this  thesis.  For  the 
purposes  of  the  author's  research,  it  is  sufficient  to  note 
that  by  1980  Amman  could  be  divided  in  the  very  roughest 
terms  into  two  main  social  areas:  east  (lower  class)  and 
west  (middle  class). 
Because  of  the  importance  and  very  recent  nature  of 
the  migration  process  in  accounting  for  Amman's  growth, 
tribalism  is  still  a  significant  influence  in  urban  as  well 
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relationships  of  migrants  remains  quite  marked  in  urban 
areas  according  to  the  research  findings  of  Jureidini  and 
McLaurin  (1984).  The  survival  of  some  traditional 
patriarchal  families  within  otherwise  "modern"  urban 
environments  is  a  feature  found  not  only  in  Jordan  (Faour, 
1983),  but  also  in  other  Arab  countries  (Patai,  1969). 
5.2.  NUCLEAR  FAMILY  STRUCTURE 
Despite  the  survival  of  some  patriarchal  extended 
families  even  in  environments  such  as  Amman,  the  nuclear 
family  structure  has  now  become  dominant  in  Jordan.  This 
is  true  both  in  urban  and  rural  areas  of  the  country.  This 
important  claim  is  substantiated  by  Table  5.2  which 
indicates  that  the  extended  family  was  not  widespread  among 
the  families  interviewed  by  the  author  in  urban  and  rural 
areas. 
Table  5.2 
Family  structure  identified  in  the  author's  survey,  1988 
Nuclear  Extended  Extended  Total  no. 
Area  family  family  family  in 
(lineal)  (lateral)  sample 
Percentage  of  households  in  each  area. 
Urban,  middle  class  92.1  6.7  1.1  178 
Urban,  lower  class  84.6  9.6 
Rural,  south  63.5  14.6 
Rural,  north  75.0  15.8 
5.8  240 
21.9  96 
9.2  76 
Source:  Author's  survey, 
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types  (  Liu,  1967,1977  ;  Burch  and  Gendell  ,  1970  ).  In 
this  study  the  nuclear  family  is  defined  as  consisting  of 
husband,  wife  and  unmarried  children,  the  lineal  extended 
family  as  consisting  of  all  the  elements  of  the  nuclear 
family  plus  one  or  more  grandparents,  and  the  lateral 
extended  family  as  consisting  of  the  nuclear  family  plus 
the  husband's  brothers,  sisters,  uncles,  aunts,  and  other 
relatives. 
The  structural  changes  described  in  the  first  part  of 
this  chapter  which  have  taken  place  in  Jordanian  society 
have  been  the  key  forces  behind  the  changes  in  Jordanian 
family  type,  and  indeed  explain  the  dominance  of  the 
nuclear  family  structure  in  the  country  today. 
The  following  examples  from  the  author's  fieldwork 
illustrate  the  different  types  of  family  structure  defined 
above:  - 
-Example  1,  represents  a  nuclear  family  structure  of  the 
type  commonly  found  in  urban  middle  class  areas  in  Amman. 
The  father  was  born  in  the  city  of  "Jericho"  in  the  West 
Bank.  He  migrated  to  Amman,  and  has  a  university 
education.  At  the  time  of  the  survey  he  was  working  as  an 
employee  at  a  tourist  office.  His  salary  was  the  only 
source  of  family  income. 
Husband  (born  1945)  Son  (born  1983) 
Wife  (born  1954)  Daughter  (born  1985) 
Although  the  main  purpose  of  this  example  is  to  illustrate 
a  typical  nuclear  family  structure,  it  is  interesting  to 
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relatively  late  age  at  which  this  couple  had  their  first 
son. 
-Example  2,.  represents  a  lateral  extended  family  from  the 
southern  village  of  Basta,  where  the  author  undertook  one 
of  his  surveys.  The  father  and  mother  were  both  born  in 
the  village.  The  father  was  illiterate,  and  60%  of  his 
family's  budget  depended  on  the  earnings  of  his  sons.  The 
remainder  of  the  family  budget  (40%)  came  from  shepherding 
and  some  agricultural  work. 
Husband  (born  1933)  Son  (born  1963) 
Wife  (born  1945)  Daughter  (born  1965) 
Son  (born  1968) 
Son  (born  1970) 
Son  (born  1973) 
Daughter  (born  1976) 
Son  (born  1979) 
Daughter  (born  1981) 
Son  (born  1984) 
Son  (dead) 
First  Brother's  wife  (born  1966)  Daughter  (born  1986) 
Son  (born  1988) 
Second  (dead)  Brother's  wife  (born  1967) 
Daughter  (born  1983) 
Daughter  (born  1984) 
Son  (born  1985) 
The  contrast  with  the  first  example  is  striking  in  terms  of 
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mother  at  the  time  of  the  first  birth. 
-Example  3,  'represents  a  lineal  extended  family  from  the 
same  southern  rural  area  (Basta). 
The  father  was  born  in  the  village,  and  was  working  as  a 
government  employee  in  the  village  at  the  time  of  the 
survey.  He  had  an  elementary  level  of  education.  His 
family's  income  depended  mainly  on  his  government  salary  in 
addition  to  a  small  amount  of  shepherding  and  agricultural 
work. 
Husband  (born  1948)  Daughter  (born  1974) 
Wife  (born  1952)  Daughter  (born  1975) 
Husband's  mother  Daughter  (born  1977) 
(born  1923)  Son  (born  1978) 
Son  (born  1982) 
Daughter  (born  1984) 
Son  (born  1986) 
Son  (born  1987) 
In  general,  it  would  be  true  to  say  that  in  the 
surveys  studied  by  the  author,  the  lineal  extended  family 
was  more  common  than  the  lateral  extended  family  (Table 
5.2).  Only  in  southern  rural  areas  was  the  lateral 
extended  family  more  common  than  the  lineal  extended 
family.  As  one  might  have  expected  in  the  south  nomadic 
families  who  had  recently  been  sedentarized  had  stronger 
kin-relationships  than  any  other  group.  Where  the  nuclear 
family  was  found  in  rural  areas  it  was  characterized  by  a 
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tribal  influence  on  kin-relationships  can  be  measured  is 
through  the  higher  level  of  social  and  economic 
obligations  which  exist  between  members  of  the  extended 
family  (Liu,  1977).  In  urban  areas,  especially  in  the 
middle  class  areas  of  Amman,  the  nuclear  family  was 
relatively  more  closed,  because  of  a  decline  in  the  social 
and  economic  kin-relationships.  These  generalisations  were 
substantiated  by  data  collected  by  the  author  and  reported 
later  in  the  chapter. 
Before  discussing  economic  and  social  links  between 
family  members  in  more  detail,  it  is  appropriate  to 
consider  more  readily  observed  linkages  manifested  in  terms 
of  physical  space  and  the  spatial  organisation  of 
residential  areas.  In  particular,  the  author  was 
interested  in  discovering  the  extent  to  which  housing  units 
within  a  neighbourhood  reflected  kinship  links  in  terms  of 
the  frequency  with  which  households  would  live  physically 
next  to  other  family  members. 
It  was  found  that  of  three  areas  studied,  the  highest 
percentage  of  households  who  had  no  relatives  living  in 
adjacent  housing  was  in  the  southern  rural  area.  The 
difference  between  the  northern  rural  and  southern  rural 
areas  was  significant  in  statistical  terms  (X2  =  8.3,  df  = 
1)  at  the  95%  level  of  confidence  (Table  5.3).  The  reason 
for  this  could  simply  be  that  there  was  no  restriction  on 
land  for  house  building  in  the  south,  but  also  must  to  a 
certain  extent  reflect  the  higher  proportion  of  extended 
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for  housing  units  to  be  organised  in  such  a  way  as  to  be 
contiguous  with  close  relatives.  The  highest  percentages  of 
"joined  housing  units"  were  in  the  northern  village 
surveyed  by  the  author  and  in  the  urban  lower  class  areas 
of  Amman  (Table  5.3).  The  obvious  reason  for  the  high 
percentage  of  joined  housing  units  in  the  urban  lower  class 
areas  was  the  low  income  level  of  families  relative  to  high 
land  prices.  This  favours  subdivision  of  land  and  property 
between  relatives.  The  relative  expense  of  construction 
materials  may  also  have  encouraged  the  adoption  of  building 
strategies  to  cut  costs,  with  close  relatives  agreeing  to 
share  a  common  wall.  In  the  urban  lower  class  areas,  the 
data  indicated  that  over  40%  of  people  were  related  to 
their  neighbours.  An  additional  reason  contributing  to  the 
explanation  of  this  high  percentage  is  the  fact  that  in 
this  area  so  many  of  the  people  were  refugees  from 
Palestine. 
Surprisingly,  there  was  no  statistically  significant 
difference  in  the  frequency  of  joined  housing  units  between 
the  urban  middle  class  and  lower  class  areas  of  Amman  which 
were  studied  (X2  =  2.6,  df  =  1,  not  significant  at  95% 
level  of  confidence).  Nevertheless,  the  proportion  of 
free-standing  housing  units  in  the  middle  class  housing 
area  in  Amman  was  a  little  lower  than  in  lower  class  areas 
(Table  5.3). 
The  presence  of  "joined  houses"  mainly  represented 
145 parents  living  next  to  sons,  and  or  brothers  living  as 
neighbours  as  shown  in  Table  5.4  and  may  be  taken  to 
represent  a  geographical  response  permitting  a  "gradual" 
transaction  from  an  extended  to  a  nuclear  family  form.  In 
the  southern  rural  area  there  was  a  relatively  high 
percentage  of  "joined  houses"  which  consisted  of  people 
living  next  to  their  uncles  or  other  more  distant 
relatives.  Table  5.4  also  shows  that  the  south  was 
distinctive  in  having  no  cases  in  which  families  lived  next 
to  the  wife's  family.  In  spite  of  the  residential 
proximity  of  many  families  to  their  relatives,  most  had 
their  meals  separately  from  their  relatives  living  in 
adjoining  units.  They  also  mainly  kept  separate  household 
budgets  (Tables  5.5,5.6).  Thus,  in  terms  of  social 
science  terminology  most,  but  not  all,  these  housing  units 
were  "independent"  households  according  to  the  conventional 
definition  and  usage  of  this  term. 
The  data  indicated  that  one  third  of  the  newly  formed 
families  in  middle  class  areas  started  their  married  life 
with  the  husband's  parents.  This  accounted  for 
approximately  half  of  all  the  newly  formed  families  in 
urban  lower  class  areas.  In  the  southern  rural  area  again 
about  half  started  with  their  parents,  while  in  the 
northern  rural  area  73.3%  of  couples  started  married  life 
by  living  with  the  husband's  parents.  The  main  reasons 
behind  this  general  phenomenon  are  the  economic 
difficulties  which  confront  new  families  with  the 
percentage  variations  quoted  above  reflecting  in  general 
146 terms  spatial  variations  in  economic  circumstances.  It  is 
worth  mentioning,  however,  that  in  the  southern  rural  area 
wives  often  demand  to  live  separately  from  the  husband's 
parents.  Most  of  the  new  families  which  had  lived  with 
the  husband's  parents  did  so  only  temporarily  until  they 
were  able  to  be  financially  self-  supporting.  In  this 
respect  the  greatest  differences  in  residential  pattern 
appears  to  be  between  urban  middle  class  couples  and 
others,  although  as  Table  5.7  shows  significant  differences 
of  behaviour  were  also  detected  between  the  southern  and 
northern  villages. 
Table  5.3 
Percentage  of  the  people  who  live  in  houses  adjoining 
relatives,  1988. 
Area  Percentage  Total  no. 
in  sample 
Urban,  middle  class  34.3  178 
Urban,  lower  class  42.1  240 
Rural,  south  26.0  96 
Rural,  north  47.4  76 
Source:  Author's  survey. 
147 Table  5.4 
Nature  of  kinship  links  with  occupants  in  adjoining  houses, 
1988  (Percentages  by  area). 
Urban,  Urban,  Rural,  Rural, 
middle  class  lower  class  south  north 
houses  adjoining 
husband's  parents  27.3  21.2  9.7  20.5 
houses  adjoining 
sons,  daughters  13.6  11.0  3.2  17.9 
houses  adjoining 
brothers,  sisters  34.1  36.8  48.4  38.4 
houses  adjoining 
wife's  family  13.6  9.7  0.0  7.7 
houses  adjoining 
uncles,  aunts  3.4  9.7  19.4  10.3 
houses  adjoining 
other  relatives  8.0  11.6  19.4  5.1 
Total  number  of  88  155  31  39 
responses* 
Source:  Author's  survey. 
*Some  households  had  relatives  living  in  more  than  one 
adjacent  houses.  For  example  uncle  might  be  living  next 
door  while  parents  were  to  be  found  on  another  floor  of  the 
same  building. 
Table  5.5 
Nature  of  social  links  wi  th  relatives  living  in  adjoining 
houses,  1988  (percentages  by  area). 
sharing  meals 
Area  Total  no. 
daily  weekly  sometime  never 
Urban,  middle  class  20.3  7.8  39.1  32.8  64 
Urban,  lower  class  17.8  1.0  22.8  58.4  101 
Rural,  south  13.8  0.0  20.7  65.5  29 
Rural,  north  19.4  8.3  27.8  44.4  36 
Source:  Author's  survey. 
148 Table  5.6 
Nature  of  economic  links  with  relatives  living  in  adjoining 
houses,  1988  (percentages  by  area). 
Sharing  budget 
Area  Total  no. 
sharing  sometimes  never 
Urban,  middle  class  6.3  15.9  77.8  63 
Urban,  lower  class  8.9  7.9  83.2  101 
Rural,  south  10.3  13.8  75.9  29 
Rural,  north  19.4  8.3  72.5  36 
Source:  Author's  survey. 
149 Table  5.7 
Place  of  residence  of  married  couples  now  and  at  time  of 
getting  married,  1988  (percentages  by  area). 
With  parents  With  parents  Separate  Total  - 
Area  and  still  but  now  house  no. 
living  with  independent 
them 
Urban,  middle  class  4.6  22.5  72.8  173 
Urban,  lower  class  11.0  38.4  50.6  237 
Rural,  south  17.0  31.9  51.1  94 
Rural,  north  16.0  57.3  26.7  75 
Here,  as  elsewhere  in  the  thesis,  X2  statistics  are  based 
on  absolute  figures  and  on  appropriately  prepared 
contingency  tables.  They  have  not  been  calculated  directly 
from  the  closed  ratio  data  in  the  table  above. 
-  Difference  between  urban  areas  (middle  and  lower  class) 
is  significant  (X2  =  21.0,  df  =  2)  at  95%  level  of 
confidence. 
-  Difference  between  rural  areas  is  significant  (X2  =  12.4, 
df  =  2)  at  95%  level  of  confidence. 
-  Difference  between  urban  and  rural  areas  is  significant 
(X2  =  21.5,  df  =  2)  at  95%  level  of  confidence. 
Source:  Author's  survey.  . 
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5.3.  ECONOMIC  AND  SOCIAL  NUCLEATION 
Before  discussing  aspects  of  economic  and  social 
nucleation  within  the  family,  it  is  worth  considering  some 
of  the  mechanisms  which  could  lie  behind  changing  family 
structures.  Opposing  interests  of  both  individuals  and 
groups  can  lead  to  conflict  in  society  in  general.  On  an  a 
priori  basis  one  would  expect  that  within  Jordan  the  level 
of  individualism  would  be  at  its  lowest  level  in  so-called 
"primitive"  Jordanian  tribal  society,  because  of  the 
overwhelming  authority  of  tribal  structure.  Before  the 
economy  became  monetized  all  members  of  the  tribe  worked 
hand  in  hand  struggling  under  hard  environmental  conditions 
to  ensure  a  communal  livelihood.  This  effort  was  under  the 
authority  of  the  tribal  chief  and  the  elderly  members  of 
the  tribe.  After  the  economy  became  monetized, 
individualism  naturally  increased  (Patai,  1969). 
Tribal  members  with  salaries  naturally  began  thinking 
that  their  earnings  were  their  own  or  their  family's 
individual  property  rather  than  the  property  of  the  tribe. 
Thus  emerged  the  view  that  they  should  derive  maximum,  - 
benefit  for  their  family  rather  than  for  the  tribe  from 
this  money.  Caldwell  (1982)  studying  African 
primitive  societies  found  that  in  these  circumstances  men 
began  to  tell  their  relatives  to  be  more  careful  in  their 
expenditures  patterns,  more  frugal  in  their  demands,  and  in 
some  instances  refused  to  give  assistance  to  relatives. 
Altorki  and  Cole  (1989)  in  their  study  of  wealth  flows  in  a 
151 developing  society  confirmed  that  in  the  case  of  the  town 
of  Unayzah,  where  their  work  was  based,  individuals  rather 
than  kin  groups  were  the  main  beneficiaries  of  rising 
salary  levels.  Despite  the  fact  that  kin  ties  have 
remained  strong  and  are  generally  highly  valued,  Altorki 
and  Cole  reported  that  there  were  cases  in  which  even  the 
wealthier  elements  of  society  had  not  helped  to  improve  the 
status  of  their  close  kin.  In  short,  research  in  other 
countries  points  to  the  strengthening  of  what  may  be  termed 
"economic  individualism"  in  parallel  with  the  expansion  of 
a  monetized  economy. 
The  advent  of  a  monetized  economy,  in  addition  to 
other  changes,  remoulded  "primitive"  Jordanian  society  into 
what  might  be  termed  a"  traditional"  society.  The 
monetized  economy  made  people  more  dependent  on  market 
forces.  This  dependence  in  turn  affected  the  role  of  women. 
For  example,  women  used  to  make  bread  but  with  the  changes 
many  women  gave  up  this  duty  and  families  began  buying 
bread  from  shops.  Women  in  the  rural  areas  no  longer 
provided  all  household  domestic  services.  In  brief,  in 
"traditional"  societies  in  rural  areas  women  did  not 
perform  many  of  the  duties  which  they  had  previously 
undertaken  in  what  has  been  defined  as  primitive  society. 
In  this  context  it  is  not  surprising  that  rural  families 
gradually  began  to  depend  on  the  market  even  for  products 
which  were  much  more  expensive  than  similar  home  produce. 
The  resultant  change  in  the  role  of  women  as  Oppong  and,  Abu 
(1986)  have  noted  in  another  context  extended  to  many 
152 other  household  activities  and  contributed  to  changing 
family  structures  and  to  what  may  be  thought  of  as  a  social 
transition. 
If  a  newly  married  couple  became  economically 
independent  because  of  the  salary  of  the  husband,  the 
opportunity  to  settle  away  from  the  rest  of  the  family  also 
presented  itself.  The  break  would  of  course  not  be  an 
absolute  one  with  family  units  still  recognizing  some 
economic  obligations  towards  some  relatives  and  towards  the 
parental  home.  Nevertheless,  the  very  possibility  of 
geographical  mobility  from  rural  to  urban  environments  and 
between  urban  areas  in  itself  affects  kinship  ties 
(Jacobson,  1970;  Patai,  1969;  Zelinsky,  1971). 
People  in  rural  areas  in  a  monetized  economy  maintain 
some  kinship  ties  and  at  the  same  time  sustain  a  range  of 
friendship  bonds.  These  friendship  ties  are  selective  and 
differ  from  those  of  primitive  society.  The  men  in 
primitive  nomadic  society  used  to  spend  much  of  their  free 
time  out  side  their  own  tent,  and  used  to  go  to  a  special 
large  tribal  tent  in  order  to  talk  to  other  men  in  the 
tribe  (Lancaster,  1981).  By  contrast  in  traditional  rural 
societies  men,  especially  young  men,  started  selecting  some 
friends  with  whom  they  spent  their  free  time  in  one  of 
their  friend's  houses.  For  example,  those  with  some  level 
of  education  tended  to  have  close  relations  with  each 
other.  Occupation  also  tended  to  become  a  determinant  in 
the  selection  of  friends. 
153 It  is  clear  from  the  discussion  above  that  economic 
factors  play  an  important  role  as  a  mechanism  of  change 
from  primitive  to  traditional  societies.  Economic  changes 
are  also  significant  in  promoting  the  emergence  of  the 
nuclear  family. 
What  came  first  -  the  economic  or  social  nuclear 
family?  In  order  to  answer  this  question  it  is  useful  to 
tabulate  some  of  the  findings  of  the  author's  field  survey. 
This  was  done  by  classifying  all  households,  as  outlined  in 
the  methodology  chapter,  on  the  basis  of  the  strength  of 
their  declared  kinship  links.  For  both  economic  and  social 
links  with  close  relatives  each  household  was  classified  as 
either  traditional,  early  transitional,  advanced 
transitional  or  modern  in  its  relationships.  The  outcome 
is  shown  graphically  in  Figures  5.1  and  5.2  and  is 
discussed  below  in  relation  to  Tables  5.8  and  5.9. 
Table  5.8  shows  that  the  families  which  have  strong 
social  kin-relationships  do  not  necessarly  have  the  same 
level  of  economic  kin-relationships.  It  can  be  seen,  for 
example,  that  amongst  those  families  defined  as  in  the 
traditional  stage  of  social  kin-relationships,  only  11.5% 
of  them  were  in  the  traditional  stage  in  economical  terms 
(Table  5.8),  while  the  remainder  have  mainly  experienced  a 
transition  in  their  economic  kin-relationships.  The  data 
from  Table  5.8  reveals  that  the  same  pattern  can  be  noticed 
in  both  urban  and  rural  areas.  This  result  suggests  that 
changing  kinship  ties  begins  with  economic  relationships. 
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156 relationships  will  affect  family  structures  causing  them 
initially  to  be  more  isolated  (socially  and  economically). 
Later,  a  more  closed  nuclear  family  will  result  which  will 
increase  the  emotional  and  social  bonds  between  the  spouses 
within  the  nuclear  family. 
Table  5.8  shows  some  regional  differences  in  terms  of 
the  character  of  the  transition  in  social  and  economic  kin- 
relationships  which  have  been  discussed  above.  Only  a 
small  percentage  of  families  in  the  urban  areas,  especially 
in  the  middle  classes  were  at  the  traditional  stage  (for 
definition  see  the  methodology  chapter)  of  economic  and 
social  kin-relationships  (11.5%,  19.5%),  while,  on  the 
contrary  a  high  percentage  of  families  in  rural  areas, 
especially  in  the  south,  were  at  the  traditional  stage 
economically  and  socially  (70.1%,  51.2%).  Perhaps  cultural 
factors  lie  behind  the  high  percentage  of  families  with 
strong  kinship  relations  in  rural  areas.  With  regard  to  the 
differences  between  rural  areas,  it  seems  plausible  that 
the  reason  why  the  southern  rural  area  has  the  highest 
percentage  (70.1  %)  is  its  greater  isolation  from  the 
Jordanian  urban  economy.  Thus  one  might  expect  cultural 
change  to  take  place  more  rapidly  in  the  rural  north  with 
its  closer  associations  with  Amman  and  the  stronger 
presence  of  market  forces.  It  is  important  also  to  bear  in 
mind  that  the  rural  north  was  an  area  of  peasant 
cultivation  while  the  rural  south  remained  an  area  of 
pastorlism  in  which  tribal  law  was  still  to  a  certain 
extent  effective. 
157 Table  5.8 
Economic  and  social  kin-relationships  by  area,  1988. 
(Figures  expressed  in  percentages) 
Economic  kin-relationships 
Traditional  Early  advanced  moden  Total 
stage*  trans-  trans-  stage  No. 
itional  itional 
stage  stage 
Social  kin-rel. 
Urban,  middle  class 
Traditional  stage  11.5  34.6  30.8  23.1  26 
Early  transitional 
stage  4.3  11.6  43.5  40.6  69 
Advanced  transi- 
tional  stage  0.0  9.3  30.2  60.5  43 
Modern  stage  0.0  8.0  20.0  72.0  25 
Urban,  lower  class 
Traditional  stage  19.5  34.1  9.8  36.6  42 
Early  transitional 
stage  7.0  23.3  31.4  38.4  60 
Advanced  transi- 
tional  stage  1.7  8.3  28.3  61.7  86 
Modern  stage  2.4  4.8  11.9  81.0  41 
158 Table  5.8  (Contd.  ) 
Economic  kin-relationships 
Traditional  Early  advanced  modern  Total 
stage*  trans-  trans-  stage  No. 
itional  itional 
stage  stage 
Social  kin-rel. 
Rural,  south 
Traditional  stage  70.1  7.5  14.9  7.5  67 
Early  transi- 
tional  stage  10.0  35.0  30.0  25.0  20 
Advanced  transi- 
tional  stage  33.3  0.0  50.0  16.7  6 
Modern  stage  0.0  0.0  0.0  100.0  1 
Rural,  north 
Traditional  stage  51.2  27.9  11.6  9.3  43 
Early  transitional 
stage  11.1  72.2  11.1  5.6  18 
Advanced  transi- 
tional  stage  0.0  42.9  57.1  0.0  7 
Modern  stage  0.0  0.0  0.0  100.0  3 
*See  methodology  chapter  for  definitions  of  traditional, 
transitional  and  modern  stages. 
Source:  Author's  survey. 
Table  5.9  shows  that  the  urban  areas  (both  middle  and 
lower  class)  would  appear  to  be  experiencing  a  rapid 
transition  in  economic  and  social  kin-relationships.  It  is 
of  course  impossible  to  prove  from  the  data  that  a 
transition  is  occuring  since  the  information  is  cross- 
sectional,  rather.  than  following  a  time  sequence. 
Nevertheless,  a  "transition"  hypothesis  seems  tenable. 
159 Table  5.9 
Economic  and  social  kin-relationships,  by  area,  1988. 
Tradition.  Early  Advanced  Modern  Total 
stage  transit.  transit.  stage  no. 
stage  stage 
Economic  kin-rel.  * 
Urban,  middle  class  3.7  14.1  34.4  47.9  163 
Urban,  lower  class  7.0  17.9  23.1  52.0  229 
Rural,  south  54.3  12.8  20.2  12.8  94 
Rural,  north  33.8  39.4  15.5  11.3  71 
Social  kin-rel.  ** 
Urban,  middle  class  16.0  42.3  26.4  15.3  163 
Urban,  lower  class  17.9  37.6  26.2  18.3  229 
Rural,  south  71.3  21.3  6.4  1.1  94 
Rural,  north  60.6  25.4  9.9  4.2  71 
*  Difference  between  urban  areas  (middle  and  lower  class  is 
not  significant  (X2  =  7.3,  df  =  3)  at'  95%  level  of 
confidence. 
*  Difference  between  rural  areas  is  significant  (X2  =  16.2, 
df  =  3)  at  95%  level  of  confidence. 
*  Difference  between  urban  and  rural  areas  is  significant 
(X2.  =  157.4,  df  =  3)  at  95%  level  of  confidence. 
**  Difference  between  urban  areas  (middle  and  lower  class) 
is  not  significant  (X2  =  1.3,  df  =  3)  at  95%  level  of 
confidence. 
**  Difference  between  rural  areas  is  not  significant  (X2  = 
3.3,  df  =  3)  at  95%  level  of  confidence. 
**  Difference  between  urban  and  rural  areas  is  significant 
(X2  =  137.41,  df  =  3)  at  95%  level  of  confidence. 
Source:  Author's  survey. 
160 The  differences  with  regard  to  this  transition 
between  the  middle  and  lower  classes  are  not  significant. 
Rural  areas  seem  to  be  witnessing  an  onset  of  the 
transition  in  economic  and  social  kin-relationships  (Table 
5.9),  but  as  previously  noted  the  transition  in  the  north 
is  relatively  rapid  compared  to  the  south.  The  difference 
between  these  two  rural  societies  is  significant  with 
regard  to  economic  but  not  in  terms  of  social  kin- 
relationships. 
These  findings  are  of  relevance  with  regard  to 
Caldwell's  central  proposition  on  family  change,  that 
"emotional"  or  social  changes  in  the  nuclear  family  precede. 
economic  change. 
Showing  how  economic  and  social  kin-relationships 
change  from  being  inclusive  of  many  relatives  to  being 
exclusive  of  all  but  the  basic  actors  in  the  nuclear  family 
is  very  important  in  understanding  the  changes  in  family 
patterns.  It  would  appear  from  the  data  presented  above 
that  increasing  economic  nucleation  is  followed  by 
increasing  "emotional"  or  social  nucleation. 
From  the  above  discussion  it  could  be  tentatively 
hypothesized  that  the  nucleation  of  the  family  follows  the 
following  sequence: 
-First,  a  physical  nuclear  family  structure  will  emerge. 
-Second,  kinship  links  in  economic  terms  will  weaken  until 
they  are  conformable  with  the  "economic  closure"  of  the 
nuclear  family. 
-Third,  social  kinship  relations  will  weaken  as  a  result  of 
161 the  emergence  of  the  closed  economic  structure  of  the 
nuclear  family. 
-Fourth,  the  nuclear  family  will  emerge  in  emotional  terms. 
Economic  isolation  makes  the  nuclear  family  structure 
depend  more  on  their  own  sources  of  income,  which  may 
affect  social  and  emotional  relations  in  two  ways;  first 
of  all  social  and  emotional  relations  with  other  kin  will 
weaken,  and  second  the  strength  of  social  emotional  bonds 
inside  the  family  will  grow.  This  will  make  the  emotional 
relation  with  kin  recessive  and  it  will  increase  the 
dominance  of  father-son,  and  then  husband-wife  economic, 
social  and  emotional  relations.  The  importance  of  the 
emergence  of  the  physical  nuclear  family  was  clear  in  the 
work  of  Altorki  and  Cole  (1989)  in  their  study  of  the  city 
of  Unayzah.  From  their  work  it  could  be  inferred  that  the 
emergence  of  the  physical  nuclear  family  was  the  first 
stage  in  a  more  fundamental  transition  to  the  economic  and 
social  closure  of  the  family. 
As  a  result  of  the  appearance  of  the  nuclear  family 
structure,  and  of  the  onset  of  a  transition  in  economic  and 
social  kin-relationships  the  strength  of  emotional  bonds 
between  spouses  would  be  expected  to  increase,  but  it  would 
not  be  expected  to  be  dominant.  Rather  the  father-child 
relationship  would  be  expected  to  be  dominant,  especially 
in  the  traditional  and  transitional  societies,  because  of 
the  economic  and  social  value  of  children.  This  point  will 
be  discussed  in  more  detail  in  the  next  chapter. 
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is  likely  to  be  relatively  slow  compared  to  the  rate  of 
change  in  economic  kin-relationships,  although  not 
quantitative  data  is  available  to  verify  this  suggestion. 
It  may  be  that  a  distinction  can  be  made  between  social 
relations  which  affect  the  speed  of  transition  from  an  open 
nuclear  or  extended  family  to  a  closed  nuclear  family, 
and  economic  relations  which  initiate  and  power  the 
transition  itself.  In  terms  of  analysing  Jordanian  family 
bonding  it  seems  clear  from  Tables  5.8  and  5.9  that  the 
nuclear  family  emerges  more  rapidly  as  an  economic  than  as 
an  emotional  unit. 
Caldwell  (1982)  considered  that  social  conditions 
change  as  fast  as  economic  ones,  and  that  social  change 
determines  economic  change.  It  may  be  that  there  is  an 
inter-relationship  between  them,  but  in  Jordan  social 
forces  do  not  appear  to  change  nearly  as  rapidly  as 
economic  conditions  (Jureidini  and  Mclaurin,  1984).  The 
slow  speed  of  cultural  change  reduces  the  speed  of  the 
social  kin-relationship  transition,  while  the  economic  kin- 
relationship  transition  advances  more  rapidly  (see  Tables 
5.8  and  5.9).  These  Tables  show  that  a  time  lag  exists 
between  economic  and  social  change.  While  social  change  may 
not  be  a  determinant  of  economic  change,  it  is  possible 
that  economic  change  influences  social  change.  Caldwell 
(1982:  72)  said:  "I  should  remark  that  nothing  I  have 
experienced  in  the  West  Africa  suggests  that  there  is  any 
cultural  lag-  any  delay  in  recognizing  how  to  achieve  new 
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things  and  an  inability  to  do  things  in  a  new  way  -  in 
adjusting  to  new  economic  ends  that  are  determined  by 
changed  social  ends.  The  rate  of  social  change  determines 
economic  change".  Clearly,  the  results  of  the  author's 
Jordanian  research  contradict  this  view. 
As  the  nuclear  family  structure  becomes  more  widely 
established  in  Jordan  in  both  urban  and  rural  areas,  it  can 
be  expected  that  there  will  be  an  increase  in  the  intensity 
of  conjugal  relations,  and  inversely  a  reduction  in  the 
other  kin  contacts  (Liu,  1977).  As  well  as  the  evidence 
reported  in  Table  5.8,  Khairi  (1985)  has  also  reported  an 
increase  in  the  strength  of  bonding  between  spouses  in 
Amman  and  a  decrease  in  financial  links  outside  the  nuclear 
family.  This  pattern  is  stronger  in  urban  than  in  rural 
areas. 
In  the  author's  survey  33%  and  38%  of  the  people  in 
the  urban  areas  (middle  and  lower  class  respectively) 
claimed  that  economic  co-operation  did  not  exist  between 
brothers,  while  in  rural  areas  (south  and  north)  the 
percentages  are  10.4,  and  15.8  respectively.  In  terms  of 
economic  co-operation  among  relatives  (such  as  with  an 
uncle)  in  urban  areas  (middle  and  lower  class)  most  people 
(71.3%  and  75.4%  respectively)  said  that  it  did  not  exist, 
while  in  rural  areas  (north  and  south)  only  a  small 
percentage  (26.0  and  23.7  respectively)  said  that  it  did 
not.  The  majority  of  people  in  both  urban  and  rural  areas 
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important  than  financial  assistance. 
In  urban  areas  most  people  considered  that  economic 
help  among  relatives  was  offered  with  some  hesitation, 
while  in  rural  areas  approximately  two  thirds  said  it  was 
offered  with  no  hesitation.  This  means  that  potentially 
economic  relations  in  rural  areas  have  still  considerable 
strength  and  that  there  remains  much  scope  for  future 
restructing  of  family  ties. 
5.4.  CONJUGAL  ROLES 
In  primitive  society  women  do  not  have  any  jural 
identity  and  responsibility.  The  social  norms  of  primitive 
society  determine  the  low  status  and  roles  of  women. 
In  traditional  rural  society  in  Jordan  the  modern 
state  has  increasingly  intervened  and  the  economy  has 
become  monetized.  Nevertheless,  the  status  of  women 
remains  relatively  poor,  although  it  is  also  true  that  the 
range  of  tasks  for  which  they  are  responsible  has  been 
reduced  by  their  changing  position  in  the  economy.  For 
example,  they  have  mainly  stopped  making  bread,  stopped 
repairing  and  putting  up  tents,  ceased  collecting  firewood, 
and  water  ...  etc. 
In  the  middle  and  lower  class  areas  of  the  cities 
other  important  changes  have  been  taking  place.  Women  have 
received  more  power  in  economic  matters,  especially 
salaried  women.  Women's  level  of  education  has  been 
improving  (Table  5.10),  with  over  half  of  all  wives  in  the 
author's  survey  area  in  middle  class  Amman  having  recieved 
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work  force  has  also  been  increasing,  and  the  social  norms 
constraining  women's  public  roles  have  generally  become 
less  acute  (Ghazwi,  1985).  These  changes  in  women's  status 
and  roles  may  have  created  some  conflicts,  as  for  example 
in  the  conflict  between  their  maternal  role  and  their 
occupational  role  (Oppong  and  Abu,  1986;  Oppong,  1987; 
Weeks,  1988).  Such  conflict  may  be  behind  the  low 
percentage  of  male  heads  of  the  household  in  the  author's 
survey  who  accepted  the  possibility  of  women  entering 
waged  work  .  Table  5.11  reveals  that  generally,  the  head 
of  the  household  was  against  women  working  outside  the 
home.  This  was  true  both  in  urban  and  rural  areas. 
In  spite  of  the  fact  that  women's  status  is  now  less 
tightly  prescribed  by  society  (especially  in  urban 
society),  cultural  influences  are  still  the  most  important 
determinants  of  women's  status  and  roles.  For  example,  the 
absence  of  women  in  some  sectors  of  the  Jordanian  labour 
market  such  as  retailing  is  a  continuing  reflection  of 
their  status  (Findlay,  1987a). 
Most  parents  no  longer  live  with  their  married 
children,  and  daughters-in-law  no  longer  live  with  their 
mothers-in-law.  Most  respondents  in  the  survey  mentioned 
that  wives  preferred  to  live  at  a  distance  from  the  house 
of  their  mothers-in-law.  This  was  true  even  in  the  south. 
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Education  level  of  wife,  by  area,  1988. 
Area  Education  level 
Less  than  Secondary  University  Total 
secondary  and  college  level  number 
Urban, 
middle  class*  26.4  47.8  25.8  178 
Urban, 
lower  class*  61.3  35.8  2.9  240 
Rural,  south**  93.8  6.3  0.0  96 
Rural,  north**  84.2  11.8  3.9  76 
Source:  Author's  survey. 
*  Differences  between  urban  areas  are  significant  (X2  = 
72.4,  df  =  2)  at  95%  level  of  confidence. 
**  Differences  between  rural  areas  are  not  significant  (X2 
=  4.2,  df  =  2)  at  95%  level  of  confidence. 
***  Differences  between  urban  and  rural  areas  are 
significant  (X2  =  93.9,  df  =  2)  at  95%  level  of 
confidence. 
Table  5.11 
Opinion  of  husband  about  female  waged  employment,  by  area, 
1988. 
Opinion  of  husband  (%) 
Total  no. 
Area  Women's  work  Women  should 
outside  the  stay  at  home 
home  is  and  not  have 
acceptable  waged 
employment 
Urban,  middle  class  30.3  69.6  178 
Urban,  lower  class  17.1  82.9  240 
Rural,  south  4.2  95.8  96 
Rural,  north  23.7  76.3  76 
Source:  Author's  survey. 
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segregated.  A  characteristic  of  gender-determined 
activities  is  that  the  husband  makes  most  of  the  economic 
decisions.  This  is  borne  out  by  the  results  of  Table  5.12. 
This  is  the  case  in  both  urban  and  rural  areas,  with  the 
feature  being  most  marked  in  rural  areas.  This  may 
reflect  the  fact  that  the  personal  relationship  between 
husband  and  wife  is  less  intense,  and  less  inclusive,  but 
in  urban  areas  this  situation  is  becoming  less  common.  For 
example,  in  urban  areas  most  husbands  and  wives  solve 
their  disagreements  by  themselves  without  any 
interference  from  outside  (Khairi,  1985).  This  is  one 
hallmark  of  the  emergence  of  a  more  mature  nuclear  family. 
Taking  all  the  evidence  on  the  transition  of  social 
and  economic  relationships  into  consideration,  it  would 
seem  fair  to  suggest  that  the  weakening  of  kin- 
relationships  is  accompanied  by  a  parallel  reduction  in 
role  segregation  between  husband  and  wife  and  some 
improvement  has  taken  place  in  husband-wife  relationships 
(Caldwell  and  Caldwell,  1987).  Husband-wife  relationships 
start  to  dominate  in  family  structures  as  other  kin- 
relationships  start  diminishing.  To  quote  Liu  (1977:  45-46): 
"The  nuclear  family  is  characterized  by  a  high  degree  of 
affective  bonding  between  the  conjugal  pair  and  a  minimum 
degree  of  authority  of  power  differentials.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  traditional  extended  family  would  be 
characterized  by  a  high  degree  of  power  differentials  and  a 
168 low  degree  of  affective  involvment" 
Caldwell  emphasized  the  importance  of  the  internal 
economy  of  the  family  and  the  relations  of  production  of 
the  peasant  family  in  traditional  society.  But  it  is  very 
important  to  consider  the  internal  economy  of  the  family  in 
transitional  and  modern  societies  as  well,  when  discussing 
family  change.  Women's  work  is  an  important  factor  in  terms 
of  family  change  in  primitive,  traditional,  transitional, 
and  modern  societies. 
Women's  work  in  primitive  and  traditional  societies 
does  not  imply  that  they  have  power  in  economic  decisions. 
The  reason  behind  this  could  be,  according  to  Caldwell's 
theory  that  the  head  of  the  household  (the  husband)  owns 
the  means  of  production.  As  a  result  women's  work  at  this 
stage  is  not  expected  to  affect  the  women's  position,  but 
in  urban  areas  women's  work  does  affect  their  position 
because  of  their  ability  to  determine  to  a  great  extent  the 
use  of  their  earnings  in  matters  relating  to  their  children 
and  to  day-to-day  matters  (Jacobson,  1970;  Wery,  1987). 
Generally,  the  data  on  Jordan  reveals  that  women  are 
increasingly  involved  in  economic  decision-making.  Women 
workers  in  urban  areas  share  more  of  the  economic  decisions 
of  the  household  than  do  women  who  do  not  work 
(Findlay,  1987a).  This  was  upheld  by  the  author's  survey 
(Table  5.12).  This  fact  supports  Caldwell's 
proposition.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  this 
proposition  focussed  on  familial  production,  where  the 
husband  owns  all  of  the  means  of  production,  and  all  of  the 
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Table  5.12 
Percentage  of  wives  who  share  in  economic-decision  making, 
1988. 
Only  husband  husband  both  share  husband  Total 
Area  makes  more  than  equally  less  no. 
decisions  wife 
Urban 
-working  wives  1.2 
-wives  not 
working  15.5 
Rural 
40.4  36.0  22.5  89 
58.4  17.7  8.4  322 
-working  wives**  xxxxx 
-wives  not 
working  41.9  51.5  6.0  6.0  167 
Source:  Author's  survey 
**  No  working  wives  were  encountered 
Table  5.13 
Attitude  of  father  towards  his  sons  and  daughters  regarding 
education,  1988  (percentages  by  areas). 
Urban,  Urban,  Rural,  Rural, 
Attitude  middle  class  lower  class  south  north 
-Daughters  should 
receive  more 
education  than  2.2  1.3  0.0  0.0 
sons 
-Both  should 
get  the  same 
level  of 
education  79.2  77.9  46.4  61.3 
-Daughters  should 
receive  less 
education  than 
sons  18.5  20.8  53.6  38.7 
-Total  number  178  240  97  76 
Source:  Author's  survey 
170 members  of  the  family  are  workers  .  In  urban  areas,  when 
the  wife  enters  the  labour  market  and  starts  to  be  a  source 
of  income  for  the  household,  this  gives  her  economic  power 
and  makes  her  share  with  the  head  of  household  in  decision- 
making,  but  this  power  is  not  complete  within  the 
traditional  male-centred  culture. 
The  author's  survey  showed  that  57.3%  of  working 
wives  in  urban  areas  have  a  partially  independent  budget 
and  7.9  %  had  a  completely  separate  budget.  The  important 
difference  between  the  work  of  women  in  rural  and  urban 
areas  is  that  women  in  rural  areas  do  not  own  anything  as  a 
result  of  their  work,  but  women  in  urban  areas  (who  work  in 
paid  jobs)  had  some  control  over  their  own  earnings.  So  the 
work  of  women  in  urban  areas  played  a  significant  role  in 
changing  their  position  in  the  household. 
Looking  at  female  education,  compared  to  that  of 
males,  provides  a  further  surrogate  measurement  of  the 
level  of  equalization  between  the  sexes.  Table  5.13 
indicates  that  there  is  still  discrimination  between  males 
and  females  in  Jordan,  but  this  discrimination  is  greatest 
in  rural  areas. 
Generally  speaking,  this  chapter  reveals  that  the 
nucleation  process  has  been  taking  place  in  Jordananian 
urban  and  rural  areas.  After  the  physical  nuclear  family 
has  emerged,  the  economic  nuclear  family  appears,  followed 
by  the  social  nuclear  family,  and  lastly  the 
.  emotional 
nuclear  family.  Associated  with  this  trend,  women's  status 
171 and  roles  are  changing  in  urban  and  rural  areas.  These 
family  changes  have  implications  on  wealth  flow  direction 
and  fertility  attitudes,  which  are  going  to  be  examined  in 
later  chapters. 
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PERCEPTIONS  OF  COSTS  AND  BENEFITS  OF  HAVING  CHILDREN 
It  has  been  suggested  that  wealth  flow  directions 
between  parents  and  children  are  critical  in  influencing 
attitudes  towards  desired  family  size  (Caldwell,  1982). 
Prior  to  evaluating  wealth  flows  (see  next  chapter)  it  is 
necessary  to  evaluate  the  costs  and  benefits  of  having 
children  as  perceived  by  the  respondents  of  the  author's 
Jordanian  sample  survey.  This  chapter  tackles  this  topic 
by  first  of  all  considering  the  difficulties  of  measuring 
the  direct  and  indirect  costs  of  children. 
6.1.  COST  OF  CHILDREN 
At  the  outset  it  should  be  noted  that  dealing  with 
variables  such  as  family  income,  cost  of  children  and 
benefit  from  children  is  not  an  easy  matter.  It  is  not  to 
be  expected  that  people  will  give  very  accurate  information 
about  their  income,  or  about  their  financial  affairs. 
Estimating  the  costs  and  benefits  of  having  children  is 
therefore  very  difficult,  and  is  a  subject  still  open  to 
much  debate.  Previous  literature  on  the  subject  indicates 
a  lack  of  precise  methods  for  estimating  the  costs  and 
benefits  of  children  (Caldwell,  1983;  Lee  and  Bulatao, 
1983;  Fawcett,  1983).  Thus  calculating  the  net  value  and 
relative  cost  of  children  is  very  difficult,  especially  in 
the  developing  countries,  because  to  do  this  requires  the 
researcher  to  make  some  heroic  assumptions.  These 
assumptions  need  to  cover  all  aspects  of  children's 
173 consumption  and  production  activities  in  order  to  make  it 
possible  to  calculate  the  balance  of  their  economic 
contribution  (Lee  and  Bulatao,  1983). 
In  the  context  of  fertility  analysis,  researchers 
have  examined  the  cost  of  children  to  the  household  in 
order  to  explain  the  transformation  in  attitudes  from 
quantity  to  quality  in  childbearing.  Demographers 
initially  tended  to  consider  the  relative  time  cost  per 
unit  of  utility  on  the  basis  of  quantity  rather  than 
quality.  There  has  been  a  requirement  to  take  into  account 
the  opportunity  cost  of  children  relative  to  the  changing 
roles  of  women  in  general  and  to  women's  work  in  particular 
(Robinson,  1987;  Mincer,  1963;  Oppong,  1983;  Lee  and 
Bulatao,  1983;  Fawcett,  1983).  It  would  appear  that  the 
true  cost  of  children  is  most  apparent  in  terms  of 
opportunity  costs  rather  than  direct  costs.  Thus  more 
importance  has  been  placed  on  women's  work,  where  the 
opportunity  cost  of  children  has  been  measured  by  a  wife's 
wage  rate  (Ho,  1979;  Arnold  et  al,  1975).  This  may  be  true 
in  the  more  advanced  countries,  and  it  offers  a  partial 
explanation  in  urban  areas  of  developing  countries, 
especially  where  the  wealth  flow  is  downward. 
In  rural  areas  the  reason  behind  the  transformation 
in  attitudes  towards  seeking  a  high  quality  of  children 
would  also  appear  to  be  an  economic  one  even  although 
wealth  flow  direction  is  expected  to  be  upward.  The  data 
in  the  previous  chapter  on  "Family  change"  reveal  that 
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employment.  This  demonstrates  that  families  are  possibly 
experiencing  a  direct  economic  cost,  and  that  opportunity 
costs  may  be  nearly  zero  in  this  environment. 
The  author's  survey  permitted  the  investigation  of 
how  respondents  perceived  both  the  benefits  and  the  costs 
of  having  children,  in  urban  and  rural  areas.  Generally, 
it  could  be  said  that  in  urban  areas  families  mostly  did 
not  expect  any  financial  gain  from  their  children.  Several 
respondents  said  that  "...  we  will  be  very  satisfied  if 
they  (or  children)  succeed  in  looking  after  themselves 
financially".  While  in  rural  areas  the  picture  was 
different.  Respondents  expected  financial  help  from  their 
children,  especially  from  educated  children.  They 
emphasized  that  they  wanted  their  children  to  be  highly 
educated.  Respondents  in  rural  areas  expressed  that  in 
terms  of  the  benefits  of  having  children,  the  quality  of 
the  children  (often  interpreted  as  educated  children)  was 
much  more  important  than  the  quantity.  Many  of  the 
respondents  said  "One  educated  and  professional  child  is 
much  better  than  ten  children  who  are  not  educated  or 
skilled". 
This  transformation  in  attitudes  towards  seeking  a 
high  quality  of  children  in  rural  areas  will  probably 
increase  the  direct  costs  of  children,  in  the  short  term, 
because  this  quality  leads  to  supporting  the  children  for  a 
long  time  as  students,  and  consequently  incurring  more 
expenditure  on  them.  While  previously  children  would  be 
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rural  areas,  to  work  on  the  land  or  to  participate  in 
herding,  or  in  southern  rural  areas  to  join  the  army. 
The  direct  cost  of  children,  in  middle  class  urban 
areas  is  relatively  low,  while  in  the  lower  class  urban 
areas,  in  the  rural  south  and  the  rural  north,  it  is 
relatively  high  (see  Table  6.1).  Thus,  most  of  the 
families  in  lower  class  urban  areas  and  in  both  southern 
and  northern  rural  areas  reported  that  they  faced  economic 
difficulties  (Table  6.2). 
This  finding  may  partially  explain  why  the 
respondents  in  these  areas  emphasized  economic  reasons  for 
stopping  having  children.  These  reasons  encouraged  them  to 
perceive  the  quality  of  children  from  an  economic  point  of 
view.  In  the  middle  class  urban  areas  it  would  appear  that 
people  are  looking  for  high  quality  children  from  a  social 
point  of  view  (Tables  6.3  and  6.4).  Their  main  concern  is 
the  social  life  of  the  family  which  increases  the 
importance  of  the  opportunity  cost  of  children  relative  to 
the  direct  costs.  Thus  in  the  case  of  middle  class  urban 
areas  child  rearing  may  be  determined  by  the  fact  that 
families  are  more  economically  secure,  even  though 
financial  returns  from  their  children  are  not  generally 
guaranteed.  The  families  in  the  middle  class  urban  areas 
were  also  less  affected  by  traditional  cultural  pressures, 
and  traditional  social  norms,  and  consequently  they  were 
mostly  isolated,  socially  and  economically,  and  had  become 
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Taking  sources  of  income  into  consideration,  with 
regard  to  economic  difficulties  brought  about  by  having 
children,  Table  6.5  shows  that  economic  difficulties  do  not 
appear  to  vary  significantly  (X2  2.7,  df  =  2, 
insignificant  at  95%  level  of  confidence)  according  to  the 
source  of  household  income.  Table  6.6  shows  that  there  are 
also  no  significant  differences  (X2  =  2.4,  df  a  2,95% 
level  of  confidence)  between  sources  of  income  in  terms  of 
the  direct  costs  of  having  children.  The  reason  for  this 
could  be  that  income  has  a  positive  relation  with  the  level 
of  direct  costs  of  having  children.  In  other  words,  high 
incomes  may  be  accompanied  by  more  expensive  consumption 
patterns.  For  example,  in  middle  class  urban  areas  the 
author  noted  that  many  families  were  accompanied  by  their 
children  on  a  weekly  visit  to  a  restaurant.  Many  children 
were  members  of  swimming  pool  clubs,  and  children  often 
spent  their  summer  holidays  abroad.  By  contrast,  in  lower 
class  urban  areas,  and  rural  areas,  children  did  not  take 
part  in  these  expensive  forms  of  consumer  behaviour.  In 
rural  areas,  especially  in  southern  rural  areas,  children 
did  not  have  any  mass-produced  toys. 
Table  6.3  shows  that  respondents  in  the  middle  class 
urban  areas  emphasized  the  importance  of  the  emotional  and 
social  life  of  their  families  in  their  decision  making. 
This  was  the  most  important  reason  for  stopping  having 
children.  By  contrast  respondents  in  the  lower  class  urban 
areas  gave  the  same  weight  to  the  social  life  of  the  family 
177 as  they  did  to  economic  factors  as  their  reason  for 
stopping  having  children.  The  differences  between  middle 
and  lower  class  urban  areas  were  significant  (X2  =  8.7  df  = 
1,  significant  at  95%  level  of  confidence,  Table  6.3). 
Families  in  which  the  wife  worked  put  more  emphasis  on  the 
emotional  and  social  life  of  the  family  and  proved  to  be 
significantly  different  from  those  families  in  which  the 
wife  did  not  work  (Table  6.4).  Noteworthy  is  the  fact  that 
most  working  wives  lived  in  middle  class  urban  areas. 
Rural  respondents,  by  contrast,  gave  the  greatest  weight  to 
economic  factors.  Differences  between  rural  areas  were  not 
significant  (X2  =  2.9  df  -  1,  insignificant  at  the  95% 
level  of  confidence),  but  the  differences  between  urban  and 
rural  areas  was  highly  significant  (X2  =  55.3,  df  1, 
significant  at  the  95%  level  of  confidence). 
Generally  speaking,  urban  parents  in  developing 
countries  are  more  concerned  about  the  opportunity  costs  of 
children  and  the  restrictions  which  children  place  on  their 
freedom,  while  by  contrast  parents  in  rural  areas  are  more 
concerned  about  the  direct  costs  of  children  (Fawcett, 
1983).  It  is  noticeable  that  respondents  in  Jordan  in  the 
northern  rural  area  were  more  interested  in  the  social  life 
of  the  family  than  the  respondents  in  southern  rural  areas 
(Table  6.3).  The  interpretation  of  this  could  be  that 
society  in  northern  rural  areas  has  witnessed  more  cultural 
changes  than  in  the  southern  rural  areas.  Table  6.3  also 
shows  that  a  certain  percentage  of  heads  of  household  in 
178 southern  rural  areas  were  worried  about  the  future  of  their 
children. 
Table  6.1 
The  percentage  cost  to  families  of  children  in  terms  of 
direct  cost  tabulated  by  area  of  interview,  1988. 
Cost  of  children 
Less  than  30-50%  More  than  Total 
30%  '  of  income  50%  No. 
of  income  of  income 
Pe  rcentage  of  Households 
Urban,  41.5  29.2  29.2  171 
middle  class 
Urban,  26.0  23.3  50.7  223 
lower  class 
Rural  south  16.3  29.1  54.7  86 
Rural  north  12.7  12.7  74.6  71 
Source:  Author's  survey. 
Table  6.2 
The  percentage  of  families  who  face  economic  difficulties 
in  raising  children,  by  area  of  interview,  1988. 
Level  of  economic  difficulties 
Percentages 
Always  Some  No  Total 
diff.  diff.  diff. 
Urban,  middle  class  10.5  39.5  50.0  172 
Urban,  lower  class  16.4  46.2  37.3  225 
Rural  south  24.4  61.6  14.0  86 
Rural  north  21.1  42.3  36.6  76 
Source:  Author's  survey. 
179 Table  6.3 
Reasons  stated  for  stopping  having  children  by  area  of 
interview,  1988. 
Reasons  stated  for  stopping  having  children 
Percentages 
Econ.  Social  Woman's  Worry  over  Other  Total* 
work  future  of  reasons  No. 
children 
Urban,  27.8  48.4  6.8  16.4  0.6  281 
middle 
class 
Urban,  38.1  38.1  3.8  18.6  1.4  291 
lower 
class 
Rural,  69.9  8.2  -  21.9  -  73 
south 
Rural,  71.2  21.2  -  7.7  -  52 
north 
*  numbers  represent  total  number  of  answers  to  the 
question. 
Respondents  were  able  to  select  more  than  one  answer. 
Source:  Author's  survey 
I 
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Reasons  stated  for  stopping  having  children  in  terms  of  the 
work  status  of  wives,  1988. 
Work  of  the  wife 
Work  outside  the  home  Not  working  outside 
Economic  22.2  44.7 
Social  44.4  36.1 
Women's  work  17.3  00.0 
Worry  over  future 
of  children  15.4  17.7 
Other  0.7  1.5 
Total  162  532 
Source:  Author's  survey 
Table  6.5 
The  percentage  of  families  who  face  economic  difficulties 
in  raising  children  by  source  of  income,  1988. 
Level  of  economic  difficulties 
Percentage  of  Households 
Source  of  Always  Some  No  Total 
income  difficult  difficulties  difficulties  No. 
Employees  16.7  47.6  35.7  384 
Self-employed  16.3  41.0  42.8  166 
Source:  Author's  survey 
181 Table  6.6 
The  percentage  cost  to  families  of  children  in  terms  of 
direct  cost  and  tabulated  by  source  of  income,  1988. 
Cost  of  children 
Percentage  of  Households 
Source  of  Less  than  30%  30-49%  More  than  50%  Total 
income  of  income  of  income  of  income  No. 
Employees  20.2  35.6  44.2  405 
Self-employed  15.1  39.7  45.3  179 
Source:  Author's  survey 
{ 
182 Within  Jordanian  culture  children  are  expected  to 
show  obedience  and  respect  for  their  fathers  and  elders. 
Traditional  relationships  between  fathers  and  children  are 
no  longer  so  strong  in  urban  areas  while  in  rural  areas 
they  remain  stronger,  although  here  too  there  is  an  erosion 
of  loyalty  to  fathers  (Table  6.7). 
It  is  worth  noticing  that  this  erosion  of  loyalty  is 
clearer  in  the  urban  areas,  especially  amongst  the  lower 
classes.  This  may  be  due  to  the  relatively  bad  economic 
situation  of  these  families  which  has  probably  been 
responsible  for  creating  some  tension  between  fathers  and 
children.  In  addition,  the  social  and  economic  isolation 
of  the  nuclear  family  leaves  parents  responsible  for  the 
entire  social  and  economic  burden  of  child  rearing. 
Differences  between  middle  and  lower  class  urban  areas  are 
not  significant  (X2  =  3.4,  df-=  2,  not  significant  at  95% 
level  of  confidence,  Table  6.7). 
The  disobedience  of  children  raises  problems  of 
control.  In  rural  areas  children,  especially  boys,  have 
started  more  openly  to  disobey  their  fathers  and  to  go 
against  their  wishes.  One  father  complained  that  his 
children  did  not  obey  his  wishes.  He  said,  for  example, 
"my  father  selected  my  bride  but  now  my  children  do  not 
want  to  take  my  opinion  into  consideration  in  this  matter". 
Thus  the  new  generation  have  no  intention  of  being 
subjugated  to  traditional  family  constraints.  Differences 
between  rural  areas  were  not  significant  (X2  =  3.7,  df  =  2, 
183 not  significant  at  95%  level  of  confidence)  in  terms  of 
perceived  obedience  of  children  to  their  parent's  wishes 
while  the  differences  were  highly  significant  between  urban 
and  rural  areas  (X2  =  191.0,  df  =  2,  significant  at  95% 
level  of  confidence,  Table  6.7). 
Traditional  norms  within  the  family  and  community, 
have  been  eroded  (Faour,  1983;  Lancaster,  1981).  Children 
have  become  less  valuable  in  economic  terms  and  their 
social  significance  has  changed,  for  example,  in  terms  of 
family  name,  prestige  and  social  security.  This  is 
especially  true  in  urban  areas  and  among.  families  who  are 
socially  and  economically  isolated. 
Table  6.8  shows  that  the  survey  revealed  interesting 
regional  differences  in  terms  of  the  motives  given  for 
having  high  fertility.  Although  respondents  in  both  urban 
areas  expressed  approximately  the  same  opinions  towards  the 
significance  of  sustaining  the  "family  name",  the 
differences  were  greater  in  terms  of  other  motives. 
In  rural  areas  Table  6.8  shows  that  respondents  in 
both  rural  areas  emphasized  "family  name",  "prestige"  and 
"old  age  security"  as  motives.  Differences  between  urban 
and  rural  areas  were  evident.  These  differences  reflect 
the  erosion  of  traditional  cultural  values,  especially  in 
middle  class  urban  areas.  Despite  these  differences  one 
can  notice  certain  similarities  in  all  areas  (urban  and 
rural).  Everywhere  it  was  considered  that  the  "family 
name"  and  "prestige"  were  more  important  than  the  other 
motives  for  having  high  fertility,  while  the  "happiness" 
184 associated  with  having  high  fertility  was  in  every  case  the 
least  important  reason. 
It  would  appear  that  socially  isolated  families  were 
less  likely  to  desire  large  numbers  of  children  than 
economically  isolated  families.  This  is  evident  in  Table 
6.8  from  the  smaller  proportion  of  families  claiming  to  be 
influenced  by  a  wide  range  of  potential  determining 
factors.  For  example,  only  27.8%  of  the  families  defined 
as  being  in  the  modern  stage  of  the  social  relation 
transition,  compared  with  39.9%  of  the  families  in  the 
modern  stage  of  the  economic  relation  transition,  supported 
the  view  that  having  a  large  number  of  children  is 
important  in  maintaining  the  name  of  the  family  over  time. 
Table  6.7 
Relationships*  between  parents  and  children,  by  area  of 
interview,  1988. 
Strong  Average  Weak  Total 
relation  relation  relation  No. 
Percentage  of  Households 
Urban,  10.3  51.1  38.5  174 
middle  class 
Urban,  7.9  44.6  47.5  240 
lower  class 
Rural,  south  63.5  32.3  4.2  96 
Rural,  north  57.6  30.3  11.8  76 
*  relationships  interpreted  in  terms  of  obedience  to 
parental  wishes  and  control. 
Source:  Author's  survey. 
185 Table  6.8 
General  motives  for  having  high  fertility  by  area  of 
interview  and  by  the  stage  of  familial  transition. 
Motivations 
Family  Prestige  Social  Economic  Happ-  Total 
name  security  earning  iness  No. 
Percentage  of  Households 
Area: 
Urban,  39.3  28.1  18.5  16.3  12.9  178 
middle  class 
Urban,  41.3  43.3  37.9  22.9  22.5  240 
lower  class 
Rural,  south  78.1  69.8  68.8  58.3  56.3  96 
Rural,  north  80.3  84.2  71.1  56.6  53.9  76 
Social  kin-relationships 
transition: 
Modern  stage  27.8  23.6  20.8  15.3  13.9  72 
Transitional  41.4  35.3  29.3  18.1  21.6  116 
advanced  stage 
Transitional  46.1  46.6  33.2  25.4  20.2  193 
early  stage 
Traditional  71.2  60.5  65.0  52.5  51.4  177 
stage 
Economic  kin-relationships 
transition: 
Modern  stage  39.9  35.8  27.5  14.7  14.7  218 
Transitional  50.4  44.6  36.7  29.5 
advanced  stage 
Transitional  50.0'  51.9  49.0  36.5 
early  stage 
Traditional  76.3  79.4  68.0  64.9 
stage 
26.6  139 
33.7  104 
62.9  97 
Source:  Author's  survey 
186 It  is  worth  mentioning  that  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
families  were  defined  as  being  modern,  there  remained  some 
who  seemed  to  be  affected  by  traditional  cultural  values  in 
terms  of  motivations  for  having  children.  Inversely  a 
small  proportion  of  families,  defined  as  being  traditional, 
disagreed  in  some  respect  with  traditional  values. 
The  motivations  for  having  children  clearly  are  not 
purely  economic.  Indeed  it  is  evident  that  culture  is  very 
important  (Mehryar  et  al,  1977).  Sustained  belief  in  the 
cultural  values  of  having  children  (family  name,  prestige) 
is  evident  and  even  though  some  economists  still  consider 
"tastes"  to  be  constant,  it  has  recently  become 
increasingly  clear  that  "tastes"  are  affected  by  social 
norms,  cultural  pressures,  personal  fears  and  satisfactions 
(Fawcett,  1972;  Demney,  1972;  Leibenstein,  1974;  Mehryar  et 
al,  1977).  Changes  in  the  family  under  the  influence  of 
forces  favouring  a  reduction  in  social  and  economic  kin- 
relationships,  has  affected  the  desire  to  have  children. 
The  assumption  remains  that  the  so-called  "modern"  nuclear 
family  will  be  less  affected  by  traditional  social  norms 
and  traditional  cultural  pressures,  and  will  generally  be 
much  more  influenced  by  personal  wishes  and  motivations 
with  regard  to  the  desire  to  have  children.  Thus  the 
perceived  "cost"  of  children  will  be  geographically  varied 
according  to  the  sub-culture  in  which  a  study  is  being 
undertaken. 
It  is  now  worth  considering  in  greater  detail  the 
essential  contribution  of  Caldwell's  theory  (Theory  of 
187 fertility  decline)  and  its  emphasis  on  the  "family 
transition".  This  contribution  sheds  light  on  some  of  the 
difficulties  faced  by  basic  theories  of  consumer  behaviour 
in  general,  and  in  particular  the  applicability  of  micro- 
economic  theories  to  fertility  analysis.  This  approach  has 
been  questioned  by  several  western  sociologists  (Mehryar  et 
al.,  1977). 
6.2  BENEFIT  FROM  CHILDREN 
Table  6.9  reveals  that  the  participation  of  girls  and 
young  women  in  the  waged  labour  market  is  still  low  in 
urban  areas,  while  in  rural  areas  it  is  even  lower.  It  is 
also  noticeable  from  Table  6.9  that  the  participation  of 
sons  in  the  labour  market  in  the  cohorts  (15-19,20-24)  is 
lower  in  middle  class  urban  areas  than  in  the  other  areas. 
This  could  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  in  middle  class 
urban  areas  sons  spend  a  longer  time  in  education. 
Economic  assistance  of  parents  by  children  (both 
single  and  married  sons  and  daughters)  still  occurs  in  both 
urban  and  rural  areas,  but  it  is  less  marked  in  urban  areas 
(Table  6.10).  In  middle  class  urban  areas  more  than  half 
of  the  children  in  waged  employment  do  not  help  their 
parents  financially,  while  the  lower  class  urban  areas  show 
an  intermediate  level  of  assistance  between  the  levels 
reported  in  the  rural  areas  and  urban  middle  class 
districts  of  Amman.  Despite  the  low  percentage  of 
daughters  who  are  working  (Table  6.9),  it  is  noticeable 
that  the  daughters  who  are  working  in  the  urban  areas  play 
188 approximately  the  same  role  as  sons  in  providing  financial 
support  to  the  household  (Table  6.10),  while  in  rural  areas 
the  role  of  daughters  in  the  waged  labour  market  has  still 
to  develop.  But  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  daughters  in 
rural  areas  are  largely  absent  from  labour  market,  their 
contribution  in  familial  production  is  very  real 
(Lancaster,  1981).  For  example,  families  who  are  engaged 
in  agricultural  activities  have  all  members  of  the' 
household,  including  daughters,  participating  at  the  time 
of  harvest. 
Table  6.10  shows  significant  differences  (X2  =  18.0, 
df  =  2,  significant  at  95%  level  of  confidence)  between 
middle  class  and  lower  class  urban  areas  in  terms  of  sons' 
help  to  family.  In  rural  areas,  by  contrast,  the 
differences  between  southern  and  northern  rural  areas  are 
insignificant  (X2  =  5.7,  df  =  2,  insignificant  at  95%  level 
of  confidence),  while  the  differences  between  rural  and 
urban  areas  are  significant  (X2  =  72.5,  df  =  2,  significant 
at  95%  level  of  confidence).  With  regard  to  urban  areas  it 
is  noticed  that  families  in  lower  class  urban  areas 
received  more  help  than  families  who  lived  in  middle  class 
areas.  The  reason  could  be  that  families  in  lower  class 
areas  have  low  income  which  makes  them  more  dependent  on 
their  children's  help. 
It  is  also  noticeable  that  their  children  leave 
school  at  a  younger  age  for  work  (Table  6.11).  Table  6.11 
also  reveals  that  there  is  a  relatively  high  percentage  of 
working  children  who  have  not  attained  even  secondary 
189 schooling. 
When  marital  status  is  taken  into  consideration  one 
finds  that  the  financial  contribution  of  single  daughters 
who  are  working  is  higher  than  that  of  married  daughters. 
Thus  it  is  apparent  that  the  marriage  of  a  daughter, 
particularly  early  marriage,  reduces  their  financial 
contribution  to  the  parental  household  (Table  6.10). 
Table  6.11  suggests  that  rural-urban  migration  may  be 
one  of  the  most  important  processes  conducive  to  an 
increase  in  the  perceived  value  of  children.  The  author's 
survey  reveals  that  in  rural  areas  only  a  small  minority  of 
the  families  depend  entirely  on  agricultural  production  for 
their  income,  while  most  of  them  depend  partially  on  income 
from  other  sources  including  migrant  remittances.  Money 
flows  from  children  to  parents  are  not  therefore  confined 
in  Jordan  to  the  immediate  location  of  the  household,  nor 
even  to  the  local  labour  market,  but  involve  migration  to 
urban  areas,  especially  to  Amman. 
Capitalist  production  (or  production  for  the  market) 
of  agricultural  produce  has  recently  been  introduced.  New 
technology  (i.  e.  chemical  fertilizer,  plastic  greenhouses, 
machinery,  etc.  )  has  been  used  extensively  in  northern 
rural  areas.  This  transformation  was  brought  about  by  rich 
families  who  lived  in  urban  areas,  especially  in  Amman,  but 
who  were  willing  to  invest  in  rural  production.  The  poorer 
farming  families  living  in  rural  areas  were  unlikely  to 
possess  the  required  investment  funds  to  transform  their 
190 familial  production  into  capitalist  production.  This 
situation  encouraged  poor  farming  families  to  look  for 
other  sources  of  income. 
The  rich  families,  who  invested  in  agricultural 
projects,  have  dominated  the  agricultural  market  (domestic 
and  international)  by  influencing  national  agricultural 
policy  in  their  favour.  The  result  has  been  that  poorer 
farming  families  have  faced  great  risks  if  they  seriously 
considered  making  investment  in  new  technology  (Stark, 
1981).  Since  the  poorer  farming  families  had  difficulties 
in  making  investments  and  in  marketing  produce,  this  led 
them  to  seek  to  reduce  their  dependence  on  agriculture  as 
their  only  source  of  income.  This  trend  in  turn  made  child 
labour,  surplus  to  the  needs  of  rural  areas.  Thus  these 
families  started  looking  at  investment  in  education  as  an 
alternative  means  of  diversifying  their  future  income.  In 
the  context  of  Jordan,  this  in  turn  favoured  rural-urban 
migration,  although  this  has  not  been  the  case  in  all 
developing  countries  (Gould,  1981).  The  new  attitudes  of 
farming  families  towards  their  children,  in  northern  rural 
areas,  has  developed  not  only  because  their  children's 
labour  competed  unfavourably  with  the  returns  to 
investments  in  modern  agricultural  technology,  but  also 
because  they  wanted  to  diversify  family  income  sources,  and 
to  control  the  level  of  risk  associated  with  family 
investments.  Stark  (1981)  has  found  similar  outcomes  in 
other  developing  countries. 
Rural-urban  migration  facilitated  the  transformation 
191 of  the  economy  of  rural  areas  towards  a  more  monetized 
base.  This  occurred  through  a  change  in  consumption 
patterns  by  the  family  (Stark,  1981).  Instead  of  depending 
completely  on  familial  production,  consumption  behaviour 
became  linked  to  waged  income  sourced  from  market 
production.  Thus  rural  migration  was  a  most  important 
mechanism  in  introducing  change  to  the  rural  economy  and 
society.  This  undoubtedly  changed  the  emphasis  of  parents 
in  favour  of  investment  in  quality  rather  than  quantity  of 
children.  In  turn  this  raised  the  relative  cost  of 
children. 
Table  6.11  indicates  that  rural  families  get 
important  financial  help  from  their  children  working  in 
urban  areas  and  in  particular  in  Amman.  Few  people  in  the 
survey  reported  children  working  abroad.  The  head  of  the 
household  in  rural  areas  insisted  on  sending  his  children 
to  school  since  he  no  longer  wanted  them  to  be  farm 
workers,  believing  instead  that  educational  investment  in 
children  would  give  the  best  long  term  returns.  Education 
might  allow  them  to  reach  better  paid  urban  white  collar 
occupations.  Thus  great  emphasis  was  given  to  having-well 
qualified  children.  This  reflected  how  important 
remittances  were  to  the  survey  respondents.  As  well  as 
sustaining  an  upward  direction  of  money  flow  within  the 
family,  it  brought  other  social  rewards  such  as  status, 
reputation  and  prestige  for  the  families  involved 
(Caldwell,  1982;  Maslow,  1970). 
192 It  is  noteworthy  that  in  the  survey  middle  class 
urban  areas  had  the  highest  percentage  of  sons  working 
abroad  (17.3%).  An  examination  of  the  recent 
characteristics  of  international  emigration  from  Jordan 
shows  that  selectivity  of  this  kind  is  a  feature  of  most 
emigration  to  the  Arab  oil  States.  Jordanian  skill  groups 
(teachers,  doctors  and  engineers,  etc.  )  were  particularly 
desired  by  the  oil-Arab  States  during  the  1970s  and  early 
1980s  (Findlay,  1987b). 
A  high  percentage  of  the  sons  of  middle  class  urban 
areas  who  had  entered  the  labour  market  had  a  university 
degree  (Table  6.11).  It  was  therefore  not  surprising  to 
find  that  in  the  context  of  Jordan  that  this  area  also  had 
the  highest  percentage  of  sons  who  were  working  abroad. 
The  majority  of  the  respondents  in  urban  and  rural 
areas  were  satisfied  with  their  children  in  terms  of  the 
economic  returns  which  they  received  from  them.  This  was 
even  true  in  urban  areas  where  the  majority  of  working 
children  were  not  helping  their  parents  economically  (Table 
6.12).  A  small  percentage  of  respondents  who  had  working 
children  in  urban  areas  in  both  middle  and  lower  class 
areas,  expressed  dissatisfaction  with  the  economic  help 
they  had  received  from  their  children. 
Taking  the  families  which  lived  in  urban  areas  and 
the  families  which  were  most  isolated  socially  and 
economically,  one  can  notice  that  they  were  the  ones  which 
considered  consumption  utility  as  the  most  important.  This 
is  especially  the  case  among  those  families  which  live  in 
193 middle  class  areas.  Several  familes  said  that  parents 
regularly  enjoyed  spending  their  leisure  time  with  their 
children,  by  going  weekly  to  restaurants,  swimming  pools  or 
for  picnics.  Returning  to  Table  6.3,  one  can  see  that 
these  families  emphasized  the  social  life  of  the  family  as 
an  important  reason  for  stopping  having  children.  When 
wives  entered  the  waged  labour  market,  the  concentration  on 
the  social  life  of  the  family  became  more  apparent.  Given 
this  situation,  it  would  seem  fair  to  assume  that  children 
will  increasingly  be  perceived  in  parents  minds  as 
competing  with  other  sources  of  satisfaction.  At  the  same 
time  children  will  become  more  valued  emotionally,  despite 
the  fact  that  the  money  flow  direction  within  families  is 
downward.  This  trend  is  important  given  the  fact  that  in 
developing  countries  the  most  important  motivations  for 
having  high  fertility  are  generally  believed  to  be  social 
and  economic,  while  the  motivations  of  happiness  and  self- 
satisfaction  have  been  less  important. 
The  five  motivations  given  for  having  high  fertility 
(see  Table  6.8  again)  can  be  classified  into  three  main 
categories:  first  is  "consumption  utility"  which  in  some 
respects  can  be  interpreted  as  self  satisfaction;  second 
is  "economic  utility"  which  involves  social  security  and 
the  contribution  of  children  to  the  family  income;  third 
is  "social  utility"  which  related  to  maintenance  of  the 
family  name,  and  prestige.  In  terms  of  this 
reclassification  it  would  seem  that  for  the  Jordanians 
194 interviewed  the  most  important  utility  was  the  social  one, 
and  the  least  important  was  consumption  utility. 
In  spite  of  the  fact  that  there  is  a  decline  in  the 
traditional  values  with  regard  to  family  relationships,  it 
is  not  surprising  that  social  values  were  the  dominant  set 
of  reasons  given  for  having  high  fertility.  Such  a  finding 
is  to  be  expected  in  Jordan,  where  the  loyalty  of  the 
individual  is  first  to  the  family  and  only  next  to  the 
state  (Faour,  1983). 
By  evaluating  the  perceptions  held  by  respondents  of 
the  costs  and  benefits  of  having  children,  Table  6.13  shows 
that  there  were  a  high  percentage  of  respondents  (old  and 
young)  in  urban  areas  who  considered  that  the  financial 
benefits  arising  from  having  children  were  less  than  the 
costs.  However,  a  high  percentage  of  parents  in  the  rural 
areas  considered  the  benefits  to  be  more  than  the  costs, 
especially  in  the  south  (Table  6.13). 
A  high  percentage  of  younger  parents  in  urban  areas 
did  not  expect  any  financial  benefits  at  all,  while  in 
rural  areas  the  majority  expected  some  benefits.  Indeed  a 
high  percentage  of  the  rural  majority  expected  the 
financial  benefits  to  be  greater  than  the  costs,  especially 
in  the  south.  The  percentage  of  younger  parents  in 
northern  rural  areas  who  did  not  expect  any  financial 
benefits  from  having  children  was  significantly  greater 
than  the  percentage  of  younger  parents  in  southern  rural 
areas.  The  regional  differences  were  significant  (X2  = 
6.2,  df  =  2,  significant  at  the  95%  level  of  confidence). 
195 Between  middle  and  lower  class  urban  areas  the  differences 
were  insignificant  (X2  =  1.1,  df  =  2,  insignificant  at  95% 
level  of  confidence).  Not  surprisingly,  the  differences 
between  urban  and  rural  areas  proved  highly  significant  (X2 
=  54.8,  df  =  2,  significant  at  95%  level  of  confidence). 
It  could  be  that  the  stronger  kinship-relations  among  the 
families  of  the  southern  rural  areas  (see  previous  chapter) 
lay  behind  the  significant  differences  in  other 
relationships  between  southern  and  northern  rural  areas. 
Finally,  it  can  be  concluded  that  in  urban  areas 
fathers  admitted  that  the  costs  of  having  children  were 
greater  than  the  financial  benefits.  There  was  also  a 
problem  of  child  control.  -  Respondents  were  looking  for 
high  quality  children  and  perceived  children  dominantly  in 
relation  to  their  social  environment.  These  opinions  were 
much  more  marked  in  middle  class  urban  areas  than  in  lower 
class  districts. 
In  rural  areas  attitudes  to  child  costs  and  benefits 
were  different.  Economic  support  of  parents  by  children 
was  evident.  This  meant  that  the  perceived  financial 
benefits  of  having  children  were  greater  than  the  costs. 
Despite  this  an  onset  of  disobedience  by  children  relative 
to  their  parents  wishes  was  reported,  but  was  very  much 
less  marked  in  rural  areas. 
The  survey  results  emphasize  the  need  to  relate 
circumstances  in  urban  and  rural  areas.  For  example  the 
rural-urban  migration  process  is  one  mechanism  by  which 
196 these,  disparate  social  contexts  were  linked  in  the 
Jordanian  case.  Rural  families  received  an  important  level 
of  financial  assistance  from-their  children  working  in 
urban  areas.  Thus  rural  social,  economic  and  demographic 
circumstances  can  never  be  treated  in  total  isolation  from 
urban  ones.  Overall,  respondents  in  rural  areas  perceived 
and  interpreted  the  quality  of  children  from  an  economic 
point  of  view. 
197 Table  6.9 
Percentage  of  children  who  are  working,  by  age  and  sex,  and 
area  of  interview,  1988. 
15-19  20-24  25-29  30-34  35+  Total 
No. 
Urban,  middle  class 
Sons:  working  chi%  0.0  26.0  79.2  100.0  95.2  51.6 
all  children:  No  33  50  24  29  21  157 
Daughters: 
working  chi%  2.3  20.0  64.7  43.8  25.0  28.0 
all  children:  No  43  40  34  16  8  141 
Urban,  lower  class 
Sons:  working  chi%  11.0  47.1  75.4  97.4  85.2  50.6 
all  children:  No  100  87  61  39  27  314 
Daughters: 
working  chi%  1.1  14.3  35.5  23.5  40.9  17.5 
all  children:  No  94  91  62  34  22  303 
Rural,  south 
Sons:  working  chi%  16.2  65.6  88.9  100.0  100.0  59.1 
all  children:  No  37  32  27  9  5  110 
Daughters: 
working  chi%  0.0  0.0  12.5  0.0  0.0  14 
all  children:  No  33  23  8  5  1  70 
Rural,  north 
Sons:  working  chi%  19.1  75.0  96.3  80.0  95.5  64.3 
all  children:  No  47  32  27  15  22  143 
Daughters: 
working  chi%  0.0  8.6  29.4  0.0  0.0  7.6 
all  children:  No  35  35  17  8  10  105 
Source:  Author's  survey. 
198 Table  6.10 
Percentage  of  working  children  who  help  their  parents  by 
area  of  interview,  sex,  and  marital  status,  1988. 
Help  Not  No  Total 
regularly*  regularly  help  No. 
Percentage  of  Households 
Urban,  middle  class: 
Single  sons  19.4  3.2  77.4  31 
Married  sons  27.3  20.4  52.3  44 
All  sons  24.0  13.3  62.7  75 
Single  daughters  28.6  10.7  60.7  28 
Married  daughters  9.1  9.1  81.8  11 
All  daughters  23.1  10.3  66.7  39 
Urban,  lower  class: 
Single  sons 
Married  sons 
All  sons 
Single  daughters 
Married  daughters 
All  daughters 
Rural,  south: 
Single  sons 
Married  sons 
All  sons 
Single  daughters 
Married  daughters 
All  daughters 
Rural,  north: 
Single  sons 
Married  sons 
All  sons 
Single  daughters 
Married  daughters 
All  daughters 
49.3  23.9  26.8  71 
27.6  32.9  39.5  76 
38.1  28.6  33.3  147 
58.6  20.7  20.7  29 
8.3  29.2  62.5  24 
35.8  24.5  39.6  53 
70.7  22.0  7.3  41 
79.2  16.7  4.2  24 
73.8  20.1  6.2  65 
100.0  0.0  0.0  1 
0.0  0.0  0.0  0 
100.0  0.0  0.0  1 
75.5  8.9  15.6  45 
85.7  4.7  9.5  42 
79.3  6.9  12.6  87 
66.7  0.0  33.3  3 
20.0  40.0  40.0  5 
37.5  25.0  37.5  8 
*  regularly  =  monthly 
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200 Table  6.12 
Level  of  satisfaction  of  father  in  terms  of  children's 
financial  help,  by  sex  and  marital  status  of  help 
(percentages),  1988. 
Level  of  satisfaction 
Completely  Sometimes  No  Total 
satisfied  satisfied  satisfaction 
MFMFMFMF 
1.  Urban,  middle  class: 
Single  67.7  67.9  16.1  17.9  16.1  14.3  31  28 
Married  65.9  45.5  15.9  36.4  18.2  18.2  44  11 
Total  66.7  61.5  16.0  23.1  17.3  15.4  75  39 
2.  Urban,  lower  class: 
single  74.6  82.8  15.5 
Married  57.9  45.8  28.9 
Total  66.0  66.0  22.4 
6.9  9.9  10.3  71  29 
50.0  13.2  4.2  76  24 
26.4  11.6  7.5  147  53 
3.  Rural,  south: 
single  85.4  100.0  14.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  41  1 
Married  91.7  0.0  4.2  0.0  4.1  0.0  24  0 
Total  87.7  0.0  10.8  0.0  1.5  0.0  65  1 
4.  Rural,  north: 
Single  84.4  100.0  11.1  0.0  4.4  0.0  45  3 
Married  92.9  40.0  4.8  60.0  2.3  0.0  42  5 
Total  88.5  62.5  8.0  37.5  3.4  0.0  87  8 
Source:  Author's  survey 
201 Table  6.13 
Perceived  financial  costs  and  benefits  of  children,  by  area 
of  interview,  1988. 
Money  flow  Money  flow  The  same  Families  do  Total 
more  than  less  than  not  expect  No. 
cost  cost  financial 
help 
(%  of  total) 
Percentage  of  all  households 
expected  some  financial  help 
Urban, 
middle 
class  16.2  76.2  7.6  49.7  178 
Urban, 
lower 
class  21.4  71.7  6.9  44.3  240 
Rural, 
south  56.0  34.1  9.9  8.1  96 
Rural, 
north  50.8  47.7  1.5  22.0  76 
Source:  Author's  survey. 
202 CHAPTER  7 
ANALYSIS  OF  WEALTH  FLOW  DIRECTION 
This  chapter  will  analyse  the  direction  of  wealth 
flow  rather  than  of  money  flow.  The  assessment,  therefore, 
takes  into  consideration  factors  other  than  purely  monetary 
ones.  It  is  desirable  to  mention  here  that  wealth  flow  is 
a  composite  variable  created  from  the  amalgamation  of 
several  other  variables  which  the  author  felt  represented 
the  power  structure  in  the  family  (see  Methodology 
chapter).  These  other  variables  (or  dimensions  of  wealth 
flow)  were  discussed  in  detail  in  the  last  two  chapters. 
Table  7.1  shows  the  differences  in  wealth  flow 
direction  in  terms  of  area  of  interview. 
Table  7.1 
Wealth  flow  direction  by  area  of  interview,  1988. 
Area  of  Interview  Wealth  flow  direction  (percentage) 
Upward  Downward  Total  No. 
Urban,  middle  class  9.8  90.2  178 
Urban,  lower  class  9.9  90.1  240 
Rural,  south  70.2  29.8  96 
Rural,  north  70.4  29.6  76 
Table  7.1  shows  that  differences  are  not  significant 
(X2  =  .  006  df  =  1,  not  significant  at  95%  level  of 
confidence)  between  the  middle  class  and  lower  class  urban 
areas,  and  even  not  significant  (X2  =  .  001  df  =  1,  not 
significant  at  95%  level  of  confidence)  between  southern 
203 and  northern  rural  areas.  But  the  differences  are  highly 
significant  (X2  =  220,  df  =  1,  significant  at  95%  level  of 
confidence)  between  rural  and  urban  areas. 
The  analysis  which  follows  will  assess  the  importance 
of  the  explanatory  variables  in  terms  of  three  separate 
models.  The  Statistical  analysis  as  described  in  the 
methodology  chapter  involved  use  of  categorical  data 
analysis  and  in  particular  stepwise  logistic  regression. 
It  focussed  on  explaining  the  relationships  between  the 
response  variable  "wealth  flow"  (WEALTH)  and  a  range  of 
potential  explanatory  variables  as  shown  in  Table  7.2.  The 
table  also  shows  the  relevant  approximated  values  of  F-to- 
enter,  and  approximated  F-to-remove  statistics  encountered 
in  the  statistical  anlysis. 
Identifying  the  first-order  relationships  involved 
the  selection  of  a  "reasonable"  subset  of  potential 
explanatory  variables.  It  was  found  that  on  the  basis  of 
the  largest  F-to-enter  values  relative  to  the  number  of 
degrees  of  freedom,  the  first  variable  to  enter  the 
logistic  regression'  equation  was  area  of  interview 
(AREAINT).  On  the  same  basis,  and  always  adjusting  for 
higher  order  relationships,  second  to  fifth  order 
relationships  were  found  between  wealth  flow  and  social 
kin-relationships  (RELSOC),  education  level  of  wives 
(R2EDUC),  and  age  of  husbands  (RIDOBYR).  The  remaining 
variables  do  not  have  a  significant  value  of  F-to-enter.  A 
list  of  all  variables  and  their  labels  is  included  in 
Appendix2'  for  reference  purposes. 
204 Table  7.2:  (Model  1),  Test  statistics  for  stage  one 
explanatory  variable  selection 
direction  (WEALTH),  1988. 
process,  wealth  flow 
Approx  df  df  Approx  df  df 
F-to-  F-to- 
enter  remove 
-First-order  relationships: 
WEALTH  x  RELSOC  76.21  2  551 
WEALTH  x  RELECO  57.67  2  551 
WEALTH  x  AREAINT  165.52  2  551 
WEALTH  x  RIEDUC  25.87  2  551 
WEALTH  x  R2EDUC  29.05  2  551 
WEALTH  x  INCSOU  5.25  1  552 
WEALTH  x  RIDOBYR  2.24  2  551 
WEALTH  x  CHILD  2.64  2  551 
-Second-order  relationships: 
WEALTH  x  AREAINT  x  RELSOC  16.97  2  549  80.34  2  549 
WEALTH  x  AREAINT  x  RELECO  5.45  2  549 
WEALTH  x  AREAINT  x  RIEDUC  2.54  2  549 
WEALTH  x  AREAINT  x  R2EDUC  3.90  2  549 
WEALTH  x  AREAINT  x  INCSOU  0.40  1  550 
WEALTH  x  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR  0.85  2  549 
WEALTH  x  AREAINT  x  CHILD  1.54  2  549 
-Third-order  relationships  : 
WEALTH  x  AREAINT  x  RELSOC 
x  RELECO  0.66  2  547 
WEALTH  x  AREAINT  x  RELSOC 
x  RIEDUC  2.39  2  547 
WEALTH  x  AREAINT  x  RELSOC 
x  R2EDUC  3.71  2  547  12.88  2  547 
WEALTH  x  AREAINT  x  RELSOC 
x  INCSOU  0.60  1 
WEALTH  x  AREAINT  x  RELSOC 




Table  7.2:  (Model  1),  Test  statistics  for  stage  one 
explanatory  variable  selection  process,  wealth  flow 
direction  (WEALTH),  1988. 
Approx  df"  df  Approx  df  df 
F-to-  F-to- 
enter  remove 
WEALTH  x  AREAINT  x  RELSOC 
x  CHILD  1.05  2  547 
-Fourth-order  relationships: 
WEALTH  x  AREAINT  x  RELSOC 
x  R2EDUC  x  RELECO  0.35  2  545 
WEALTH  x  AREAINT  x  RELSOC 
x  R2EDUC  x  RIEDUC  0.30  2  545 
WEALTH  x  AREAINT  x  RELSOC 
x  R2EDUC  x  INCSOU  0.27  1  546 
WEALTH  x  AREAINT  x  RELSOC 
x  R2EDUC  x  RIDOBYR  2.87  2  545  3.81  2  545 
WEALTH  x  AREAINT  x  RELSOC 
X  R2EDUC  x  CHILD  1.58  2  545 
-Fifth-order  relationships: 
WEALTH  x  AREAINT  x  RELSOC 
x  R2EDUC  x  RIDOBYR  x  RELECO  0.31  2  543 
WEALTH  x  AREAINT  x  RELSOC 
x  R2EDUC  x  R1DOBYR  x  RIEDUC  0.50  2  543 
WEALTH  x  AREAINT  x  RELSOC 
x  R2EDUC  x  RIDOBYR  x  INCSOU  0.44  1  544 
WEALTH  x  AREAINT  x  RELSOC 
x  R2EDUC  x  RIDOBYR  x  CHILD  1.35  2  543  2.71  2  543 
206 Table  7.3:  (Model  1)  Stepwise  logistic  regression  results, 
1988. 
Variables  Category*  Coefficient  S.  Error 
RELSOC  (1)  0.131  0.280 
(2)  1.298  0.285 
AREAINT  (1)  -0.926  0.192 
(2)  1.399  0.193 
R2EDUC  (1)  -0.185  Ex-01  0.279 
(2)  0.954  0.290 
RIDOBYR  (1)  -0.804  Ex-01  0.206 
(2)  0.416  0.186 
CONSTANT  -2.1163  0.328 
*  As  defined  in  the  methodology  chapter. 
Table  7.4:  (Model  1) 
regression,  1988. 
Summary  of  stepwise  logistic 
Step  Variable  df  Log  Improvement  Goodness  P-VAL 
No.  entered  Likelihood  in  of  ft 
X2  P-VAL  of  X 
0  -327.426  505.154  0.000 
1  AREAINT  2  -226.791  201.270  0.000  303.877  0.224 
2  RELSOC  2  -210.931  31.721  0.000  272.158  0.683 
3  R2EDUC  2  -206.875  8.112  0.017  264.046  0.772 
4  RIDOBYR  2  -204.063  5.623  0.060  258.424  0.818 
207 Table  7.3  shows  the  coefficients  used  for  estimating 
the  probability  of  households  having  a  downward  wealth  flow 
direction.  The  statistical  results  of  the  overall  model 
(Model  1)  reveal  that  households  living  in  urban  areas, 
having  weak  social  kin-relationships,  having  high  levels  of 
education  amongst  wives  and  involving  young  married  couples 
have  a  higher  probability  than  all  other  households  of 
having  a  downward  wealth  flow  direction.  Table  7.4 
provides  an  overall  statistical  summary  of  the  stepwise 
logistic  model  fitted  to  the  author's  survey  data.  The 
goodness  of  fit  of  the  model  is  measured  using  the  X2 
statistic,  with  the  state  of  probability  of  the 
hierarchical  model  being  expressed  in  the  conventional 
statistical  form  as  shown  by  the  columns  of  Table  7.4  head 
"P-value".  With  the  entry  of  each  additional  explanatory 
variable  the  improvement  in  the  model  fit  is  indicated  by 
the  reduction  of  the  chi  square  statistic.  This  is  also 
shown  in  terms  of  the  column  measuring  the  "improvement  in 
chi  square".  Table  7.4  shows  (and  all  similar  tables 
throughout  the  remainder  of  the  thesis)  variables  in 
decreasing  order  of  statistical  significance.  Thus,  for 
example,  the  greatest  reduction  in  variance  in  explaining 
wealth  flow  direction  is  area  of  interview  followed  by 
social  kin-relationships.  Even  a  cursory  examination  of 
Table  7.4  immediately  shows  that  the  proportion  of  variance 
explained  by  area  of  interview  is  so  high  that  it  threatens 
to  obscure  other  important  associations.  As  a  result,  it 
208 was  decided  to  disaggregate  the  model,  and  to  examine 
wealth  flow  directions  in  urban  and  rural  areas  separately. 
By  controlling  for  location  of  interview  allowed  the 
researcher  to  investigate  in  more  detail  the  determinants 
of  wealth  flow  direction  in  urban  and  rural  environments. 
It  was  decided,  therefore,  to  re-run  the  model  on  this 
basis  (Figure  7.1).  When  this  change  is  introduced  quite 
remarkable  modifications  emerge  in  the  relationships 
influencing  wealth  flow.  These  more  refined  models  (Model 
1A  and  Model  1B)  study  urban  and  rural  areas  separately  and 
are  shown  in  Tables  7.5  to  7.10. 
Table  7.5  shows  the  relevant  approximated  values  of 
F-to-enter,  and  approximated  F-to-remove  statistics  for  the 
urban  model.  On  the  basis  of  the  largest  F-to-enter  value 
relative  to  number  of  degrees  of  freedom,  and  always 
adjusting  for  higher  order  relationships,  it'was  found  that 
in  urban  areas  relationships  exist  between  wealth  flow  and 
social  kin-relationships  (RELSOC),  and  the  education  level 
of  wives  respectively. 
Table  7.6  gives  the  coefficients  for  estimating 
probabilities  of  households  having  a  downward  direction  of 
wealth  flow.  Weak  social  kin-relationships,  and  high 
levels  of  education  amongst  wives'  serve  to  increase  the 
probability  that  an  urban  household  will  have  a  downward 
direction  of  wealth  flow  from  parents  to  children. 
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210 Table  7.5:  (Model  1A),  -Test  statistics  for  stage  one 
explanatory  variable  selection 
direction  (WEALTH),  in  urban  areas, 
process,  wealth  flow 
1988. 
Approx  df  df  Approx  df  df 
F-to-  F-to- 
enter  remove 
-First-order  relationships: 
WEALTH  x  RELSOC  8.66  2  387 
WEALTH  x  RELECO  4.51  2  387 
WEALTH  x  RIEDUC  2.01  2  387 
WEALTH  x  R2EDUC  3.52  2  387 
WEALTH  x  INCSOU  2.40  1  388 
WEALTH  x  R1DOBYR  0.03  2  387 
WEALTH  x  CHILD  0.06  2  387 
-Second-order  relationships: 
WEALTH  x  RELSOC  x  RELECO  2.11  2  385 
WEALTH  x  RELSOC  x  RIEDUC  2.62  2  385 
WEALTH  x  RELSOC  x  R2EDUC  5.25  2  385  7.16  2  385 
WEALTH  x  RELSOC  x  INCSOU  2.66  1  386 
WEALTH  X  RELSOC  x  RIDOBYR  0.04  2  385 
WEALTH  x  RELSOC  x  CHILD  0.46  2  385 
-Third-order  relationships: 
WEALTH  x  RELSOC  x  R2EDUC 
x  RELECO  1.53  2  383 
WEALTH  x  RELSOC  x  R2EDUC 
x  RIEDUC  0.27  2  383 
WEALTH  x  RELSOC  x  R2EDUC 
x  INCSOU  1.92  1  384 
WEALTH  x  RELSOC  x  R2EDUC 
x  RIDOBYR  0.70  2  383 
WEALTH  x  RELSOC  x  R2EDUC 
x  CHILD  1.86  2  383  4.98  2  383 
211 Table  7.6:  (Model  lA)  Stepwise  logistic  regression  results, 
1988. 
Variables  Coefficient  S.  Error 
RELSOC  (1)  -0.388  -02  0.302 
(2)  1.265  0.320 
R2EDUC  (1)  -0.151  0.332 
(2)  0.873  0.307 
CONSTANT  -2.803  0.350 
In  rural  areas  (Model  lb)  it  was  found  that  social 
and  economic  kin-relationships  had  the  largest  F-to-enter 
values,  after  adjusting  for  higher  order  relationships 
(Tables  7.8,7.9).  In  other  words,  weak  social  and 
economic  kin-relationships  increase  the  probability  that  a 
household  will  have  a  downward  direction  of  wealth  flow. 
Table  7.10  offers  a  summary  of  the  stepwise  logistic 
regression  for  the  two  rural  survey  areas. 
The  above  statistical  results  indicate  that  in  the 
disaggregated  models  social  and  economic  kin-relationships 
are  the  most  important  variables  determining  direction  of 
wealth  flow  (Fig.  7.1).  Caldwell  (1982)  emphasised  wealth 
flow  as  a  fundamental  variable  which  could  be  used  to 
explain  both  stable  high  fertility  and  the  onset  of 
fertility  decline.  It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that 
social  and  economic  kin-relationships  are  the  most 
important  variables  in  terms  of  wealth  flow,  because  wealth 
flow  itself  reflects  the  family's  internal  power  structure. 
212 Indeed,  wealth  flow  directions  mirror  internal 
relationships  within  the  family. 
The  erosion  of  social  and  economic  kin-relationships 
in  traditional  society  in  favour  of  more  "modern"  familial  - 
relationships  forms  part  of  the  process  responsible  for  the 
creation  of  the  closed  nuclear  family,  both  socially  and 
economically.  This  new  social  creation  is  accompanied  by  a 
change  in  the  social  and  moral  norms  held  by  the  family. 
The  closed  nuclear  family  is  not  characterised  by  the  same 
level  of  differentiation  and  segregation  in  terms  of  age 
and  sex  found  as  is  the  traditional  Islamic  household. 
Therefore,  a  new  form  of  familial  production  and  morality 
appear  along  with  the  new  power  structure. 
In  both  urban  and  rural  areas  social  kin- 
relationships  have  most  influence  on  wealth  flow 
directions,  although  as  has  been  shown  through  Tables  7.4, 
7.7  and  7.10  the  statistical  definition  of  these  linkages 
varies  from  one  geographical  context  to  another.  These 
results  might  seem  at  first  examination  to  contradict  those 
of  the  previous  chapter  (Family  Change  chapter)  which 
suggested  that  the  strength  of  economic  kin-relationships 
diminish  first,  followed  by  social  kin-relations.  In 
practice,  however,  changes  in  family  structure  and  in 
wealth  flow  direction  within  the  families  may  form  a 
complex  interdependent  system  of  linkages  rather  than  a 
simple  unidirectional  causal  model. 
Model  1A  (Figure  7.1)  indicates  that  the  education 
213 level  of  wives  in  urban  areas  also  has  a  significant  impact 
on  wealth  flow  directions.  This  would  suggest  that  the 
status  and  roles  of  women  have  been  improving  significantly 
and  that  the  internal  power  structure  of  the  family  has 
been  affected  by  its  changing  external  context.  But  in 
rural  areas  it  seems  that  women's  status  and  roles  do  not 
play  as  important  a  role  in  determining  wealth  flow 
directions,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  some  changes  have 
been  taking  place. 
Generally  speaking,  there  is  no  doubt  about  the 
influence  of  these  important  explanatory  variables:  Area 
of  interview,  level  of  education,  and  social  and  economic 
kin-relationships.  The  data  suggests  that  a  significant 
cultural  change  has  been  taking  place  in  Jordan  and  that 
this  is  manifested  geographically  by  the  different 
directions  of  wealth  flow  found  by  the  author  in  rural  and 
urban  environments. 
The  highly  significant  differences  between  urban  and 
rural  areas  probably  reflects  how  much  the  economy  and 
culture  of  these  areas  has  been  affected  by  external  forces 
such  as  the  penetration  of  international  economic 
processes.  Abu  Lugod  (1984)  has  attempted  to  explain 
variations  in  the  forms  of  urbanisation  in  different  Arab 
countries  in  terms  of  an  analysis  of  these  kinds  of  forces 
(i.  e.  the  operation  of  different  modes  of  production).  It 
seems  equally  possible  that  differentiation  between  regions 
within  a  country,  such  as  Jordan,  relate  in  a  similar  way 
to  geographical  variations  in  the  penetration  of 
214 international  capital  and  production.  Detailed 
investigation  of  this  particular  hypothesis  lies  beyond  the 
scope  of  this  thesis.  What  seems  certain,  however,  is  that 
traditional  cultural  values  continue  to  be  held  by  only  a 
small  percentage  of  families  in  urban  areas,  while  in  rural 
areas  these  traditional  cultural  values  are  still 
widespread  amongst  most  families  and  play  a  strong  role  in 
influencing  directions  of  wealth  flow.  The  consequences 
of  this  are  that  major  regional  disparities  have  emerged  in 
the  attitude  of  parents  towards  the  role  of  children  within 
the  family  and  consequently  in  the  attitudes  of  parents 
towards  desired  fertility  levels.  It  is  this  latter  issue 
which  is  the  focus  of  attention  in  the  next  chapter. 
Table  7.7:  (Model  1A)  Summary  of  stepwise  logistic 
regression,  1988. 
Step  Variable  df  Log  Improvement  Goodness  P-VAL 
No.  entered  Likelihood  in  of  f't 
removed  X2  P-VAL  of  X' 
0  -126.780  161.428  0.836 
1  RELSOC  2  -119.103  15.355  0.000  146.072  0.962 
2  R2EDUC  2  -113.777  10.651  0.005  135.421  0.990 
215 Table  7.8:  (Model  1B),  Test  statistics  for  stage  one 
explanatory  variable  selection 
direction  (WEALTH),  in  rural  areas, 
process, 
1988. 
wealth  flow 
Approx  df  df  Approx  df  df 
F-to-  F-to- 
enter  remove 
-First-order  relationships: 
WEALTH  x  RELSOC  10.12  2  161 
WEALTH  x  RELECO  6.05  2  161 
WEALTH  x  RIEDUC  0.34  2  161 
WEALTH  x  R2EDUC  1.01  2  161 
WEALTH  x  INCSOU  1.09  1  162 
WEALTH  x  RIDOBYR  1.68  2  161 
WEALTH  x  CHILD  2.47  2  161 
-Second-order  relationships: 
WEALTH  x  RELSOC  x  RELECO  2.69  2  159  56.64  2  159 
WEALTH  x  RELSOC  x  RIEDUC  0.10  2  159 
WEALTH  x  RELSOC  x  R2EDUC  0.53  2  159 
WEALTH  x  RELSOC  x  INCSOU  0.93  1  160 
WEALTH  x  RELSOC  x  RIDOBYR  1.58  2  159 
WEALTH  x  RELSOC  x  CHILD  1.79  2  159 
-Third-order  relationships: 
WEALTH  x  RELSOC  x  RELECO 
x  RIEDUC  0.12  2  157 
WEALTH  x  RELSOC  x  RELECO 
x  R2EDUC  0.68  2  157 
WEALTH  x  RELSOC  x  RELECO 
x  INCSOU  0.62  1  158 
WEALTH  x  RELSOC  x  RELECO 
x  RIDOBYR  1.10  2  157 
WEALTH  x  RELSOC  x  RELECO 
x  CHILD  1.52  2  157  2.42  2  157 
216 Table  7.9:  (Model  1B)  Stepwise  logistic  regression  results, 
1988. 
Variables  Category*  Coefficient  S.  Error 
RELSOC  (1)  2.745  0.000 
(2)  4.085  0.463 
RELECO  (1)  0.638  0.308 
(2)  0.112  0.301 
*As  defined  in  the  methodology  chapter. 
Table  7.10:  (Model  1B)  Summary  of  stepwise  logistic 
regression,  1988. 
Step  Variable  df  Log  Improvement  Goodness  P-VAL 
No.  entered  Likelihood  in  of  f't 
removed  X2  P-VAL  of  X 
0  -100.011  104.518  0.001 
1  RELSOC  2  -90.772  18.477  0.000  86.041  0.035 
2  RELECO  2  -88.214  5.117  0.077  80.924  0.054 
217 CHAPTER  8 
ANALYSIS  OF  FERTILITY  ATTITUDES 
The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  investigate  the 
fertility  attitudes  of  the  survey  sample  population  through 
analyzing  the  following  areas  of  interest: 
1.  Attitudes  to  family  size  to  what  might  be  the  best 
number  of  children  to  have  (BESTNC). 
In  the  demographic  literature  there  is  a  detailed 
discussion  about  how  best  to  elicit  information  about 
desired  number  of  children  (Lee  &  Bulatao,  1983).  In  the 
context  of  this  thesis  it  was  felt  most  appropriate  to 
follow  Caldwell's  approach  (1982)  as  closely  as  possible 
and  to  ask  respondents  what  they  considered  to  be  the  best 
number  of  children  to  have. 
2.  The  social  and  -economic  motivations  for  having  high 
fertility  (MOTIV). 
3.  Contraceptive  use  (CONUSE) 
The  literature  review  (Chapter  1)  showed  that  a  large 
number  of  explanatory  variables  might  be  investigated  to 
explain  variations  in  attitudes  towards  these  aspects  of 
fertility.  In  this  study  analysis  was  limited  to  three 
main  groups  of  explanatory  variables.  The  labels  given  to 
variables  in  subsequent  tables  are  shown  in  brackets.  The 
three  main  areas  were:  - 
1.  Kin-relationships  expressed  both  in  social  (RELSOC)  and 
economic  terms  (RELECO). 
218 2.  Wealth  flow  directions  reflecting  the  structure  of 
power  in  the  family  (WEALTH). 
3.  Socio-economic  and  demographic  variables: 
a)  area  of  interview  (AREAINT) 
b)  level  of  education  of  husband  (RIEDUC) 
C)  level  of  education  of  wife  (R2EDUC) 
d)  source  of  income  (INCSOU) 
e)  age  of  husband  (RIDOBYR) 
f)  actual  number  of  children  (CHILD) 
In  order  to  investigate  the  relationships  between 
dependent  and  independent  variables  categorical  data 
analysis  (stepwise  logistic  regression)  was  used.  An 
explanation  of  the  statistical  structure  of  the  variables 
was  undertaken  in  order  to  determine  which  of  the 
explanatory  variables  were  most  significant. 
The  analysis  which  follows  will  assess  the  importance 
of  the  behaviour  of  the  explanatory  variables  in  terms  of 
three  main  separate  models.  The  results  are  helpful  in 
investigating  the  theory  of  fertility  decline,  by  shedding 
some  light  on  some  of  Caldwell's  propositions.  These 
propositions  and  the  implications  of  the  statistical 
analysis  presented  below  are  discussed  in  greater  detail  in 
the  next  chapter. 
219 8.1.  MODEL  1:  ATTITUDE  TO  THE  BEST  NUMBER  OF  CHILDREN  TO 
HAVE 
Table  8.1 
Best  number  of  children  to  have,  by  area  of  interview, 
1988. 
Urban  Urban  Rural  Rural 
Middle  Lower  South  North 
class  class 
Best  No.  of  Children  (BESTNC)  Percentages 
3  or  less  48.3  21.3  10.4  9.2 
4-5  34.8  35.0  18.8  27.6 
6  or  more  16.9  43.8  70.8  63.2 
Total  No.  178  240  96  76 
Source:  Author's  Survey 
Chi  square  test  carried  out  on  the  data  on  which  Table  8.1 
is  based  indicated  that  in  urban  areas  there  were 
significant  differences  between  urban  middle  class  and 
lower  class  areas,  while  the  differences  between  rural 
north  and  rural  south  were  not  significant. 
Statistical  analysis  involved  explaining  the 
relationships  between  respondents  attitude  to  what  might  be 
the  best  number  of  children  and  a  range  of  potential 
explanatory  variables  is  shown  in  Table  8.2.  Table  8.2 
also  shows  the  relevant  approximated  values  of  F-to-enter, 
and  approximated  F-to-remove  statistics. 
Identifying  the  first-order-relationships  involved 
the  selection  of  a  "reasonable"  subset  of  potential 
220 explanatory  variables.  It  was  found  that  on  the  basis  of 
the  'largest  F-to-enter  value  relative  to  number  of  degrees 
of  freedom,  the  first  variable  entered  is  again  "area  of 
interview".  On  the  same  basis,  and  always  adjusting  for 
higher  order  relationships,  second  and  third  order 
relationships  were  found  between  attitude  to  what  might  be 
the  best  number  of  children  and  the  area  of  interview, 
education  level  of  wife,  and  economic  kin-relationships. 
The  remaining  variables  do  not  have  a  significant  value  of 
F  to  merit  entering  them  in  the  regression  equation. 
Table  8.3  gives  coefficients  for  estimating 
probabilities  of  households  declaring  that  in  their  view 
the  best  number  of  children  to  have  was  3.  These 
coefficients  show  that  husbands  living  in  urban  areas,  with 
highly  educated  wives,  and  with  weak  economic  kin- 
relationships  are  the  most  likely  group  to  want  to  have 
fewer  than  4  children.  Inversely  in  the  sample  survey 
husbands  in  rural  areas,  who  are  married  to  poorly  educated 
wives,  and  with  strong  economic  kin-relationships  were  more 
likely  to  want  to  have  more  than  4  children. 
In  order  to  investigate  the  determinants  of  fertility 
attitudes  in  urban  and  rural  environments  in  more  detail, 
and  because  of  the  complex  influences  which  the  location  of 
interview  might  have  had  on  the  analysis,  it  was  decided  to 
re-run  the  model  in  a  spatially  disaggregated  form.  When 
this  change  was  introduced  interesting  modifications 
emerged  in  the  relationships  influencing  attitude  to 
desired  family  size.  The  more  refined  urban  and  rural 
221 models  are  shown  in  Tables  8.5  to  8.10. 
Table  8.5  shows  the  relevant  approximated  values  of 
F-to-enter  and  approximated  F-to-remove  statistics  in  urban 
areas  (Model  IA).  On  the  basis  of  adjusting  for  higher 
order  relationships  first,  second  and  third  order 
relationships  were  found  between  attitude  to  what  might  be 
the  best  number  of  children  and  the  education  level  of 
wives  and  economic  kin-relationships  respectively.  it  is 
most  interesting  that  when  location  of  interview  was 
controlled  in  Model  1A,  the  results  were  similar  to  the 
results  of  Model  1,  suggesting  that  the  overall  model  has 
some  similarities  to  the  urban  context  of  Model  1A  although 
the  strength  of  the  relationships  is  different. 
Table  8.6  shows  coefficients  which  suggest  that 
husbands  in  urban  areas  who  marry  highly  educated  wives, 
and  have  weak  economic  kin-relationships  generally  want  to 
have  fewer  than  4  children.  Comparison  of  Tables  8.4  and 
8.7  indicates  that  the  main  effect  of  specifying  the  model 
more  precisely  has  been  to  increase  the  statistical 
explanatory  power  of  the  education  variable,  but  by 
contrast  the  economic  relations  with  kin  (RELECO)  were  of 
no  greater  importance  than  in  the  general  model.  This 
could  be  taken  to  imply  a  high  degree  of  covariance  between 
urban  environments  and  levels  of  female  education,  a 
hypothesis  which  seems  highly  logical. 
Table  8.8  shows  the  relevant  approximated  values  of 
F-to-enter  and  approximated  F-to-remove  statistics  for 
222 rural  areas  (Model  1B). 
Relationships  were  found  between  attitude  to  what 
might  be  the  best  number  of  children,  the  education  level 
of  the  husband,  and  social  kin-relationships.  Regression 
coefficients  suggested  that  husbands  with  a  high  level  of 
education,  and  weak  social  kin-relationships  were  most 
likely  to  want  fewer  than  4  children  (Table  8.9). 
Contrasting  Table  8.10  with  Tables  8.4  and  8.7  is  useful. 
Not  only  are  relationships  in  rural  areas  less  well  defined 
by  the  model,  but  the  variables  involved  are  different, 
with  attitudes  to  the  best  number  of  children  being 
determined  as  has  been  shown  by  very  different  factors. 
223 Table  8.2:  (Model  1)  Test  statistics  for  stage  one 
explanatory  variable  selection  process  -  Best  number  of 
children  (BESTNC),  1988. 
F-to-  F-to 
Approx. 
enter  df  df 
Approx. 
remove  df  df 
-First-order  relationships: 
BESTNC  x  RELSOC  3.05  2  551 
BESTNC  x  RELECO  13.07  2  551 
BESTNC  x  AREAINT  35.21  2  551 
BESTNC  x  WEALTH  21.40  1  552 
BESTNC  x  RIEDUC  20.43 
BESTNC  X  R2EDUC  29.92  2  551 
BESTNC  x  INCSOU  0.19  1  552 
BESTNC  x  RIDOBYR  3.70  2  551 
BESTNC  x  CHILD  7.57  2  551 
-Second-order  relationships: 
BESTNC  x  AREAINT  x  RELSOC  0.85  2  549 
BESTNC  x  AREAINT  x  RELECO  4.50  2  549 
BESTNC  x  AREAINT  x  WEALTH  3.03  1  550 
BESTNC  x  AREAINT  x  RIEDUC  3.59  2  549 
BESTNC  X  AREAINT  x  R2EDUC  7.63  2  549  27.91  2  549 
BESTNC  x  AREAINT  x  INCSOU  1.27  1  550 
BESTNC  x  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR  2.30  2  549 
BESTNC  x  AREAINT  x  CHILD  3.05  2  549 
-Third-order  relationships: 
BESTNC  x  AREAINT  x  R2EDUC 
x  RELSOC  1.32  2  547 
BESTNC  x  AREAINT  x  R2EDUC 
x  RELECO  3.85  2  547  7.22  2  547 
BESTNC  x  AREAINT  x  R2EDUC 
x  WEALTH  1.48  1  548 
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Table  8.2:  (Model  1)  Test  statistics  for  stage  one 
explanatory  variable  selection  process  -  Best  number  of 
children  (BESTNC),  1988. 
F-to-  F-to 
Approx.  Approx. 
enter  df  df  remove  df  df 
BESTNC  X  AREAINT  x  R2EDUC 
x  RIEDUC  0.06  2  547 
BESTNC  X  AREAINT  x  R2EDUC 
x  INCSOU  0.66  1  548 
BESTNC  x  AREAINT  x  R2EDUC 
x  RIDOBYR  0.19  2  547 
BESTNC  x  AREAINT  x  R2EDUC 
x  CHILD  1.41  2  547 
-Fourth-order  relationship  s: 
BESTNC  x  AREAINT  x  R2EDUC 
x  RELECO  x  RELSOC  1.29  2  545 
BESTNC  x  AREAINT  x  R2EDUC 
x  RELECO  x  WEALTH  0.82  1  546 
BESTNC  x  AREAINT  x  R2EDUC 
x  RELECO  x  RIEDUC  0.04 
. 
2  545 
BESTNC  x  AREAINT  x  R2EDUC 
x  RELECO  x  INCSOU  0.83  1  546 
BESTNC  x  AREAINT  x  R2EDUC 
x  RELECO  x  RIDOBYR  0.32  2  545 
BESTNC  x  AREAINT  x  R2EDUC 
x  RELECO  x  CHILD  1.47  2  545  3.71  2  545 
225 Table  8.3:  (Model  1)  Stepwise  logistic  regression  results, 
1988. 
Variables  Category*  Coefficient  S.  Error 
RELECO  (1)  0.674  0.167 
(2)  0.395  0.252 
AREAINT  (1)  0.197  0.160 
(2)  0.532  0.216 
R2EDUC  (1)  -0.119  0.157 
(2)  0.612  0.169 
CONSTANT  1.011  0.157 
*  As  defined  in  the  methodology  chapter. 
Table  8.4:  (Mod 
regression,  1988. 
Step  Variable  df 
No.  entered 
removed 
0 
ei  1)  Summary  of  stepwise  logistic 
Log  Improvement  Goodness  P-VAL 
Likelihood  in  of  f't 
X  P-VAL  of  X 
-317.412  409.352  0.000 
1  AREAINT  2  -286.235  62.354  0.000  346.985  0.111 
2  R2EDUC  2  -278.865  14.741  0.001  332.256  0.229 
3  RELECO  2  -275.010  7.708  0.021  324.539  0.301 
226 Table  8.5:  (Model  1A)  Test  statistics  for  stage  one 
explanatory  variable  selection  process  -  Best  number  of 
children  (BESTNC)  in  urban  areas,  1988. 
Approx. 
F-to- 
enter  df  df 
Approx. 
F-to 
remove  df  df 
-First-order  relationships: 
BESTNC  x  RELSOC  0.33  2  387 
BESTNC  x  RELECO  3.67  2  387 
BESTNC  X  WEALTH  2.87  1  388 
BESTNC  x  RIEDUC  7.96  2  387 
BESTNC  x  R2EDUC  16.07  2  387 
BESTNC  x  INCSOU  0.10  1  388 
BESTNC  x  RIDOBYR  1.86  2  387 
BESTNC  x  CHILD  6.29  2  387 
-Second-order  relationships: 
BESTNC  x  R2EDUC  x  RELSOC  0.62  2  385 
BESTNC  x  R2EDUC  x  RELECO  3.50  2  385  13.91  2  385 
BESTNC  x  R2EDUC  x  WEALTH  1.13  1  386 
BESTNC  x  R2EDUC  x  RIEDUC  0.14  2  385 
BESTNC  x  R2EDUC  x  INCSOU  0.00  1  386 
BESTNC  x  R2EDUC  x  RIDOBYR  0.34  2  385 
BESTNC  x  R2EDUC  x  CHILD  2.27  2  385 
-Third-order  relationships: 
BESTNC  x  R2EDUC  x  RELECO 
x  RELSOC  0.55  2  383 
BESTNC  x  R2EDUC  x  RELECO 
x  WEALTH  0.76  1  384 
BESTNC  x  R2EDUC  x  RELECO 
x  RIEDUC  0.18  2  383 
BESTNC  x  R2EDUC  x  RELECO 
x  INCSOU  0.01  1  384 
BESTNC  x  R2EDUC  x  RELECO 
x  RIDOBYR  0.27  2  383 
227 (CONTD) 
Table  8.5:  (Model  1A)  Test  statistics  for  stage  one 
explanatory  variable  selection  process  -  Best  number  of 
children  (BESTNC)  in  urban  areas,  1988. 
Approx.  Approx. 
F-to-  F-to 
enter  df  df  remove  df  df 
BESTNC  x  R2EDUC  x  RELECO 
x  CHILD  2.25  2  383  3.40  2  383 
228 Table  8.6:  (Model  lA),  Stepwise  logistic  regression 
results  for  urban  households,  1988. 
Variables  Category*  Coefficient  S.  Error 
RELECO  (1)  0.857  0.215 
(2)  0.382  0.349 
R2EDUC  (1)  -0.107  0.160 
(2)  0.878  0.167 
CONSTANT  0.703  0.199 
*As  defined  in  the  methodology  chapter. 
Table  8.7:  (Model  IA)  Summary  of  stepwise  logistic 
regression  for  urban  households,  1988. 
Step  Variable  df  Log  Improvement  Goodness  P-VAL 
No.  entered  Likelihood  in  of  fit 
removed  X2  P-VAL  of  X2 
0  -246.107  252.300  0.009 
1  R2EDUC  2  -231.141  29.932  0.000  222.368  0.133 
2  RELECO  2  -227.622  7.038  0.030  215.328  0.189 
229 Table  8.8:  (Model  1B)  Test  statistics  for  stage  one 
explanatory  variable  selection  process  - 
children  (BESTNC)  in  rural  areas,  1988. 
Best  number  of 
Approx.  Approx. 
F-to-  F-to 
.  enter  df  df  remove  df  df 
-First-order  relationships: 
BESTNC  x  RELSOC  3.78  2  161 
BESTNC  x  RELECO  0.63  2  161 
BESTNC  x  WEALTH  0.26  1  162 
BESTNC  x  RIEDUC  4.10  2  161 
BESTNC  x  R2EDUC  0.96  2  161 
BESTNC  x  INCSOU  1.04  1  162 
BESTNC  x  RIDOBYR  1.39  2  161 
BESTNC  x  CHILD  0.50  2  161 
-Second-order  relationships: 
BESTNC  x  RIEDUC  x  RELSOC  4.48  2  159  3.49  2  159 
BESTNC  x  RIEDUC  x  RELECO  0.28  2  159 
BESTNC  x  RIEDUC  x  WEALTH  0.14  1  160 
BESTNC  x  RIEDUC  x  R2EDUC  0.34  2  159 
BESTNC  x  RIEDUC  x  INCSOU  0.63  1  160 
BESTNC  x  RIEDUC  x  RIDOBYR  0.09  2  159 
BESTNC  x  RIEDUC  x  CHILD  0.40  2  159 
-Third-order  relationships: 
BESTNC  x  RIEDUC  x  RELSOC 
x  RELECO  1.92  2  157  3.0  2  157 
BESTNC  x  RIEDUC  x  RELSOC 
x  WEALTH  0.03  1  158 
BESTNC  x  RIEDUC  x  RELSOC 
x  R2EDUC  0.27  2  157 
BESTNC  x  RIEDUC  x  RELSOC 
x  INCSOU  0.37  1  158 
BESTNC  x  RIEDUC  x  RELSOC 
x  RIDOBYR  0.22  2  157 
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Table  8.8:  (Model  1B)  Test  statistics  for  stage  one 
explanatory  variable  selection  process  -  Best  number  of 
children  (BESTNC)  in  rural  areas,  1988. 
Approx.  Approx. 
F-to-  F-to 
enter  df  df  remove  df  df 
BESTNC  x  RIEDUC  x  RELSOC 
x  CHILD  0.33  2  157 
1 
231 Table  8.9:  (Model  1B),  Stepwise  logistic  regression 
results  for  rural  households,  1988. 
Variables  Category*  Coefficient  S.  Error 
RELSOC  (1)  1.230  0.554 
(2)  0.595  0.458 
RIEDUC  (1)  0.711  0.440 
(2)  0.935  0.415 
CONSTANT  1.168  0.454 
*As  defined  in  the  methodology  chapter. 
Table  8.10:  (Model  1B)  Summary  of  stepwise  logistic 
regression  for  rural  households,  1988. 
Step  Variable  df  Log  Improvement  Goodness  P-VAL 
No.  entered  Likelihood  in  of  ft 
removed  X2  P-VAL  of  Xi 
0  -54.619  68.960  0.827 
1  RIEDUC  2  -51.158  6.921  0.031  62.039  0.920 
2  RELSOC  2  -48.318  5.681  0.058  56.358  0.963 
232 8.2.  MODEL  2  MOTIVATION  FOR  HIGH  FERTILITY 
Five  different  social  and  economic  motivations  for 
having  high  fertility  were  investigated:  family's  name, 
prestige,  security  in  old  age,  economic  benefit  from 
children,  and  happiness. 
On  the  basis  of  people's  responses  to  the 
questionnaire,  their  attitudes  to  fertility  were  classified 
as  being  "modern",  "transitional"  or  "traditional".  The 
precise  means  by  which  this  was  done  has  already  been 
outlined  in  the  methodology  chapter.  To  recap  briefly, 
however,  respondents  who  said  having  a  large  number  of 
children  was  important  in  sustaining  factors  such  as  the 
family's  name  were  interpreted  by  the  author  as  being 
"traditional",  while  inversely  those  who  disagreed  with 
such  a  view  were  seen  as  being  "modern".  The  methodology 
chapter  shows  that  no  less  than  five  variables  were  taken 
into  consideration  in  defining  the  overall  classification 
of  fertility  attitudes. 
Chi  square  tests  carried  out  on  the  data  on  which 
Table  8.11  is  based  indicated  that  in  urban  areas  there 
were  no  significant  differences  between  urban  middle  class 
and  urban  lower  class  areas  in  attitudes  to  high  fertility. 
Also,  these  differences  were  not  significant  between  the 
rural  north  and  rural  south.  Once  again  the  chief  contrast 
was  between  the  urban  and  rural  environments. 
233 Table  8.11 
Social  and  economic  motivations  affecting  levels  of 
fertility  classified  by  type  (modern,  transitional  and 
traditional),  and  by  area  of  interview,  1988. 
Urban  Urban  Rural  Rural 
Middle  Lower  South  North 
class  class 
Motivations  affecting 
fertility  (MOTIV)  Percentages 
Modern  57.3  47.1  13.5  10.5 
Transitional  27.5  29.6  22.9  27.6 
Traditional  15.2  23.3  63.5  61.8 
Total  number  178  240  96  76 
Source:  Author's  survey 
The  analysis  which  follows  investigates  the 
relationships  between  the  motivations  affecting  fertility 
and  a  range  of  potential  explanatory  variables.  Table  8.12 
shows  the  relevant  approximated  values  of  F-to-enter,  and 
approximated  F-to-remove  statistics  for  the  explanatory 
variables. 
Identifying  the  first-order  relationships  involved 
the  selection  of  a  "reasonable"  subset  of  potential 
explanatory  variables.  It  was  found  that  on  the  basis  of 
the  largest  F-to-enter  value  relative  to  the  degrees  of 
freedom,  the  first  variable  to  enter  was  wealth  flow.  On 
the  same  basis,  and  always  adjusting  for  higher  order 
relationships,  second  to  sixth  order  relationships  were 
found  between  motivations  for  high  fertility  and  level  of 
234 education  of  husband,  economic  kin-relationships,  social 
kin-relationships,  and  the  age  of  husband.  The  remaining 
variables  do  not  have  a  significant  value  of  F. 
It  is  most  interesting  that  the  explanatory  variables 
were  entered  in  this  order,  suggesting  that  wealth  flow 
rather  than  location  was  the  prime  explanatory  variable. 
By  contrast  with  the  previous  logistic  regression  equations 
discussed  in  this  thesis,  location  does  not  have  a 
significant  role  in  this  model.  In  the  last  chapter 
(Chapter  7)  location  was  the  single  most  significant 
influence  on  wealth  flow.  It  seems,  however,  that  wealth 
flow  has  an  intermediate  role  in  determining  attitudes  to 
fertility  as  specified  in  Model  2  and  outlined  in  Table 
8.12. 
Table  8.13  gives  coefficients  for  estimating  the 
probabilities  of  households  being  classified  as  "modern"  in 
terms  of  their  fertility  attitudes.  The  regression 
coefficients  show  that  a  downward  wealth  flow  direction, 
high  education  level  amongst  husbands,  weak  economic  and 
social  kin-relationships  and  young  married  couples  all 
reduce  the  probability  of  people  wanting  to  sustain  high 
fertility  levels.  Inversely,  in  the  sample  survey  an 
upward  wealth  flow  direction,  a  low  education  level  amongst 
husbands,  strong  economic  and  social  kin-relationships  and 
older  married  couples,  serve  to  increase  the  probabilities 
that  a  household  will  be  motivated  to  have  a  high 
fertility. 
Model  2  was  modified  in  order  to  investigate  the 
235 determinants  of  motivations  for  having  high  fertility  in 
urban  and  rural  environments  in  more  detail,  and  because  of 
the  complex  influences  which  the  location  of  interview 
might  have  had  on  the  analysis.  These  more  refined  models 
studying  urban  and  rural  areas  separately  are  shown  in 
Tables  8.15  to  8.20. 
Table  8.15  shows  the  relevant  approximated  values  of 
F-to-enter  and  approximated  F-to-remove  statistics  in  urban 
areas  (Model  2A).  On  the  basis  of  adjusting  for  higher 
order  relationships,  first  to  fifth  order  relationships 
were  found  between  motivations  for  having  high  fertility 
and  wealth  flow  directions,  education  level  of  husbands, 
social  kin-relationships  and  education  level  amongst  wives. 
Table  8.16  shows  coefficients  which  suggest  that  a 
downward  wealth  flow  direction,  a  high  education  level 
amongst  husbands,  weak  social  kin-relationships  and  a  high 
education  level  amongst  wives  reduces  the  probabilities  of 
people  desiring  high  fertility  levels.  Inversely,  in  the 
sample  survey,  households  with  an  upward  wealth  flow 
direction,  poorly  educated  husbands,  strong  social  kin- 
relationships,  and  poorly  educated  wives,  were  more  likely 
to  desire  high  fertility  levels. 
Table  8.18  shows  the  relevant  approximated  values  of 
F-to-enter  and  approximated  F-to-remove  statistics  in  rural 
areas  (Model  2B).  On  the  basis  of  adjusting  for  higher 
order  relationships  first,  second  and  third  order 
relationships  were  found  between  motivations  for  having 
236 high  fertility  and  the  education  level  of  husband,  and 
economic  kin-relationships  respectively. 
The  coefficients  of  Table  8.19  suggest  that  high 
education  levels  amongst  husbands,  and  weak  economic  kin- 
relationships  reduce  the  likelihood  of  households  seeking 
high  fertility  levels.  Inversely,  poorly  educated  husbands 
and  strong  economic  kin-relationship  will  increase 
probability  that  households  will  be  motivated  to  have  high 
fertility.  The  implications  of  these  patterns  are 
discussed  in  the  next  chapter. 
237 Table  8.12:  (Model  2),  Test  statistics  for  stage  one 
explanatory  variable  selection  process,  motivations  for 




df  df  Approx  df  df 
F-to- 
remove 
-First-order  relationships: 
MOTIV  x  RELSOC  37.67  2  551 
MOTIV  x  RELECO  54.49  2  551 
MOTIV  x  AREAINT  54.11  2  551 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  86.05  1  552 
MOTIV  x  RIEDUC  40.43  2  551 
MOTIV  x  R2EDUC  20.70  2  551 
MOTIV  x  INCSOU  1.65  1  552 
MOTIV  x  RIDOBYR  7.91  2  551 
MOTIV  x  CHILD  1.95  2  551 
-Second-order  relationshi  ps: 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RELSOC  13.00  2  550 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RELECO  23.81  2  550 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  AREAINT  15.87  2  550 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC  25.26  2  550  66.53  1  551 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  R2EDUC  9.32  2  550 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  INCSOU  0.24  1  551 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  R1DOBYR  9.98  2  550 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  CHILD  0.85  2  550 
-Third-order  relationships: 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  RELSOC  10.12  2  548 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  RELECO  15.81  2  548  19.71  2  548 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  AREAINT  6.84  2  548 
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Table  8.12:  (Model  2),  Test 
explanatory  variable  selection 




for  stage  one 
motivations  for 
Approx  df  df  Approx  df  df 
F-to-  F-to- 
enter  remove 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  R2EDUC  0.67  2  548 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  INCSOU  0.56  1  549 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  RIDOBYR  1.88  2  548 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  CHILD  0.05  2  548 
-Fourth-order  relationships: 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  RELECO  x  RELSOC  2.63  2  546  13.38  2  547 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  RELECO  x  AREAINT  1.56  2  546 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  RELECO  x  R2EDUC  0.44  2  546 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  RELECO  x  INCSOU  0.15  1  547 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
X  RELECO  x  RIDOBYR  2.45  2  546 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  RELECO  x  CHILD  0.05  2  546 
-Fifth-order  relationships: 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  RELECO  x  RELSOC  x  AREAINT  1.04  2  544 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  RELECO  x  RELSOC  x  R2EDUC  0.47  2  544 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  RELECO  x  RELSOC  x  INCSOU  0.05  1  545 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  RELECO  x  RELSOC  x  RIDOBYR  2.91  2  544  2.64  2  544 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  RELECO  x  RELSOC  x  CHILD  0.02  2  544 
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Table  8.12:  (Model  2),  Test  statistics  for  stage  one 
explanatory  variable  selection  process,  motivations  for 
having  a  high  fertility  (MOTIV),  1988. 
Approx  df  df  Approx  df  df 
F-to-  F-to- 
enter  remove 
-Sixth-order  relationships: 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  RELECO  x  RELSOC  x  RIDOBYR 
x  AREAINT  0.99  2  542  2.62  2  542 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  RELECO  x  RELSOC  x  RIDOBYR 
x  R2EDUC  0.41  2  542 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  RELECO  x  RELSOC  x  R1DOBYR 
x  INCSOU  0.13  1  543 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  RELECO  x  RELSOC  x  RIDOBYR 
x  CHILD  0.23  2  542 
240 Table  8.13:  (Model  2),  Stepwise  logistic  regression 
results,  1988. 
Variables  Category*  Coefficient  S.  Error 
RELSOC  (1)  -0.753  -01  0.214 
(2)  -0.574  0.237 
RELECO  (1)  0.578  -01  0.168 
(2)  0.733  0.204 
WEALTH  0.453  0.138 
RIEDUC  (1)  -0.465  0.225 
(2)  0.831  0.186 
RIDOBYR  (1)  0.113  0.202 
(2)  0.350  0.176 
CONSTANT  -1.647  0.217 
*  As  defined  in  the  methodology  chapter. 
241 Table  8.14:  (Model  2) 
regression,  1988. 
Summary  of  stepwise  logistic 
Step  Variable  df  Log  Improvement  Goodness  P-VAL 
No.  entered  Likelihood  in  of  ft 
removed  X  P-VAL  of  X 
0-  -299.449  429.239  0.000 
1  WEALTH  1  -264.937  69.023  0.000  360.212  0.047 
2  RIEDUC  2  -241.553  46.768  0.000  313.442  0.514 
3  RELECO  2  -225.966  31.175  0.000  282.270  0.893 
4  RELSOC  2  -223.137  5.657  0.059  276.614  0.920 
5  RIDOBYR  2  -219.976  6.322  0.042  270.292  0.945 
242 Table  8.15:  (Model  2A),  Test  statistics  for  stage  one 
explanatory  variable  selection  process,  motivations  for 




df  df  Approx  df  df 
F-to- 
remove 
-First-order  relationships: 
MOTIV  x  RELSOC  9.94  2  387 
MOTIV  x  RELECO  5.45  2  387 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  18.77  1  388 
MOTIV  x  R1EDUC  8.17  2  387 
MOTIV  x  R2EDUC  7.33  2  387 
MOTIV  x  INCSOU  0.12  1  388 
MOTIV  x  RIDOBYR  3.06  2  387 
MOTIV  x  CHILD  0.41  2  387 
-Second-order  relationships: 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RELSOC  6.66  2  386 
MOTIV  x.  WEALTH  x  RELECO  3.71  2  386 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC  7.26  2  386  15.94  1  387 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  R2EDUC  5.72  2  386 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  INCSOU  0.00  1  387 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIDOBYR  3.19  2  386 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  CHILD  0.70  2  386 
-Third-order  relationships: 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  RELSOC  7.87  2  384  6.78  2  384 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  RELECO  3.32  2  384 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  R2EDUC  1.91  2  384 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  INCSOU  0.11  1  385 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  RIDOBYR  1.21  2  384 
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Table  8.15:  (Model  2A),  Test  statistics  for  stage  one 
explanatory  variable  selection  process,  motivations  for 
having  a  high  fertility  (MOTIV)  in  urban  areas,  1988. 
Approx  df  df  Approx  df  df 
F-to-  F-to- 
enter  remove 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  CHILD  0.12  2  384 
-Fourth-order  relationships: 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  RELSOC  x  RELECO  1.11  2  382 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  RELSOC  x  R2EDUC  2.92  2  382  7.12  2  382 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  RELSOC  x  INCSOU  0.13  1  383 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  RELSOC  x  RIDOBYR  1.79  2  382 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
X  RELSOC  x  CHILD  0.23  2  382 
-Fifth-order  relationships: 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  RELSOC  x  R2EDUC  x  RELECO  0.89  2  380 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  RELSOC  x  R2EDUC  x  INCSOU  0.03  2  381 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  RELSOC  x  R2EDUC  x  RIDOBYR  0.94  2  380 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  x  RIEDUC 
x  RELSOC  x  R2EDUC  x  CHILD  0.20  2  380 
v 
244 Table  8.16:  (Model  2A),  Stepwise  logistic  regression 
results  for  urban  households,  1988. 
Variables  Category*  Coefficient  S.  Error 
RELSOC  (1)  -0.841  -01  0.198 
(2)  0.938  0.234 
WEALTH  0.483  0.191 
RIEDUC  (1)  -0.338  0.210 
(2)  0.421  0.222 
R2EDUC  (1)  0.156  0.263 
(2)  0.725  0.310 
CONSTANT  -1.513  0.294 
*As  defined  in  methodology  chapter. 
Table  8.17:  (Model  2A)  Summary  of  stepwise  logistic 










X  P-VAL 
Goodness 
of  ft 
of  X 
P-VAL 
0  -196.534  250.353  0.012 
1  WEALTH  1  -189.023  15.022  0.000  235.332  0.049 
2  RIEDUC  2  -182.220  13.605  0.001  221.726  0.129 
3  RELSOC  2  -174.877  14.686  0.001  207.040  0.298 
4  R2EDUC  2  -171.790  6.175  0.046  200.865  0.372 
245 Table  8.18:  (Model  2B),  Test  statistics  for  stage  one 
explanatory  variable  selection  process,  motivations  for 




df  df  Approx  df  df 
F-to- 
remove 
-First-order  relationships: 
MOTIV  x  RELSOC  2.07  2  161 
MOTIV  x  RELECO  8.67  2  161 
MOTIV  x  WEALTH  3.17  1  162 
MOTIV  x  RIEDUC  21.73  2  161 
MOTIV  x  R2EDUC  6.37  2  161 
MOTIV  x  INCSOU  2.69  1  162 
MOTIV  x  R1DOBYR  6.80  2  161 
MOTIV  x  CHILD  0.44  2  161 
-Second-order  relationships: 
MOTIV  x  RIEDUC  x  RELSOC  1.43  2  159 
MOTIV  x  RIEDUC  x  RELECO  6.87  2  159  9.58  2  159 
MOTIV  x  RIEDUC  x  WEALTH  2.82  1  160 
MOTIV  x  RIEDUC  x  R2EDUC  0.10  2  159 
MOTIV  x  RIEDUC  x  INCSOU  1.08  1  160 
MOTIV  x  RIEDUC  x  R1DOBYR  0.67  2  159 
MOTIV  x  RIEDUC  x  CHILD  0.09  2  159 
-Third-order  relationships: 
MOTIV  x  RIEDUC  x  RELECO 
x  RELSOC  0.70  2  157 
MOTIV  x  RIEDUC  x  RELECO 
x  WEALTH  1.29  1  158  5.55  2  157 
MOTIV  x  RIEDUC  x  RELECO 
x  R2EDUC  0.14  2  157 
MOTIV  x  RIEDUC  x  RELECO 
x  INCSOU  1.30  1  158 
MOTIV  x  RIEDUC  x  RELECO 
x  R1DOBYR  0.28  2  157 
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Table  8.18:  (Model  2B),  Test  statistics  for  stage  one 
explanatory  variable  selection  process,  motivations  for 
having  a  high  fertility  (MOTIV),  in  rural  areas,  1988. 
Approx  df  df  Approx  df  df 
F-to-  F-to- 
enter  remove 
MOTIV  x  RIEDUC  x  RELECO 
x  CHILD  0.21  2  157 
247 Table  8.19:  (Model  2B)'  Stepwise  logistic  regression 
results  for  rural  households,  1988. 
Variables  Category*  Coefficient  S.  Error 
RELECO  (1)  -0.168  0.279 
(2)  0.926  0.277 
RIEDUC  (1)  2.179  0.000 
(2)  4.592  0.583 
CONSTANT  -4.370  0.572 
*As  defined  in  the  methodology  chapter. 
Table  8.20:  (Model  2B)  Summary  of  stepwise  logistic 
regression  for  rural  households,  1988. 
Step  Variable  df  Log  Improvement  Goodness  P-VAL 
No.  entered  Likelihood  in  of  fit 
removed  x  P-VAL  of  X 
0  -113.663  135.697  0.000 
1  RIEDUC  2  -93.229  40.869  0.000  94.828  0.108 
2  RELECO  2  -87.057  12.343  0.002  82.485  0.343 
248 8.3.  MODEL  3:  CONTRACEPTIVE  USE 
Chi  Square  tests  carried  out  on  the  data  on  which 
Table  8.21  is  based  reveals  that  in  urban  areas  there  was  a 
much  higher  use  of  contraceptives  in  urban  middle  class 
areas  than  in  urban  lower  class  ones.  Differences  in 
usage  were  insignificant  between  the  rural  north  and  rural 
south.  The  greater  usage  of  contraceptives  in  urban 
relative  to  rural  areas  is  self  evident  from  Table  8.21. 
Table  8.21:  Current  use  of  contraception,  by  area  of 
interview,  1988. 
Urban  Urban  Rural  Rural 
middle  class  lower  class  South  North 
Contraception  use  (CONUSE) 
No  use  10.7  59.6  85.8  88.2 
Currently  use  89.3  40.4  4.2  11.8 
Total  number  178  240  96  76 
Source:  Author's  survey. 
The  analysis  which  follows  is  an  investigation  of  the 
statistical  relationships  between  contraceptive  use  and  a 
range  of  potential  explanatory  variables  using  once  against 
logistic  regression  equations.  Table  8.22  shows  the 
relevant  approximated  values  of  F-to-enter,  and 
approximated  values  of  F-to-remove. 
Identifying  the  first-order  relationships  involved 
the  selection  of  a  "reasonable"  subset  of  potential 
249 explanatory  variables.  It  was  found  that  on  the  basis  of 
the  largest  F-to-enter  value  relative  to  the  degrees  of 
freedom,  the  first  variable  to  enter  is  area  of  interview. 
On  the  same  basis,  and  always  adjusting  for  higher  order 
relationships,  second  to  sixth  order  relationships  were 
found  between  contraceptive  use  and  the  age  of  husbands, 
education  level  of  husbands,  actual  number  of  children,  and 
social  kin-relationships.  The  remaining  variables  did  not 
have  a  significant  value  of  F. 
Table  8.23  gives  coefficients  for  estimating  the 
probabilities  of  wives  currently  using  contraceptives.  The 
regression  coefficients  show  that  husbands  living  in  urban 
areas,  young  married  couples,  highly  educated  men,  and 
households  with  weak  social  kin-relationships,  have  a 
higher  probability  of  practising  contraception.  Inversely, 
husbands  living  in  rural  areas,  older  married  couples, 
poorly  educated  men,  and  households  with  strong  social  kin- 
relationships  were  less  likely  to  use  contraceptives. 
Table  8.24  indicates  that  although  all  these  variables  were 
statistically  significant,  the  area  of  interview  category 
mopped  up  an  inordinant  amount  of  variance,  making  it 
difficult  to  evaluate  the  relative  significance  of  the 
other  explanatory  variables. 
Table  8.25  shows  the  relevant  approximated  values  of 
F-to-enter  and  approximated  F-to-remove  statistics  for 
urban  areas  alone  (Model  3A).  On  the  basis  of  adjusting 
for  higher  order  variables,  relationships  were  found 
between  contraceptive  use  and  the  education  level  of  wives, 
250 the  actual  number  of  children,  in  a  household,  the 
education  level  of  husbands,  the  source  of  income  and  the 
strength  of  social  kin-relationships. 
The  coefficients  in  Table  8.26  suggest  that  highly 
educated  wives,  large  numbers  of  children,  highly  educated 
husbands,  employment  in  the  private  business  sector,  and 
weak  social  kin-relationships  increase  the  probabilities  of 
practising  contraception.  By  contrast  with  the  general 
model,  the  urban  model  clearly  allocates  most  of  the 
explanation  of  contraceptive  use  to  the  education  level  of 
wives,  a  finding  conformable  with  the  concensus  of  most 
comparable  survey  research. 
Table  8.28  presents  the  relevant  approximated  values 
of  F-to-enter,  and  approximated  values  of  F-to-remove,  in 
rural  areas  (Model  3B).  On  the  basis  of  adjusting  for 
higher  order  variables,  relationships  were  found  between 
contraceptive  use  and  education  level  of  wives,  and 
economic  kin-relationships  respectively. 
Table  8.29  demonstrates  that  highly  educated  wives 
and  weak  economic  kin-relationships  in  rural  areas  will 
increase  the  probability  of  using  contraceptives. 
251 Table  8.22:  (Model  3),  Test  statistics  for  stage  one 
explanatory  variable  selection  process,  contraceptive  use 
(CONUSE),  1988. 
Approx  df  df  Approx  df  df 
F-to-  F-to- 
enter  remove 
-First-order  relationships: 
CONUSE  x  RELSOC  35.21  2  418 
CONUSE  x  RELECO  35.19  2  418 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  151.48  2  418 
CONUSE  x  WEALTH  75.72  1  419 
CONUSE  x  BESTNC  39.83  1  419 
CONUSE  x  RIEDUC  62.90  2  418 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  65.23  2  418 
CONUSE  x  INCSOU  10.95  1  419 
CONUSE  x  RIDOBYR  13.08  2  418 
CONUSE  x  CHILD  7.71  2  418 
-Second-order  relationships: 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RELSOC  2.92  2  416 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RELECO  3.16  2  416 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  WEALTH  0.77  1  417 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  BESTNC  3.75  1  417 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RIEDUC  7.25  2  416 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  R2EDUC  6.05  2  416 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  INCSOU  1.10  1  417 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR  9.32  2  416  53.44  2  416 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  CHILD  0.27  2  416 
-Third-order  relationships  : 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR 
x  RELSOC  3.03  2  414 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR 
x  RELECO  2.79  2  414 
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Table  8.22:  (Model  3),  Test  statistics  for  stage  one 
explanatory  variable  selection  process,  contraceptive  use 
(CONUSE),  1988. 
Approx  df  df  Approx  df  df 
F-to-  F-to- 
enter  remove 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR 
x  WEALTH  0.99  1  415 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR 
x  BESTNC  3.99  1  415 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR 
x  RIEDUC  3.64  2  414  7.90  2  414 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR 
x  R2EDUC  2.24  2  414 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR 
x  INCSOU  1.63  1  415 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR 
x  CHILD  0.12  2  414 
-Fourth-order  relationships: 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR 
x  RIEDUC  x  RELSOC  2.69  2  412 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR 
x  RIEDUC  x  RELECO  2.49  2  412 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR 
x  RIEDUC  x  WEALTH  0.96  1  413 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR 
x  RIEDUC  x  BESTNC  3.86  1  413  3.75  2  412 
CONUSE  X  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR 
X  RIEDUC  x  R2EDUC  1.16  2  412 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR 
x  RIEDUC  x  INCSOU  2.73  1  413 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR 
x  RIEDUC  x  CHILD  0.24  2  412 
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Table  8.22:  (Model  3),  Test  statistics  for  stage  one 
explanatory  variable  selection  process,  contraceptive  use 
(CONUSE),  1988. 
Approx  df  df  Approx  df  df 
F-to-  F-to- 
enter  remove 
-Fifth-order  relationships: 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR 
x  RIEDUC  x  BESTNC  x  RELSOC  2.91 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR 
x  RIEDUC  x  BESTNC  x  RELECO  2.06 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR 
x  RIEDUC  x  BESTNC  x  WEALTH  0.61 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR 
x  RIEDUC  x  BESTNC  x  R2EDUC  0.79 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR 
x  RIEDUC  x  BESTNC  x  INCSOU  2.95 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR 
x  RIEDUC  x  BESTNC  x  CHILD  0.40 
-Sixth-order  relationships: 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR 
x  RIEDUC  x  BESTNC  x  RELSOC 
x  RELECO  1.11 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR 
x  RIEDUC  x  BESTNC  x  RELSOC 
x  WEALTH  0.00 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR 
x  RIEDUC  x  BESTNC  x  RELSOC 
x  R2EDUC  0.91 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR 
x  RIEDUC  x  BESTNC  x  RELSOC 
x  INCSOU  2.65 
2  411 
2  411 
1  412 
2  411 
1  412 
2  411 
2  409 
1  410 
2  409 
1  410  2.57  2  409 
3.66  1  412 
CONUSE  x  AREAINT  x  RIDOBYR 
x  RIEDUC  x  BESTNC  x  RELSOC 
x  CHILD  0.20  2  409 
254 Table  8.23:  (Model  3),  Stepwise  logistic  regression 
results,  1988. 
Variables  Category*  Coefficient  S.  Error 
RELSOC  (1)  -0.318  0.194 
(2)  0.492  0.235 
AREAINT  (1)  0.219  0.207 
(2)  1.973  0.279 
BESTNC  0.351  0.166 
RIEDUC  (1)  -0.283  0.197 
(2)  0.480  0.195 
RIDOBYR  (1)  -0.310  0.199 
(2)  0.712  0.196 
CONSTANT  -0.567  0.212 
*As  defined  in  the  methodology  chapter. 
255 Table  8.24:  (Model  3) 
regression,  1988. 
Summary  of  stepwise  logistic 
Step  Variable  df  Log  Improvement  Goodness  P-VAL 
No.  entered  Likelihood  in  of  f)t 
removed  X2  P-VAL  of  X 
0  -290.177  506.954  0.000 
1  AREAINT  2  -186.160  208.035  0.000  298.922  0.474 
2  RIDOBYR  2  -177.065  18.190  0.000  280.729  0.730 
3  RIEDUC  2  -173.250  7.628  0.002  273.101  0.804 
4  BESTNC  1  -171.287  3.926  0.048  269.175  0.838 
5  RELSOC  2  -168.334  5.906  0.052  263.270  0.877 
256 Table  8.25:  (Model  3A),  Test  statistics  for  stage  one 
explanatory  variable  selection  process,  contraceptive  use 
(CONUSE),  in  urban  areas,  1988. 
Approx  df  df  Approx  df  df 
F-to-  F-to- 
enter  remove 
-First-order  relationships: 
CONUSE  x  RELSOC  2.17  2  297 
CONUSE  x  RELECO  1.64  2  297 
CONUSE  x  WEALTH  2.39  1  298 
CONUSE  x  BESTNC  13.57  1  298 
CONUSE  x  RIEDUC  14.87  2  297 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  16.66  2  297 
CONUSE  x  INCSOU  3.53  1  298 
CONUSE  x  RIDOBYR  5.83  2  297 
CONUSE  x  CHILD  2.91  1  298 
-Second-order  re  lationships: 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  RELSOC  3.79 
,2 
295 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  RELECO  1.83  2  295 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  WEALTH  0.71  1  296 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  BESTNC  6.01  1  296  11.97  2  295 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  RIEDUC  4.15  2  295 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  INCSOU  4.57  1  296 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  RIDOBYR  1.98  2  295 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  CHILD  0.03  1  296 
-Third-order  rel  ationships: 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  BESTNC 
x  RELSOC  3.92  2  294 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  BESTNC 
x  RELECO  1.35  2  294 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  BESTNC 
x  WEALTH  0.33  1  295 
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Table  8.25:  (Model  3A),  Test  statistics  for  stage  one 
explanatory  variable  selection  process,  contraceptive  use 
(CONUSE),  in  urban  areas,  1988. 
Approx  df  df  Approx  df  df 
F-to-  ,  F-to- 
enter  remove 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  X  BESTNC 
x  RIEDUC  4.14  2  294  5.65  1  295 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  BESTNC 
x  INCSOU  4.41  1  295 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  BESTNC 
x  RIDOBYR  2.46  2  294 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  BESTNC 
x  CHILD  0.00  1  295 
-Fourth-order  relationships: 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  BESTNC 
x  RIEDUC  x  RELSOC  3.18  2  292 
CONUSE  X  R2EDUC  x  BESTNC 
x  RIEDUC  x  RELECO  1.33  2  292 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  BESTNC 
x  RIEDUC  x  WEALTH  0.66  1  293 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  BESTNC 
x  RIEDUC  x  INCSOU  4.72  1  293  5.83  1  293 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  BESTNC 
X  RIEDUC  x  RIDOBYR  2.05  2  292 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  BESTNC 
x  RIEDUC  x  CHILD  0.08  1  293 
-Fifth-order  relationships  : 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  BESTNC 
x  RIEDUC  x  INCSOU  x  RELSOC  3.12  2  291 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  BESTNC 
x  RIEDUC  x  INCSOU  x  RELECO  1.01  2  291 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  BESTNC 
x  RIEDUC  x  INCSOU  x  WEALTH  0.93  1  292 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  BESTNC 
x  RIEDUC  x  INCSOU  x  RIDOBYR  2.07  2  291 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  BESTNC 
x  RIEDUC  x  INCSOU  x  CHILD  0.00  1  292 
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Table  8.25:  (Model  3A),  Test  statistics  for  stage  one 
explanatory  variable  selection  process,  contraceptive  use 
(CONUSE),  in  urban  areas,  1988. 
Approx  df  df  Approx  df  df 
F-to-  F-to- 
enter  remove 
-Sixth-order  relationships: 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  BESTNC 
x  RIEDUC  x  INCSOU  x  RELSOC 
x  RELECO  0.58  2  289 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  BESTNC 
x  RIEDUC  x  INCSOU  x  RELSOC 
x  WEALTH  0.01  1  290 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  BESTNC 
x  RIEDUC  x  INCSOU  x  RELSOC 
x  RIDOBYR  2.13  2  289  2.91  2  289 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  BESTNC 
xýR1EDUC  x  INCSOU  x  RELSOC 
x  CHILD  0.00  1  290 
259 Table  8.26:  (Model  3A),  Stepwise  logistic  regression 
results,  1988. 
Variables  Category*  Coefficient  S.  Error 
RELSOC  (1)  -0.320  0.198 
(2)  0.553  0.250 
BESTNC  0.421  0.167 
,  RIEDUC  (1)  -0.368  0.207 
(2)  0.561  0.226 
ýR2EDUC  (1)  0.321  0.292 
(2)  1.065  0.334 
,  INCSOU  0.353  0.169 
CONSTANT  -1.657  0.300 
*As  defined  in  the  methodology  chapter. 
Table  8.27:  (Model  3A) 
regression,  1988. 
Summary  of  stepwise  logistic 
Step  Variable  df  Log  Improvement  Goodness  P-VAL 
No.  entered  Likelihood  in  of  ft 
removed  X2  P-VAL  of  Xi 
'0  -177.884  264.954  0.002 
,1 
R2EDUC  2  -160.945  33.879  0.000  231.075  0.072 
2  BESTNC  1  -157.870  6.150  0.013  224.925  0.109 
3  RIEDUC  2  -153.705  8.330  0.016  216.595  0.174 
4  INCSOU  1  -151.239  4.930  0.026  211.664  0.225 
5  RELSOC  2  -148.328  5.824  0.054  205.840  0.283 
260 Table  8.28:  (Model  3B),  Test  statistics  for  stage  one 
explanatory  variable  selection  process,  contraceptive  use 
(CONUSE),  in  rural  areas,  1988. 
Approx  df  df  Approx  df  df 
F-to-  F-to- 
enter  remove' 
-First-order  relationships: 
CONUSE  x  RELSOC  1.35  2  118 
CONUSE  x  RELECO  6.43  2  118 
CONUSE  x  WEALTH  0.13  1  119 
CONUSE  x  BESTNC  1.88  1  119 
CONUSE  x  RIEDUC  4.58  2  118 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  9.52  2  118 
CONUSE  x  INCSOU  0.38  1  119 
CONUSE  x  RIDOBYR  4.79  2  118 
CONUSE  x  CHILD  0.36  2  118 
-Second-order  relationships: 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  RELSOC  0.85  2  116 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  RELECO  4.43  2  116  14.91  2  116 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  WEALTH  0.15  1  117 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  BESTNC  2.14  1  117 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  RIEDUC  1.20  2  116 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  INCSOU  0.08  1  117 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  RIDOBYR  3.79  2  116 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  CHILD  0.24  2  116 
-Third-order  relationships  : 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  RELECO 
x  RELSOC  0.02  2  114 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  RELECO 
x  WEALTH  0.03  1  115 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  RELECO 
x  BESTNC  1.03  1  115 
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Table  8.28:  (Model  3B),  Test  statistics  for  stage  one 
explanatory  variable  selection  process,  contraceptive  use 
(CONUSE),  in  rural  areas,  1988. 
Approx  df  df  Approx  df  df 
F-to-  F-to- 
enter  remove 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  RELECO 
x  RIEDUC  0.47  2  114 
CONUSE  X  R2EDUC  X  RELECO 
x  INCSOU  0.02  1  115 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  RELECO 
x  RIDOBYR  2.19  2  114  2.39  2  114 
CONUSE  x  R2EDUC  x  RELECO 
x  CHILD  0.23  2  114 
262 Table  8.29:  (Model  3B),  Stepwise  logistic  regression 
results,  1988. 
Variables  Category*  Coefficient  S.  Error 
RELECO  (1)  -4.008  27.80 
(2)  -2.267  27.80 
R2EDUC  (1)  -4.608  0.960 
(2)  -2.305  0.000 
CONSTANT  7.922  27.800 
*As  defined  in  the  methodology  chapter. 
Table  8.30:  (Model  3B)  Summary  of  stepwise  logistic 
regression,  1988. 
Step  Variable  df  Log  Improvement  Goodness  P-VAL 
No.  entered  Likelihood  in  of  fit 
removed  X2  P-VAL  of  X2 
0  -41.276  65.339  0.667 
1  R2EDUC  2  -36.100  10.352  0.006  54.987  0.906 
2  RELECO  2  -31.477  9.245  0.010  45.741  0.983 
263 8.4.  DISCUSSION 
Based  on  the  above  results  it  is  important  to  achieve 
an  overall  interpretation  of  the  relationships  which  exist 
between  family  characteristics  and  attitudes  towards 
fertility. 
It  is  obvious  that  the  education  level  of  both  the 
wife  and  husband  plays  an  important  role  in  terms  of 
fertility  attitudes.  The  education  level  of  wives,  in 
urban  areas,  seems  to  be  the  most  important  variable  in 
determining  both  the  best  number  of  children  to  have,  and 
also  whether  or  not  contraceptives  are  used  (Figs.  8.1, 
8.2,8.3).  The  potential  influence  of  wives'  education  on 
demographic  decisions  is  particularly  important  as  is 
change  in  the  status  and  role  of  women  in  society. 
The  education  level  of  husbands  also  has  an  important 
role  in  terms  of  fertility  attitudes  but  the  models  shown 
graphically  in  Figure  8.1  suggest  that  in  fact  male 
education  is  more  influential  only  in  rural  areas.  In  many 
respects  Jordanian  society  can  still  be  generally 
characterised  as  a  male-centred  culture.  In  rural  areas 
in  particular  male  education  appears  to  strongly  influence 
a  households  attitudes  to  traditional  values.  For  example, 
higher  levels  of  male  education  are  positively  correlated 
with  more  liberal  attitudes  to  women's  status,  roles,  and 
education. 
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The  statistical  results  which  have  been  reported 
reveal  that  social  and  economic  kin-relationships  also  have 
a  significant  influence  on  fertility  attitudes.  In  urban 
areas  social  kin-relationships  were  more  significant  than 
economic  kin-relationships  in  two  of  the  three  models.  In 
rural  areas  economic  kin-relationships  appeared  to  be  more 
significant  than  social  kin-relationships  in  two  of  the 
three  models  (Figs.  8.1,8.2,8.3).  One  interpretation  of 
this  could  be  that  there  has  been  a  remarkable  crumbling  of 
economic  kin-relationships  in  rural  areas.  In  rural  areas 
the  results  reported  in  Chapter  5  indicated  that  changes 
in  social  kin-relationships  are  rapidly  changing. 
Nevertheless,  at  present  in  rural  areas  economic  kin- 
relationships  still  play  a  more  important  role  with  regard 
to  fertility  attitudes. 
Fig.  8.2  shows  that  wealth  flow  directions  emerged  as 
the  most  significant  influence  in  encouraging  couples  to 
favour  high  fertility.  However,  it  should  be  remembered 
that  social  and  economic  kin-relationships  themselves  have 
an  important  influence  on  wealth  flow  directions  and  that 
in  some  cases  wealth  flow  directions  can  be  considered  as 
an  intermediate  variable  rather  than  as  an  ultimate 
explanation  of  fertility  motivations. 
It  is  very  interesting  that  of  the  three  models, 
wealth  flow  direction  only  appeared  as  the  most  important 
determinant  in  terms  of  motivations  for  high  fertility. 
This  is  consistent  with  the  central  hypothesis  of 
Caldwell's  theory,  in  which  he  hypothesises  that  a  change 
268 in  wealth  flow  direction,  from  net  upward  to  downward 
wealth  transfer,  would  be  critical  in  reducing  fertility 
levels.  In  other  words,  and  also  according  to  Caldwell's 
theory,  social  conditions  (in  Marxian  terms,  the 
superstructure)  represent  to  a  certain  degree  underlying 
economic  conditions  (or  infrastructure).  In  this  case 
motivations  for  high  fertility  represent  the 
superstructure,  but  are  mainly  affected  by  wealth  flows 
representing  the  infrastructure  or  power  structure  inside 
the  family. 
Area  of  interview  was  recorded  as  important  in  two  of 
the  three  general  models  (Model  1  and  Model  3),  and 
therefore  was  clearly  important,  but  as  an  explanatory 
variable  it  is  difficult  to  use  because  of  the  "ecological" 
problems  resulting  from  area  of  interview  being  correlated 
with  other  socio-economic  and  demographic  characteristics. 
It  is  not  really  "place"  which  seems  to  be  significant,  but 
rather  the  characteristics  of  urban  and  rural  populations. 
This  is  shown  to  be  the  case  by  the  fact  that  removal  of 
"area  of  interview"  as  a  statistical  variable,  did  not  lead 
to  an  automatic  increase  in  the  explanatory  power  of  all 
the  other  variables  in  the  general  model.  Instead  other 
variables  emerged.  With  regard  to  desired  number  of 
children  in  rural  areas,  for  example,  the  education  level 
of  the  husband  and  social  kin-relationships  emerged  as  the 
most  important  determinants  when  "area  of  interview"  was 
suppressed. 
269 Similarly  source  of  income  was  of  some  significance 
in  relation  to  contraceptive  use  as  shown  in  Fig.  8.3 
(Model  3A),  suggesting  that  in  urban  areas  economic  factors 
have  a  particularly  strong  influence  on  attempts  to  control 
fertility.  It  is  also  worth  noticing  that  the  desired 
number  of  children  was  a  significant  determinant  of 
contraceptive  use  in  urban  areas,  suggesting  that  many 
couples  may  now  be  actively  seeking  to  control  their  family 
size. 
Finally,  it  is  worth  commenting  on  the  fact  that 
husband's  age  was  important  in  two  of  the  models, 
suggesting  that  it  mops  up  variance  not  explained  by  other 
variables.  It  would  seem  that  one  possible  interpretation 
of  this  is  that  fertility  attitudes  are  changing  in  a 
general  fashion  as  one  moves  to  younger  generations,  but 
that  this  passive  "diffusionist"  perspective  is  only  a 
minor  influence  by  comparison  with  the  active  agents  of 
change  which  are  associated  with  education  and  economic 
forces. 
It  is  important  to  note  that  some  circularity  has 
entered  the  analysis  of  this  chapter,  despite  the  author's 
awareness  of  the  problem  (see  page  88).  This  has  been  as  a 
result  of  the  method  used  in  the  construction  of  the 
composite  variables.  It  is  considered  that  the  effect  of 
this,  while  unfortunate,  in  no  way  nullifies  the 
conclusions  reached  as  a  result  of  the  logistic  regression 
analysis. 
270 CHAPTER  9 
THE  CONDITIONS  OF  THE  FERTILITY  TRANSITION  IN  JORDAN 
After  examining  in  the  last  few  chapters  in  detail 
the  most  important  changes  which  have  taken  place  in  the 
Jordanian  family  in  its  structure  and  organisation  and  in 
its  relation  to  fertility  attitudes,  it  is  suitable  now  to 
focus  the  discussion  on  what  all  this  implies  in  terms  of 
Jordan's  fertility  transition.  Based  on  the  results  which 
have  been  reported,  this  chapter  hopes  to  synthesize  the 
thesis  findings  concerning  the  conditions  of  the  fertility 
transition  in  Jordan. 
9.1.  FERTILITY  LEVELS  IN  RURAL  AREAS 
As  society  moves  from  being  characterised  by 
"traditional"  values  to  those  of  a  so-called  "modern" 
society,  the  importance  of  the  individual  in  decision- 
making  in  the  household  increases.  In  rural  Jordan  the 
first  indicators  of  increased  individualism  are  readily 
observable,  but  as  yet  these  changes  in  the  social  and 
economic  structure  of  relations  have  not  led  to  fertility 
decline.  For  example,  a  fundamental  change  took  place  in 
southern  Jordan  when  young  tribesmen  first  entered  the  wage 
labour  market.  This  change  profoundly  affected  the  way  of 
making  a  living,  with  the  family  no  longer  depending  on 
tribal  modes  of  production  but  rather  with  familial 
relations  becoming  monetised  through  the  establishment  of  a 
common  family  budget  which  was  at  least  partially 
independent  of  the  tribe.  This  change  undermined  tribal 
271 authority  and  tribal  values.  It  introduced  the  concept  of 
individualism  with  its  many  implications  for  social 
organisation  and  structure  (Caldwell,  1982:  237). 
Individual  action  remains  dominated  by  broader  familial 
interests  in  most  of  southern  Jordan.  This  is  so  because 
the  family  budget  commonly  remains  under  the  control  of  the 
patriarchal  head  of  household.  Wealth  flow  directions 
between  parents  and  children  remain  upwards,  and  as 
Caldwell's  theory  would  predict,  the  result  is  high 
fertility  levels.  It  can  be  said  that  in  the  1980s  this 
matrix  of  relationships  remained  intact  in  many  rural  areas 
in  Jordan  and  this  explains  the  high  fertility  regime  of 
much  of  the  country. 
In  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  .  influence  of 
individualism  in  rural  areas  is  still  relatively  weak  the 
changed  basis  of  production  has  brought  about  a  decline  in 
the  strength  of  economic  kin-relationships.  However, 
within  the  family,  other  forms  of  bonding  remain  strong. 
Older  generations  continue  to  command  respect  from  the 
younger  and  males  dominate  the  most  powerful  familial 
roles.  There  is,  therefore,  some  familial  stability  in 
terms  of  traditional  familial  values. 
9.2.  FERTILITY  LEVELS-IN  URBAN  AREAS 
In  urban  areas,  especially  in  middle  class  ones, 
individualism  in  general  is  greater  than  elsewhere  in  the 
country.  There  is  both  greater  equality  of  the  sexes  and 
also  between  the  elder  and  younger  generations.  In  the 
272 Amman  conurbation  a  relatively  high  percentage  of  families 
have  a  divided  family  budget.  This  division  is  in  a  way  a 
measure  of  the  effective  power  of  individualism  as  a  force 
within  the  family.  The  sharp  decline  in  the  strength  of 
economic  kin-relationships  is  another  example  of  the  growth 
of  individualism.  At  the  same  time,  inequalities  in  the 
division  of  labour  within  the  household  have  been 
diminishing.  Given  these  changes  it  is  not  surprising  to 
find  that  fertility  has  also  been  starting  to  decline  in 
urban  areas,  especially  in  the  middle  class  areas. 
Changes  in  family  morality  and  outlook  are  very 
important  in  bringing  about  changes  in  family  structure. 
These  changes  have  crystalised  in  most  urban  areas  with  the 
emergence  in  physical  terms  of  a  nuclear  family  structure. 
This  has  been  argued  in  the  thesis  to  be  the  first  stage  in 
moving  towards  true  nucleation  of  families  in  social  and 
economic  terms. 
9.3.  FAMILY  STRUCTURE,  DEVELOPMENT  AND  FERTILITY 
The  transition  from  the  extended  physical  family 
structure  to  the  nuclear  family  is  a  significant  step  in 
terms  of  social  reorganisation  and  demographic  change.  The 
nuclear  family  is  more  sensitive  to  economic  changes  than 
to  social  changes  in  the  short  term.  This  is  because  the 
family's  economic  situation  is  affected  more  rapidly  by 
structural  changes  in  the  economy  which  subsequently 
impinge  upon  the  economic  functioning  of  the  family, 
because  of  its  strong  dependence  on  the  "modern"  economic 
context  in  which  it  is  set.  By  contrast  the  social  kinship 
273 bonds  of  the  nuclear  family  are  affected  more  slowly,  being 
subject  to  the  social  norms  operating  in  the  broader 
cultural  environment.  An  important  point  made  by  Goode 
(1963)  in  his  study  of  family  change  was  that  the  nuclear 
family  is  more  flexible  than  the  extended  family  in 
reacting  to  economic  conditions.  Davis  (1955),  and  Davis 
and  Blake  (1956)  expressed  the  same  idea  when  they  found 
that  the  independence  of  the  family  from  kinship  groups  led 
to  lower  fertility  levels. 
It  could  be  argued,  therefore,  that  a  transition  in 
family  structure  could  be  the  most  important  dimension  in 
bringing  about  the  fertility  transition.  Persisting  high 
fertility  levels  in  developing  countries  probably  reflect 
the  persistence  of  traditional  social  norms,  especially  in 
terms  of  the  way  that  these,  norms  relate  to  family 
relationships.  Fertility  decline  may  not  occur  in 
developing  societies  until  social  norms  abandon  the  values 
of  traditional  culture.  This  in  turn  will  allow  the 
family  system  to  begin  its  transition  toward  a  closed 
economic  and  social  nuclear  family.  Therefore,  in  spite  of 
the  fact  that  macro-scale  socio-economic  and  demographic 
analysis  reveals  useful  information  with  regard  to  the 
explanations  of  fertility,  examination  of  the  dynamics  of 
the  family  gives  richer  information  with  regard  to 
understanding  fertility  behaviour. 
Researchers  who  have  studied  fertility  in  the 
developing  countries  have  noticed  that  despite  the  fact 
274 that  some  economic  and  social  development  has  taken  place, 
this  has  not  been  accompanied  as  might  have  been  expected, 
by  a  concomitant  reduction  in  fertility.  The  fact  is  that 
fertility  has  not  been  in  rapid  decline  in  all  developing 
countries  (Adepoju,  1977),  nor  even  in  many  urban  areas 
within  these  countries.  This  has  certainly  been  the 
experience  of  the  Arab  world  (Fargues,  1989).  Adepoju 
(1977)  notes  that  Nigeria  has  recently  achieved  some 
measure  of  real  economic  development,  but  despite  this 
fertility  levels  have  not  started  to  decline.  This  finding 
led  him  to  suggest  that  there  are  other  fundamental  factors 
such  as  the  nature  of  urbanisation  which  account  for  the 
continuing  high  level  of  fertility.  He  notes  that  rural- 
urban  links  remain  very  strong  in  most  developing 
countries,  a  point  upheld  by  Potter  and  Unwin  (1989). 
Associated  with  this  is  the  fact  that  kin  relationships 
also  remain  strong  between  rural  and  urban  communities. 
This  in  turns  can  slow  the  pace  of  family  nucleation  in 
economic  and  social  terms  even  in  large  urban  areas. 
In  the  case  of  Jordan,  the  strength  of  the  migration 
process  may  help  to  explain,  at  least  partially,  why  the 
level  of  fertility  remained  so  high  in  the  1960s  and  early 
1970s  even  in  urban  areas.  Urban  growth  was  very  rapid. 
Urban  areas  rose  from  accounting  for  about  44%  of  the 
population  in  1961  to  59%  in  1979  (Ministry  of  Planning, 
1986).  Most  migrant  families  actively  maintained  their 
links  with  their  kin  in  their  place  of  origin.  This  had 
two  principal'  effects.  First  rural  migrants  who  lived  in 
275 urban  areas,  while  adopting  a  nuclear  family  structure  in 
physical  terms,  kept  up  strong  relations  with  the  other 
members  of  their  family  and  relatives  in  the  place  of 
origin.  Thus,  social  and  economic  links  with  the  extended 
family  remained  despite  the  emergence  of  physical 
nucleation.  Second,  some  of  the  rural  migrants  who  came  to 
urban  areas  chose  to  live  in  the  same  areas  as  other 
migrants  to  whom  they  were  related,  thus  maintaining 
traditional  rural  linkage  patterns  within  the  city. 
In  Amman,  for  example,  there  are  many  residential 
areas  of  the  city  well  known  for  having  clusters  of 
migrants  from  specific  parts  of  the  country  (Samha,  1979). 
This  situation  remains  an  important  factor  promoting  strong 
kin-relationships  within  urban  areas.  These  continuing 
kinship  groups  provide  powerful  support  for  traditional 
family  values  including  the  desire  for  high  fertility. 
It  is  to  be  expected  in  urban  areas  with  this  kind  of 
social  structure  that  the  wealth  flow  direction  will  remain 
upwards.  Fertility  can  not  be  expected  to  start  to  decline 
in  areas  such  as  this  unless  some  transition  occurs  in 
terms  of  the  strength  of  kin-relationships.  The  results  of 
, 
the  last  few  chapters  have  shown,  however,  that  some  change 
is  occurring  in  kin-relationships  and  that  these  trends  are 
having  a  significant  indirect  effect  on  wealth  flow 
directions.  It  could  also  be  the  case  that  fundamental 
changes  in  family  relationships  has  lain  behind  the  onset 
of  fertility  decline  in  Amman  from  the  middle  of  the  1970s. 
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that  upward  wealth  flows  are  found  almost  ubiquitously  in 
rural  areas.  This  direction  of  flow  reflects  the  fact  that 
rural  areas  still  hold  with  what  has  been  termed 
"traditional  morality"  involving  the  dominance  of  the  older 
generation  in  setting  key  social  norms.  In  this  situation, 
it  is  neither  surprising  nor,  irrational  that  fertility 
levels  have  remained  high. 
It  is  to  be  expected  that  the  older  generation's  role 
will  gradually  be  eroded  by  forces  favouring  greater  inter- 
generational  equality  and  individualism.  The  last  chapter 
indicated  that  such  an  erosion  of  traditional  values  has 
already  begun. 
9.4.  FUTURE  FERTILITY  DECLINE 
When  the  complete  nucleation  of  the  family  is 
achieved  in  physical,  economic,  social  and  emotional  terms, 
it  should  be  expected  that  there  will  be  a  substantial 
shift  in  the  values  held  by  family  members  with  regard  to 
fertility.  These  should  assure  future  fertility  decline 
(Caldwell,  1982;  Caldwell,  1987). 
At  present,  however,  in  rural  areas  of  Jordan 
fertility  levels  remain  high  and  show  little  sign  of 
changing  in  the  near  future.  In  urban  areas,  such  as 
Amman,  social,  economic  and  "emotional"  nuclear  familes  are 
beginning  to  appear.  These  changes  have  resulted  in  a 
downward  direction  of  wealth  flows,  and  in  a  reduction  in 
fertility  levels. 
Table  9.1  gives  a  summary  of  some  of  the  fundamental 
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author  has  found  for  Jordan,  and  which  have  been  explored 
in  this  thesis. 
It  should  be  recalled  that  four  terms  defining  kin- 
relationships  as  traditional,  early  transitional,  advanced 
transitional  and  modern  have  been  defined  and  discussed  in 
detail  in  chapter  3.  Families  included  in  the  survey  were 
defined  as  belonging  to  one  of  the  four  categories,  as  a 
result  of  measurement  of  the  strength  of  their  economic  and 
social  ties  with  members  of  the  extended  family.  The  table 
therefore  provides  the  opportunity  for  the  reader  to  see  in 
summary  form  the  way  in  which  a  family's  status  in  terms  of 
its  economical  and  social  linkages  is  associated  with  other 
fertility  related  characteristics.  Statistical  analysis  of 
some  of  these  relationships  has  already  been  explored 
elsewhere  in  this  thesis,  but  the  average  statistical 
values  for  families  in  each  transitional  category  relative 
to  other  socio-demographic  characteristics  is  included  to 
illustrate  the  strength  of  the  basic  idea,  i.  e.  that 
changing  kinship  relations  are  critical  in  affecting  the 
circumstances  of  the  fertility  transition. 
The  figures  of  Table  9.1  demonstrate  how  important 
economic  and  social  nucleation  is  in  bringing  about  other 
changes  within  the  household.  It  is  concluded  that  changes 
in  family  structure  and  organisation  are  amongst  the  most 
important  conditions  in  influencing  the  timing  and 
character  of  the  fertility  transition.  Until  these  changes 
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geographical  and  also  in  a  sociological  sense,  fertility 
levels  will  remain  high.  Fertility  decline  can,  however, 
be  expected  to  occur  more  rapidly  in  the  future*in  those 
urban  environments  of  Jordan  where  change  in  the  family 
structure  is  already  well  advanced. 
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Some  attributes  of  kin-relationships 
families  at  different  stages  in  the 
"traditional"  to  "modern"  structures. 
amongst  Jordanian 
transition  from 
Characteristics  Transitional  Stage 
Trad-  Early  Advanced  Modern 
itional  Transition  Transition 
%  of  heads  of 
households  who  have 
weak  control  over 
their  children  14.7  34.2  44.0  50.0 
%  of  households 
with  a  physical 
family  structure 
which  is  nuclear  73.4  83.4  88.8  91.7 
Average  desired 
family  size  4.7  4.3  4.1  4.0 
Average  completed 
family  size  (for 
mothers  over  45 
years  of  age)  8.6  7.6  6.6  7.1 
of  wives  who  are 
working  (paid  job)  6.2  19.2  16.4  15.3 
%  of  husbands  who 
accept  the  idea  of 
their  wives  working  11.3  21.2  22.4  30.6 
Nature  of  the  family 
budget;  %  of  those 
who  have  a  common 
family  budget  76.8  67.9  63.8  69.4 
Percentage  of  head  of 
household  who  believe 
that  financial  help 
from 
.  relatives  is 
available  22.0  3.6  5.2  0.0 
%  of  respondents 
who  said  that  financial 
help  is  happily  given 
to  relatives  55.9  20.2  16.4  4.2 
%  of  husbands  who 
are  responsible  for 
most  (75+%) 
economic  decisions  65.5  46.1  36.2  34.7 
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Characteristics  Transitional  Stage 
Trad-  Early  Advanced  Modern 
itional  Transition  Transition 
%  of  wives  who  are 
responsible  for  most 
(75+%)  economic 
decisions  1.1  3.1  3.4  12.5 
%  of  heads  of 
household  who  have 
traditional  values 
favouring  high 
fertility  43.5  14.5  15.5  6.9 
%  of  heads  of 
household  who  have 
weak  economic  kin- 
relationships  16.9  34.7  55.2  79.2 
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In  conclusion,  the  above  discussion  has  stressed  the 
cultural  context  of  fertility  change  in  Jordan.  Growing 
individualism,  crumbling  family  relationships,  and'changing 
women's  status  and  roles  in  Jordanian  society  (both  urban 
and  rural  areas)  reveals  that  there  is  a  departure  from  a 
society  being  characterised  by  what  might  be  termed  a 
"theocentric"  culture  to  one  characterised  by  secularism. 
Cäldwell's  theory  (1982)  stressed  the  importance  of 
cultural  changes  in  introducing  fertility  decline. 
Caldwell  (1982,1987)  considered  that  traditional  culture 
or  theocentric  culture  (where  religion  and  culture  may  not 
really  be  distinguished)  provided  support  for  the  system  of 
upward  wealth  flows  in  traditional  society.  Caldwell's 
theory  focussed  on  production  relations,  within  the  family, 
as  a  determinant  of  culture. 
This  assumption,  philosophically,  has  roots  in 
Marxism.  Where  the  production  relations  can  be  considered 
as  a  determinant  of  superstructure,  this  assumption  could 
be  true  to  a  certain  degree.  The  results  of  Chapter  8 
demonstrate  that  wealth  flow  is  the  most  important 
determinant  with  regard  to  motivations  for  fertility. 
However,  at  the  same  time,  it  was  found  that  education  was 
very  important  in  terms  of  fertility  attitudes. 
In  addition  to  the  results  of  Chapter  8,  which  reveal 
how  important  education  is  in  terms  of  fertility  attitude, 
Table  9.2  shows  the  percentage  of  respondents  who  said  that 
the  best  number  of  children  to  have  was  "as  many  as 
282 possible"  without  placing  any  restriction  on  natural 
fertility.  This  attitude  was  found  to  be  significantly 
different  between  respondents  both  when  classified  by 
wealth  flow  and  the  education  level  of  husband  and  wife. 
Indeed,  chi  square  tests  showed  that  the  most  significant 
differences  occurred  between  education  groups  (Table  9.2). 
Therefore,  education  could  have  the  same  or  greater 
influence  on  fertility  change  as  familial  production 
relations.  However,  one  can  note  that  Caldwell  himself 
stressed  that  it  was  only  by  education  that  secularism  is 
brought  about. 
Table  9.2 
Percentage  of  respondents  who  believe  that  the  best  number 
of  children  to  have  is  as  many  as  possible,  classified  by 
wealth  flow  direction  and  education  level,  1988. 
Percentage 
Wealth  flow* 
Upward  wealth  flow  45.0 
Downward  wealth  flow  21.3 
Education  level  of  husband** 
Less  than  secondary 
Secondary  and  college 
University  level 




Less  than  secondary  42.5 
Secondary  and  college  8.6 
University  level  0.0 
Source:  Author's  survey. 
*  Difference  are  significant  (X2  =  31.4,  df  =  1)  at  95% 
level  of  confidence. 
**  Differences  are  signficant  (X2  =  112.2,  df  =  2)  at  95% 
level  of  confidence. 
***  Differences  are  significant  (X2  =  93.8,  df  =  2)  at  95% 
level  of  confidence. 
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CONCLUSIONS  AND  RECOMMENDATIONS 
10.1  FERTILITY  AND  FERTILITY  PREFERENCES 
In  conclusion,  it  is  worth  restating  the  main 
findings  of  this  thesis,  not  only  as  a  means  of 
synthesizing  what  has  been  discovered,  but  also  to  help  to 
emphasize  the  linkages  which  exist  between  the  factors 
influencing  the  different  dimensions  of  fertility  and 
family  change  which  have  been  investigated. 
10.1.1  -  It  has  been  found  that  between  1976  and  1983 
Jordan  was  witnessing  an  onset  of  the  decline  in  fertility. 
This  decline  was  more  rapid  in  urban  areas  than  rural 
areas.  In  contrast,  marital  fertility  levels  were 
relatively  stable  or  slightly  higher  in  some  regions.  It 
was  apparent  that  the  short  duration  of  breastfeeding 
negatively  affected  natural  marital  fertility  levels  in  all 
regions,  which  in  turn  made  marital  fertility  levels  to  be 
slightly  higher  in  the  absence  of  contraceptive  use.  This 
was  especially  true  in  rural  areas.  Except  in  Amman, 
where  contraceptive  use  seemed  to  play  a  significant  role, 
it  is  possible  to  say  that  change  in  marriage  patterns  has 
been  the  most  influential  force  in  changing  overall 
fertility  levels.  The  above  results  are  to  be  expected  in 
a  society  like  Jordan  which  is  experiencing  the  onset  of 
fertility  decline. 
10.1.2  -  Analysis  indicates  that  there  was  a  higher 
percentage  of  Jordanian  women  who  did  not  want  more 
children  in  1983  than  in  1976.  This  was  true  in  all 
284 regions  of  the  country  as  well  as  in  both  urban  and  rural 
environments.  The  data  suggested  that  the  proportion  of 
women  wanting  no  more  children  increased  markedly  through 
time  with  increasing  family  size.  It  is  noticeable  that  in 
Amman,  preferred  family  size  was  much  smaller  than  elsewhere 
in  Jordan. 
Results  demonstrated  that  there  is  a  gap  between  the 
actual  total  fertility  rate  and  the  wanted  total  fertility 
rate  in  the  different  regions  of  Jordan.  These  results 
also  suggest  that  there  is  a  high  potential  for  reduction 
of  the  TFR  in  all  regions  of  the  country.  The  potential 
fertility  decline  remained  stable  in  urban  areas  between 
1976  and  1983.  In  contrast,  it  had  risen  in  rural  areas  by 
1983. 
10.2  INTERMEDIATE  VARIABLES:  MARRIAGE,  BREASTFEEDING  AND 
CONTRACEPTIVE  USE 
There  is  an  indication  of  changes  in  the  pattern  of 
marriage  in  Jordan.  These  changes  have  been  in  the  age  at 
marriage  and  in  the  proportion  married. 
Differences  in  age  at  marriage  between  different 
regions  are  relatively  small.  Widowhood  is  the  major  cause 
of  the  disolution  of  marriage  in  all  regions  of  Jordan. 
Duration  of  breastfeeding  is  decreasing.  The 
decrease  among  the  rural  areas  was  more  rapid  than  in  urban 
areas.  Regional  differences  were  not,  however,  very  big. 
Partial  breastfeeding  is  found  throughout  Jordan.  A 
considerable  percentage  of  women  give  their  children  non- 
285 maternal  milk  and  nourishment  at  a  very  early  age.  This 
partial  breastfeeding  emerged  in  all  of  the  different 
regions  of  Jordan. 
The  proportion  of  couples  of  childbearing  age 
practicing  contraception  increased  in  all  urban  and  rural 
areas  between  1976  and  1983.  There  were  remarkable 
regional  differences. 
Results  suggested  that  women  used  contraceptives  for 
controlling  rather  than  for  spacing  births.  The  proportion 
of  women  who  use  highly  effective  methods  increased  between 
1976  and  1983  in  all  regions.  Results  reveal  that  the 
proportion  of  women  who  use  IUD  methods  increased  very 
rapidly  in  all  regions. 
10.3  FAMILY  CHANGE 
10.3.1  -  It  was  clear  that  economic  mechanisms  were  behind 
the  changes  in  nomadic  societies  in  Jordan.  These  economic 
changes  favoured  the  emergence  of  the  physical  nuclear 
family.  The  strength  of  economic  kin-relationships  has 
been  considerably  reduced  in  Jordan,  particularly  in  urban 
areas.  Social  kin-relationships  have  also  been  declining 
in  importance  in  urban  areas,  but  more  slowly  than  the 
decline  in  economic  kin-relationships.  While  in  rural 
areas  social  kin-relationships  are  still  strong  there  is 
evidence  of  an  onset  of  decline.  The  data  suggests  that 
the  nucleation  of  the  family  will  probably  take  place  in 
the  following  sequence:  - 
-  first,  a  physical  nuclear  family  structure  will  emerge. 
286 -  second,  kinship  links  in  economic  terms  will  weaken  until 
they  are  conformable  with  the  "economic  closure"  of  the 
nuclear  family. 
-  third,  social  kinship  relations  will  weaken  as  a  result 
of  the  emergence  of  the  closed  economic  structure  of  the 
nuclear  family. 
-  fourth,  in  emotional  terms  the  nuclear  family  will 
emerge. 
These  changes  have  crystalised  to  a  certain  degree  in 
urban  areas.  In  rural  areas  the  data  shows  that  there 
remains  some  familial  stability  in  terms  of  traditional 
family  relationships. 
10.3.2  -  Women  in  nomadic  society  used  to  work  hard  from 
early  morning  until  late  at  night.  But  when  the  changes, 
especially  economic  ones,  took  place  in  this  society  the 
role  of  women  also  changed. 
In  rural  areas  women  now  perform  only  a  few  of  the 
duties  which  they  had  previously  undertaken.  But  the  data 
suggests  that  in  rural  areas  women's  status  and  role  do  not 
play  as  important  a  role  in  demographic  decision  making  as 
in  urban  areas.  In  cities,  their  status  and  role  have  been 
improving  significantly  in  recent  years. 
For  example,  women  have  recieved  more  power  in 
economic  matters,  especially  salaried  women.  Women's 
levels  of  education  have  been  improving.  In  spite  of  the 
fact  that  women's  status  is  now  less  prescribed  by  society 
in  urban  areas,  and  especially  Amman,  cultural  influences 
287 are  still  the  most  important  determinants  of  women's  status 
and  role. 
10.4  COSTS  AND  BENEFITS  OF  CHILDREN 
10.4.1  -  In  urban  areas  families  mostly  do  not  expect  any 
financial  gain  from  their  children,  while  in  rural  areas  it 
is  vice  versa.  Respondents  expect  financial  help  from 
their  children,  especially  from  educated  children.  They 
emphasised  that  they  wanted  their  children  to  be  highly 
educated. 
The  direct  cost  of  children,  in  middle  class  urban 
areas  is  relatively  low,  while  in  the  lower  class  urban 
areas,  in  the  rural  south  and  the  rural  north,  it  is  still 
relatively  high.  Therefore,  most  families  in  these  areas 
reported  that  they  had  some  economic  difficulties 
associated  with  child  rearing.  Families  in  lower  class 
urban  areas,  northern  rural  and  southern  rural  areas, 
emphasised  economic  reasons  for  stopping  having  children, 
while  in  middle  class  urban  areas  families  emphasised 
social  reasons  for  stopping  having  children. 
10.4.2  -  Traditional  relationships  between  fathers  and 
children  are  no  longer  so  strong  in  urban  areas.  Although 
there  is  an  erosion  of  loyalty  to  fathers  in  rural  areas, 
familial  relations  have  remained  strong. 
10.4.3  -  Economic  assistance  of  parents  by  children  (both 
single  and  married  sons  and  daughters)  still  occurs  in  both 
urban  and  rural  areas,  but  it  is  less  marked  in  urban 
areas.  In  middle  class  urban  areas  more  than  half  of 
all  children  in  waged  employment  do  not  help  their  parents 
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intermediate  level  of  assistance  between  the  levels 
reported  in  the  rural  areas  and  that  of  the  middle  class 
districts  of  Amman. 
10.4.4  -  The  data  suggests  that  rural-urban  migration  may 
be  one  of  the  most  important  processes  conducive  to  an 
increase  in  the  perceived  value  of  children,  and  in  turn, 
rural  migration  is  the  most  important  mechanism  in 
introducing  change  to  the  rural  economy  and  society. 
10.4.5  -  In  rural  areas  respondents  emphasised  "Family 
name",  "prestige"  and  "old  age  security"  as  motives  for 
having  high  fertility.  But  differences  between  urban  and 
rural  areas  are  evident. 
10.5  DETERMINANTS  OF  ATTITUDES  TOWARD  FERTILITY 
It  is  obvious  that  the  education  level  of  both  the 
wife  and  husband  plays  an  important  role  in  terms  of 
fertility  attitudes.  The  education  level  of  wives,  in 
urban  areas,  seems  to  be  the  most  important  variable  in 
determining  the  best  number  of  children,  and  of 
contraceptive  use. 
The  statistical  results  which  have  been  reported 
reveal  that  social  and  economic  kin-relationships  also  have 
a  significant  influence  on  fertility  attitudes.  In  urban 
areas  social  kin-relationships  were  relatively  more 
significant  than  economic  ones.  In  rural  areas  economic 
kin-relationships  appeared  to  be  relatively  more 
significant  than  social  kin-relationships.  The  survey 
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most  significant  influence  on  motivations  for  having  high 
fertility.  That  is  to  say  as  wealth  flow  direction 
changed,  so  also  did  people's  perceptions  of  the  importance 
of  having  many  children  in  order  to  maintain  the  family's 
name,  to  have  security  in  old  age,  prestige,  economic 
benefits  from  children,  and  happiness. 
Source  of  income  was  of  some  significance  in  relation 
to  contraceptive  use  in  urban  areas,  suggesting  that  in 
urban  areas  economic  factors  have  a  particularly  strong 
influence  on  attempts  to  control  fertility.  It  would  seem 
that  fertility  attitudes  are  changing  in  a  general  fashion 
as  one  moves  to  younger  generations.  This  might  be  taken 
to  support  a  passive  "diffusionist"  perspective  of 
demographic  change,  but  in  practice  generational 
differences  are  minor  by  comparison  with  the  active  agents 
of  change  which  are  associated  with  education  and  economic 
forces. 
10.6  DETERMINANTS  OF  WEALTH  FLOW 
Data  analysis  shows  that  social  and  economic  kin- 
relationships  are  the  most  important  variables  in  terms  of 
wealth  flow.  In  urban  and  rural  areas  kin-relationships 
have  had  most  influence  on  wealth  flow  directions.  It  was 
also  found  that  the  education  level  of  wives  in  urban  area 
had  a  significant  impact  on  wealth  flow  directions.  But  in 
rural  areas  it  seems  that  women's  status  and  roles  do  not 
play  as  important  a  role  and  male  education  and  outlook 
remains  more  critical. 
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The  highly  significant  differences  between  urban  and 
rural  areas  -  with  regard  to  familial  relationships,  wealth 
flow  direction,  and  fertility  attitudes,  etc.,  suggest  that 
a  significant  cultural  change  has  been  taking  place  in 
Jordan.  The  precise  nature  of  these  cultural  changes  are 
inevitably  very  hard  to  define,  but  it  does  seem  clear  that 
traditional  cultural  values  are  now  held  by  only  a  small 
percentage  of  families  in  urban  areas.  In  rural  areas 
these  traditional  cultural  values  are,  however,  still 
widespread.  This  in  turn,  has  played  a  strong  role  in 
influencing  kin-relationships,  and  the  direction  of  wealth 
flow,  and  as  a  result  has  been  critical  in  affecting 
fertility  attitudes. 
In  urban  areas,  especially  in  middle  class  ones, 
individualism  in  general  is  greater  than  elsewhere  in  the 
country.  In  the  Amman  Conurbation  a  relatively  high 
percentage  of  families  have  a  divided  family  budget.  Also, 
there  has  been  a  sharp  decline  in  the  strength  of  economic 
kin-relationships. 
In  rural  Jordan  the  first  indicators  of  increased 
individualism  are  readily  observable.  Economic  changes 
have  profoundly  affected  peoples'  ways  of  making  a  living, 
with  the  family  no  longer  depending  on  tribal  modes  of 
production  but  rather  with  familial  relations  becoming 
monetised  through  the  establishment  of  a  common  family 
budget  which  is  at  least  partially  independent  of  the 
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remain  strong.  Elder  generations  continue  to  command 
respect  from  the  younger  and  males  dominate  the  most 
powerful  familial  roles.  There  is,  therefore,  some'familial 
stability  in  terms  of  traditional  familial  values. 
10.8  FERTILITY  TRANSITION 
It  is  concluded  that  changes  in  family  structure  and 
organisation  are  amongst  the  most  important  conditions  in 
influencing  the  timing  and  character  of  the  fertility 
transition.  Until  these  changes  occur  throughout  all  of 
Jordanian  society  both  in  a  geographical  and  also  in  a 
sociological  sense,  fertility  levels  will  remain  high. 
Fertility  decline  can,  however,  be  expected  to  occur  more 
rapidly  in  the  future  in  those  urban  environments  of  Jordan 
where  change  in  the  family  structure  is  already  well 
advanced. 
10.9  RECOMMENDATIONS  FOR  FUTURE  RESEARCH 
It  has  been  found  that  recently  there  is  an  emphasis 
on  cultural  issues  amongst  researchers  working  in 
population  studies,  especially  on  fertility.  This  surge  of 
interest  reflects  the  importance  of  studying  culture  (or 
values  system)  in  order  to  achieve  a  deeper  understanding 
of  fertility  behaviour. 
This  author  here  would  like  to  support  this  trend  in 
development  in  population  studies.  There  can  be  little 
doubt  that  studying  the  cultural  dimension  of  fertility 
behaviour  is  a  pre-requisite  to  achieving  a  better 
explanation  of  spatial  and  historical  variations  in 
292 fertility  levels.  It  is  hard  to  conceive  of  convincing 
explanations  being  achieved  of  trends  in  fertility  and  of 
the  speed  of  change  in  internal  and  external  familial 
relationships  without  a  more  profound  understanding  being 
reached  of  the  mechanisms  bringing  about  change  in  value 
systems  in  society.  Therefore,  the  author  suggests  that 
the  basis  of  value  systems  be  studied  in  Jordan  and 
elsewhere  as  an  important  item  on  any  future  research 
agenda  involving  population  studies.  Such  research  should 
consider  the  following  items:  - 
1.  Social  and  economic  mutual  obligations  between  - 
a)  parents  and  their  children,  as  compared  to 
sons/daughters 
b)  husband  and  wife 
c)  relatives,  and  the  relative  significance  of  men  and 
women  in  these  relations 
2.  Women's  status  and  roles. 
3.  Conjugal  roles. 
4.  Parental  roles. 
5.  Decision  making,  and  the  relative  significance  of  men 
and  women  in  decision  making  tasks. 
6.  The  participation  of  men  as  opposed  to  women  in 
leisure,  sports,  cinema,  and  artistic  activities. 
The  above  mentioned  items  could  be  studied  relative 
0to 
commitment  to  a  reli 
ýý  s 
people's  giom  or  secular  stand 
point.  This  comparison  would  be  very  useful  in  revealing 
the  process  of  cultural  change,  which,  in  turn,  would  help 
293 towards  achieving  a  better  understanding  of  fertility 
behaviour. 
It  should  be  stressed  here  that  understanding  the 
source  of  culture  is  absolutely  essential.  The  source  of 
culture  remains  a  strongly  debated  issue.  Some  researchers 
consider  it  a  product  of  the  means  and  relations  of 
production,  and  claim  that  it  has  no  other  source. 
Religion  could,  however,  be  cited  as  one  independent 
important  source  of  culture.  The  importance  of  examining 
the  source  of  culture  is  therefore  evident.  In  the  long 
term  such  advances  would  help  towards  explaining  why  some 
values  resist  change  and  dominate  for  a  long  time,  while 
others  disappear  relatively  quickly. 
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m 7.  After  marriage,  head  of  the  household  lived: 
a)  With  parents  but  now  independent 
b)  With  parents  and  still  living  with  them 
c)  In  separate  house 
8.  Do  any  of  your  relatives  live  in  a  house  adjoined  to 
yours? 
a)  Parents 
b)  Sons,  daughters 
c)  Brothers,  sisters 
d)  Wife's  family 
e)  Uncles,  aunts 
f)  Other  relatives 
9.  If  the  answer  of  Q.  8  is  yes,  do  you  share  meals? 
a)  Yes,  daily 
b)  Yes,  weekly 
.  c)  Yes,  sometimes 
d)  Never 
10.  If  the  answer  of  Q.  8  is  yes,  do  you  have  a  shared 
budget? 
a)  Yes,  sharing 
b)  Sometimes 
c)  Never 
11.  Number  of  children  ever  born 
a)  Male 
b)  Female 
c)  Total 
316 12.  According  to  your  opinion,  what  is  the  best  number  of 
children  to  have? 
13.  What  are  the  reasons  for  stopping  having  children? 
a)  Economic  reasons  (family  income) 
b)  Social  reasons,  parents  can  enjoy  their  time  freely 
c)  Women's  work 
d)  Worry  of  future  of  children 
e)  Other 
14.  Do  you  agree  that  a  large  number  of  children'  keeps 
family  name  carried  for  generations? 
a)  Strongly  agree 
b)  Possibly  true 
c)  Do  not  agree 
15.  Do  you  agree  that  a  large  number  of  children  guarantees 
security  in  old  age? 
a)  Strongly  agree 
b)  Possibly  true 
c)  Do  not  agree 
16.  Do  you  agree  that  a  large  number  of  children  gives  the 
family  prestige? 
a)  Strongly  agree 
b)  Possibly  true 
c)  Do  not  agree 
17.  Do  you  agree  that  a  large  number  of  children  will 
economically  benefit  the  family? 
a)  Strongly  agree 
b)  Possibly  true 
c)  Do  not  agree 
317 18.  Do  you  agree  that  a  large  number  of  children  brings 
happiness  to  the  family? 
a)  Strongly  agree 
b)  Possibly  true 
c)  Do  not  agree 
19.  What  is  the  minimum  level  of  education  you  would  like 
your  sons  to  obtain? 
a)  Primary 
b)  Preparatory 
c)  Secondary 
d)  College 
e)  University  (BA) 
f)  University  (MA,  PhD) 
20.  What  is  the  minimum  level  of  education  you  would  like 
your  daughters  to  obtain? 
a)  Primary 
b)  Preparatory 
c)  Secondary 
d)  College 
e)  University  (BA) 
f)  University  (MA,  PhD) 
318 21.  How  do  you  evaluate  your  social  relationships  with  the 
the  following  relatives? 
Strong  Ordinary  Weak  and  no 







22.  How  do  you  evaluate  your  economic  relationships  with 
the  following  relatives  (in  the  sense  of  mutual 
financial  help). 
Strong  Ordinary  Weak  and  no 







23.  Do  you  believe  that  financial  help  among  relatives  is 
available? 
Available  Available  to  Not 
a  certain  degree  available 
From  children 
to  parents 
Among  brothers 
Among  relatives 
319 24.  Do  you  believe  that  mutual  helps  among  relatives  is: 
a)  more  monetary  than  services 
b)  more  services  than  monetary 
c)  both  equal 
25.  Is  the  financial  help  among  relatives  happily  given? 
a)  Yes 
b)  No  (but  because  of  social  pressure) 
26.  Does  your  wife  work? 
a)  Yes  (at  home) 
b)  Yes  (outside  the  home) 
c)  No 
27.  Source  of  family  income? 
0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100 











28.  What  is  your  job?  (For  employees) 
29.  What  type  of  business  do  you  have? 
320 30.  Financial  help  from  working  children: 
Sex  Place  of  work  Pattern  of  help 
M  The  Outside  Abroad  No  Only  Regularly 
F  same  city/  help  when 
city/  village  in 
village  need 
single 
Married 
31.  Are  you  satisfied  with  the  financial  help  from  your 
children? 
Sex  Satisfaction 
M  Completely  Relatively  Not 
F  Satisfied  Satisfied  Satisfied 
Single 
Married 
32.  What  type  of  family  budget  do  you  have? 
a)  Common  family  budget 
b)  The  wife  has  partially  separated  budget 
c)  The  wife  has  completely  separated  budget 
d)  Children  have  partially  separated  budget 
e)  Children  have  completely  separated  budget 
33.  Responsibility  for  economic  decisions: 
Less  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100 
%%%%%%%%%% 







321 34.  What  is  the  perceived  direct  cost  of  children? 
a)  Less  than  30%  of  income 
b)  30-50%  of  income 
c)  More  than  50%  of  income 
35.  Do  you  have  any  financial  difficulties  with  regard  to 
cost  of  children? 
a)  Always  difficulties 
b)  Some  difficulties 
c)  No  difficulties 
36.  How  do  you  evaluate  the  financial  help  from  your 
working  children? 
a)  Money  flow  more  than  cost 
b)  Money  flow  less  than  cost 
c)  Money  flow  and  cost  are  the  same 
37.  How  do  you  perceive  the  future  financial  help  from  your 
children?  (For  fathers  who  have  unworking  children) 
a)  Money  flow  more  than  cost 
b)  Money  flow  less  than  cost 
c)  Money  flow  and  cost  are  the  same 
d)  No  expectation  of  help 
38.  According  to  your  opinion  which  is  better  for  women  to 
go  for  work  (outside  home)  or  to  stay  at  home? 
a)  Work  outside  home 
b)  Stay  at  home 
322 39.  How  do  you  evaluate  your  relationships  with  your 
children  with  regard  to  obedience? 
a)  Strong  relation 
b)  Average  relation 
c)  Weak  relation 
40.  Are  you/is  your  wife,  practicing  any  type  of 
contraceptive  use? 
a)  Yes 
b)  No 
41.  Which  makes  you  more  satisfied  to  see  your  children 
work: 
a)  in  agriculture/shepherd 
b)  as  employees 
42.  Which  makes  you  more  satisfied  to  see  you  children 
work: 
a)  in  agriculture/shepherd 
b)  go  to  school  and  university 
323 APPENDIX  2 
List  of  variables  used  in  the  thesis. 
Variable  name  Variable  label 
Wealth  flow  direction  WEALTH 
Social  kin-relationships  RELSOC 
Economic  kin-relationships  RELECO 
Area  of  interview  AREAINT 
Education  level  of  husbands  RIEDUC 
Education  level  of  wives  -  R2EDUC 
Source  of  income  INCSOU 
Age  of  husbands  RIDOBYR 
Actual  number  of  children  CHILD 
Best  number  of  children  BESTNC 
Motivations  for  having  a  high  fertility  MOTIV 
Contraceptive  use  CONUSE 
Wife's  work  - 
Economic  decision-making  - 
Financial  help  among  relatives  - 
Nature  of  the  family  budget  - 
Husband's  opinion  towards  wife's  work  - 
Family  structure  - 
Father-children  relationships  - 
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